Magistrate Recommends Dismissal of Frivolous Claim

Landis Deluan Franklin,
Plaintiff,
v.
United States of America,
Defendant.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Landis Deluan Franklin (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action purportedly against the United States of America. [Doc. 1 at 1–2.] Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed on September 16, 2019. [Doc. 1-1.] This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C. Having reviewed the Amended Complaint and each of Plaintiff's submissions filed in this case, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that this action should be summarily dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint against the United States of America. [Doc. 1 at 1–2.] Plaintiff asserted that this Court had diversity jurisdiction over this matter, but he failed to provide any additional allegations or information to support that assertion. [Id. at 3.] In the statement of the claim section of the Complaint, Plaintiff simply alleged: “Status of citizenship as American Indian.” [Id. at 5.] For his relief, Plaintiff stated: “Tax free citizen — foreigner living in US. Refund of Taxes paid.” [Id.] Plaintiff made no other allegations in his Complaint.

By Order dated August 19, 2019, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies in his original Complaint identified by the Court. [Doc. 10.] Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed on September 16, 2019. [Doc. 1-1.] In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff again asserts that the basis for this Court's jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff makes no other allegations concerning this Court's jurisdiction. In the statement of the claim section of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, verbatim,

[Id. at 4.] Plaintiff makes no other allegations in his Amended Complaint. As attachments to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has filed several documents, including his birth certificate and a document entitled “Affidavit of Title (Statement of Beneficial Ownership).” [Doc. 1-3 at 3–4.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).

Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, this Court possesses the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous, even if the complaint were not subject to the prescreening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307S08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”) (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua sponte, and it exists independent of the 'defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules.”); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing a judge may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without issuing a summons or following other procedural requirements).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff appears to allege that he is entitled to a refund of his federal income taxes because of his status as an American Indian.¹ [Doc. 1 at 5.] This action is subject to summary dismissal because the Pleadings fail to state a claim for relief and are legally frivolous.

As noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows the litigant to commence a federal court action without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. See Staley v. Witherspoon, No. 9:07-cv-195-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 1988272, at *1 (D.S.C. July 3, 2007). However, the statute provides limitations to such actions by permitting the Court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous or malicious.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). A complaint is deemed frivolous when it is “clearly baseless” and includes allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327–28 (1989)).

In reviewing for frivolousness or malice, the Court looks to see whether the complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (M.D.N.C. 2004). The Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review a complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, it is well-settled that the Court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).

Liberally construed, the Pleadings appear to assert that Plaintiff is entitled to a refund of his taxes because he is a “[t]ax free citizen” based on his status as an American Indian and/or foreigner. [Doc. 1 at 5.] The Court finds that Plaintiff's bare allegations clearly fall within the statute's definition of frivolity. Plaintiff's conclusory assertions fail to state a cognizable claim for relief. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Brock v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952, 953–54 (4th Cir. 1997).

Further, Plaintiff has failed to allege any specific facts against the named Defendant. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading). The Pleadings contain no allegations of wrongdoing against the named Defendant, which is present only in the caption of the Pleadings. As a result, no plausible claim is stated against the named Defendant, which is entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter, 497 F.2d at 1207; Newkirk, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2. In the absence of substantive allegations of wrongdoing against the named Defendant, the Court is unable to liberally construe any type of plausible cause of action arising from the Pleadings against them. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining statute allowing dismissal of in forma pauperis claims encompasses complaints that are either legally or factually baseless); Weller, 901 F.2d at 389 n.2 (finding dismissal proper where there were no allegations to support claim).

Finally, this action is subject to summary dismissal because it does not appear that the Court possesses jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999). There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). As such, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]” Generally, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over two types of cases, referred to as (1) federal question cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Plaintiff purports to bring this action pursuant to this Court's diversity jurisdiction. The diversity statute requires complete diversity of the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Anderson v. Caldwell, No. 3:10-cv-1906-CMC-JRM, 2010 WL 3724752, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3724671 (D.S.C. Sept. 15, 2010). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that he meets the amount in controversy requirement under the statute. Dismissal of a diversity action for want of jurisdiction is justified only where it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the jurisdictional amount. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)). Here, Plaintiff's Pleadings are completely devoid of any allegations concerning the statutory amount in controversy. Thus, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Federal question jurisdiction arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that the “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To determine whether a plaintiff's claims “arise under” the laws of the United States, courts typically use the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which focuses on the allegations of the complaint. Prince v. Sears Holdings Corp., 848 F.3d 173, 177 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004)). “In other words, federal question jurisdiction exists 'only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly-pleaded complaint.'” Burbage v. Richburg, 417 F. Supp. 2d 746, 749 (D.S.C. 2006) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2003)). Here, the Pleadings contain no allegations that Defendant has violated a federal statute or constitutional provision, nor is any source of federal question jurisdiction otherwise evident from the face of the Complaint. Therefore, federal question jurisdiction does not appear to exist in this case. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege facts in the Pleadings to establish that this Court has jurisdiction over his claims under either federal question or diversity grounds.

CONCLUSION

Consequently, for the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.²

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge

September 18, 2019
Greenville, South Carolina

Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).