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Supreme Court Review Sought in Puerto Rico SSI Benefits Case

SEP. 4, 2020

United States v. Jose Luis Vaello-Madero

DATED SEP. 4, 2020
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES

United States v. Jose Luis Vaello-Madero

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PETITIONER
v.
JOSE LUIS VAELLO-MADERO

In the Supreme Court of the United States

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JEFFREY B. WALL
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record

EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
VIVEK SURI
Assistant to the Solicitor General

ABBY C. WRIGHT
LAURA E. MYRON
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Congress violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security Income — a program that provides benefits to needy aged, blind, and disabled individuals — in the 50 States and the District of Columbia, and in the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to a negotiated covenant, but not extending it to Puerto Rico.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (D.P.R.):

United States v. Vaello-Madero, No. 17-cv-2133 (Feb. 4, 2019)

United States Court of Appeals (1st Cir.):

United States v. Vaello-Madero, No. 19-1390 (Apr. 10, 2020)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions below.

Jurisdiction..

Statutory provisions involved.

Statement:

A. Legal background

B. Factual background and proceedings below Reasons for granting the petition

A. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect

B. The decision below warrants this Court's review Conclusion.

Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion (Apr. 10, 2020) Appendix B — District court opinion and order (Feb. 4, 2019)

Appendix C — District court opinion and order (May 14, 2018)

Appendix D — Statutory provisions.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)

Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978)

Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937)

Chase Manhattan Bank (National Ass'n) v. South Acres Development Co.,434 U.S. 236 (1978)

Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937)

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U.S. 43 (2015).

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)

FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993)

Financial Oversight & Management Board v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020)

Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964)

Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) passim

Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)..

Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019)

Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979)

King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)

Lyng v. International Union, United Automobile,

Aerospace, & Agricultural Implementation Workers of America, 485 U.S. 360 (1988)

Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940)

Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977)

Maricopa County v. Lopez-Valenzuela, 574 U.S. 1006 (2014)

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)

Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880)

Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019)

Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (1990)

Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914)

Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977)

Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017)

Peña-Martinez v. Azar, No. 18-1206, 2020 WL 4437859 (D.P.R. Aug. 3, 2020)..

Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016)

Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).

Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)

Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954)

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012)

United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010)

United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020)..

Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979)

Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015)

Constitution, statutes, and rules:

U.S. Const.:

Art. I:

§§ 2-3

§ 8, Cl. 1

Art. II, § 2

Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2

Territory Clause

Amend. V

Due Process Clause..

Amend. XIV

Equal Protection Clause

Social Security Amendments of 1972, Tit. II, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465-14782

7 U.S.C. 2012(r)

26 U.S.C. 881

26 U.S.C. 882

26 U.S.C. 933

26 U.S.C. 2209

26 U.S.C. 5314

26 U.S.C. 7652

26 U.S.C. 7701

28 U.S.C. 1345

42 U.S.C. 408(a)(4)

42 U.S.C. 623(a)-(b)

42 U.S.C. 801(a)(2)

42 U.S.C. 1308(a)(1)

42 U.S.C. 1308(f)-(g)

42 U.S.C. 13813

42 U.S.C. 1381 note

42 U.S.C. 1381a

42 U.S.C. 1382

42 U.S.C. 1382(f )(1)

42 U.S.C. 1382 note

42 U.S.C. 1382c

42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(1)(B)(i)

42 U.S.C. 1382c(e)

42 U.S.C. 1383

42 U.S.C. 1383 note

42 U.S.C. 1384 note

42 U.S.C. 1385 note

42 U.S.C. 1395w-114(a)

42 U.S.C. 1396d(b)

42 U.S.C. 1760(f  )

48 U.S.C. 1801 & note

Sup. Ct. R. 10(c)

Miscellaneous:

Gary Burtless & Orlando Sotomayor, Labor Supply and Public Transfers, in The Economy of Puerto Rico: Restoring Growth (Susan M. Collins et al. eds., 2006)

Memorandum from Michael Stephens, Supervisory Actuary, Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration, to Steve Goss, Chief Actuary, Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration, Estimated Change in Federal SSI Program Cost for Potential Extension of SSI Eligibility to Residents of Certain U.S. Territories —

INFORMATION (June 11, 2020), https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/SSIEligExt_20200611.pdf

Social Security Administration, SSI Monthly Statistics, June 2020, Tbl. 1 (released July 2020), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi_monthly/2020-05/table01.html


PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Acting Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-37a) is reported at 956 F.3d 12. The opinion and order of the district court (App., infra, 38a-49a) are reported at 356 F. Supp. 3d 208. An additional opinion and order of the district court (App., infra, 50a-60a) are reported at 313 F. Supp. 3d 370.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on April 10, 2020. On March 19, 2020, this Court extended the time within which to file any petition for a writ of certiorari due on or after that date to 150 days from the date of the lower court judgment. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Relevant statutory provisions are reprinted in an appendix to this brief. App., infra, 61a-64a.

STATEMENT

A. Legal Background

1. In 1972, Congress created the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, a benefits program that is administered by the Social Security Administration and that provides monthly cash payments to aged, blind, and disabled individuals who lack the financial means to support themselves. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Tit. III, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465-1478. To be eligible, a person must be age 65 years or over, blind, or disabled; must have income and assets that fall below specified limits; and must fulfill certain other statutory qualifications. 42 U.S.C. 1382, 1382c, 1383. More than 8 million individuals receive SSI payments each month, and the average monthly federal benefit is around $575. See Social Security Administration, SSI Monthly Statistics, June 2020, Tbl. 1 (released July 2020).

When Congress created SSI in 1972, it made the pro-gram available in the 50 States and the District of Columbia, but not in Puerto Rico and other Territories. Congress provided, subject to exceptions not at issue here, that a person must be “a resident of the United States” to qualify for SSI, 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(1)(B)(i); that a person who stays “outside the United States” for the entirety of a month may not receive SSI benefits for that month, 42 U.S.C. 1382(f )(1); and that the term “ 'United States' ” means “the 50 States and the District of Columbia” for purposes of those provisions, 42 U.S.C. 1382c(e). Congress later extended SSI to the Northern Mariana Islands, in accordance with the covenant to establish the Islands as a Commonwealth in political union with the United States. 48 U.S.C. 1801 & note. But Congress has not similarly extended SSI to Puerto Rico or other Territories.

Congress instead provides federal assistance to needy aged, blind, and disabled individuals in Puerto Rico through a different program — Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD). App., infra, 32a. AABD originally operated in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, but in 1972, Congress replaced AABD with SSI in the 50 States and the District of Columbia while leaving it in place in Puerto Rico. Ibid. AABD provides more local control but less federal funding than SSI. Under SSI, the federal government sets eligibility criteria, determines the amount of the federal benefits, and pays the full amount of those benefits and the associated administrative costs. 42 U.S.C. 1381, 1381a. Under AABD, by contrast, the government of Puerto Rico sets its own income and asset limits and determines its own benefit amounts, while the federal government pays 75% of the benefits and 50% of the administrative costs, subject to a statutory cap on total expenditures. 42 U.S.C. 1381 note, 1382 note, 1383 note, 1384 note, 1385 note. The income limit and benefit level for AABD are lower than for SSI. App., infra, 32a-33a & n.27. AABD thus covers fewer people and provides a lower level of benefits than SSI would have done had it been available in Puerto Rico. Id. at 32a-33a

2. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam), this Court summarily reversed a three-judge 
district court's decision holding that the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the SSI program violated the Constitution. Id. at 2-3, 5. In particular, the Court rejected the contention that the statutory scheme “unconstitutionally burdened the right of interstate travel” because individuals who “mov[ed] to Puerto Rico” would “los[e] the benefits to which they were entitled while residing in the United States.” Id. at 2-4. The Court explained that it “ha[d] never held that the constitutional right to travel embraces any such doctrine.” Id. at 4. The Court observed that the challenger “had also relied on the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause,” but noted that even the district court had “apparently acknowledged that Congress has the power to treat Puerto Rico differently.” Id. at 3 n.4. Finally, the Court stated that, “[s]o long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket.” Id. at 5 (citations omitted). The Court explained that “[a]t least three reasons have been advanced to explain the exclusion of persons in Puerto Rico from the SSI program”: (1) “because of the unique tax status of Puerto Rico, its residents do not contribute to the public treasury”; (2) “the cost of including Puerto Rico would be extremely great”; and (3) “inclusion in the SSI program might seriously disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.” Id. at 5 n.7.

Two years later, in Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (per curiam), this Court summarily reversed a decision in which a district court had held unconstitutional the lower level of reimbursement for Puerto Rico than for the States and the District of Columbia under another federal benefits program — Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The Court rejected the claim that the different treatment of Puerto Rico violated “the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee,” explaining that, under the Territory Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2, Congress “may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions.” Rosario, 446 U.S. at 651-652. The Court noted that, in Torres, it had “concluded that a similar statutory classification was rationally grounded on three factors: Puerto Rican residents do not contribute to the federal treasury; the cost of treating Puerto Rico as a State under the statute would be high; and greater benefits could disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.” Id. at 652. The Court observed that the “same considerations” supported the different treatment of Puerto Rico under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, and it “s[aw] no reason to depart from [its] conclusion” in Torres “that they suffice to form a rational basis for the challenged statutory classification.” Ibid.

B. Factual Background And Proceedings Below

1. Respondent Jose Luis Vaello Madero is a citizen of the United States who is “afflicted with severe health problems.” App., infra, 3a. Respondent lived in New York from 1985 to 2013, and he started receiving SSI payments there in 2012. Ibid.

Respondent moved from New York to Puerto Rico in July 2013, and, as a result, lost his eligibility to receive SSI benefits. App., infra, 3a-4a. But respondent failed to notify the Social Security Administration of his move, and the agency continued to make SSI payments to him through his bank account in New York for several more years. Id. at 3a-4a, 39a. The agency eventually became aware of respondent's change of residence in 2016, whereupon it informed him that it was discontinuing his SSI benefits with retroactive effect. Id. at 3a-4a.

2. In August 2017, the government sued respondent in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, seeking restitution of $28,081 in SSI benefits that it had incorrectly paid him from August 2013 to August 2016. App., infra, 4a, 40a. Respondent filed an answer in which he challenged the constitutionality of Congress's exclusion of Puerto Rico from SSI. Id. at 5a.

The government moved to dismiss its claims without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). D. Ct. Doc. 23, at 3-5 (Mar. 14, 2018).* The district court denied the motion, explaining that respondent opposed dismissal without prejudice and that such a dismissal would “unfairly harm” respondent by leaving the United States free to recommence the suit in the future. App., infra, 54a; see id. at 50a-60a. The court also emphasized that allowing this case to move forward would enable the federal courts to “revisit” Torres and Rosario — cases that the court described as “erroneous,” “outdated,” “anachronistic,” and “ripe for reconsideration.” Id. at 55a, 57a-59a.

Then, in February 2019, the district court granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment, denied the government's cross-motion for summary judgment, and concluded that the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the SSI program violates the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. App., infra, 38a-49a. The court suggested that Congress may have excluded Puerto Rico in order to harm citizens “of Hispanic origin,” but found it unnecessary to consider that theory further because it believed that the exclusion of Puerto Rico failed even “rational basis scrutiny.” Id. at 45a-46a. The court concluded that “the principal purpose of the statute is to impose inequality,” and it rejected the government's contentions that the statute reflected valid distinctions between Puerto Rico and the States. Id. at 46a (brackets and citation omit-ted). In a footnote, the court dismissed the government's reliance on this Court's precedents in Torres and Rosario, explaining that it could not “simply bind itself ” to those decisions and “ignore important subsequent developments in the constitutional landscape.” Id. at 47a n.7.

3. The court of appeals affirmed. App., infra, 1a-37a.

The court of appeals first rejected the government's contention that this Court's decisions in Torres and Rosario controlled the outcome of this case. App., infra, 8a-19a. The court stated that neither Torres nor Roario considered whether the SSI program's exclusion of residents of Puerto Rico denied equal protection, because Torres involved “the right to travel” rather than equal protection, and Rosario involved “block grants under [Aid to Families with Dependent Children]” rather than SSI. Id. at 14a (emphasis omitted). The court also emphasized that Torres and Rosario were “[s]ummary dispositions.” Id. at 15a. Finally, the court stated that one of the three rationales set out in Torres and Rosario — that “inclusion in the SSI program might seriously disrupt the Puerto Rican economy,” Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7 — is “dubious,” “ 'has troubling overtones,' ” and “should be met with suspicion,” at least in light of “the present circumstances of Puerto Rico's economic affairs,” App., infra, 16a-18a & n.10 (quoting Rosario, 446 U.S. at 655 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).

The court of appeals also found unpersuasive the government's argument that, even apart from Torres and Rosario, Congress's treatment of Puerto Rico for purposes of SSI was rational. App., infra, 19a-37a. The court rejected the government's argument that the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the program could be justified by Puerto Rico's “unique tax status” — in particular, by the reality “ 'that residents of Puerto Rico do not, as a general matter, pay federal income taxes.' ” Id. at 20a (citations omitted). The court found income taxes to be irrelevant to the SSI program because “any individual eligible for SSI benefits almost by definition earns too little to be paying federal income taxes.” Id. at 27a. The court also rejected the government's argument that “the cost of including Puerto Rico residents in the SSI program is a rational basis for their exclusion,” explaining that “cost alone does not support differentiating individuals.” Id. at 29a, 31a.

The court of appeals separately emphasized that, as part of the Northern Mariana Islands' covenant to enter into a political union with the United States, the United States agreed to make SSI available in that Territory. App., infra, 34a. The court concluded that, “while the inclusion of the Northern Mariana Islands in the SSI program does not standing alone render the discriminatory treatment of [residents of Puerto Rico] per se irrational, the fact that Congress extended SSI benefits to the residents of the Northern Mariana Islands * * * undercuts [the government's] only offered explanations for the exclusion.” Ibid. (citation omitted).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The court of appeals held that the Congress's decision not to extend the Supplemental Security Income program to Puerto Rico violates the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court's decision holds unconstitutional a decades-old Act of Congress; conflicts with this Court's decisions in Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam), and Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (per curiam); threatens to impose billions of dollars in costs on the United States; and could affect numerous other Acts of Congress that treat Puerto Rico differently than the States and the District of Columbia for purposes of federal benefits programs. This Court should either summarily reverse the decision or grant plenary review.

A. The Court Of Appeals' Decision Is Incorrect

This Court's decisions in Torres and Rosario resolve this case. Rosario establishes the legal standard that governs respondent's equal-protection challenge, and Torres and Rosario both establish that Congress's decision not to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico satisfies that standard. The court of appeals' efforts to distinguish those decisions lack merit, as do the district court's arguments for overruling them.

1. This Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits Congress from denying any person the equal protection of the laws. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). In Rosario, the Court explained that “the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee” allows Congress to “treat Puerto Rico differently from States” for purposes of a welfare program “so long as there is a rational basis” for the distinction. 446 U.S. at 651-652.

Rosario's use of the rational-basis standard accords with settled principles of equal-protection law. Long ago, this Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment concerns “persons and classes of persons” rather than places, and that the government thus remains free to establish “one system for one portion of its territory and another system for an-other portion.” Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1880). The Court has since reaffirmed time and again that “this guaranty does not require territorial uniformity,” Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914); that “[t]erritorial uniformity is not a constitutional requisite,” Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 552 (1954); that the guarantee “relates to equality between persons as such, rather than between areas,” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961); and that the government retains “wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or * * * only in certain counties,” Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964). Some provisions of the Constitution do require geographic uniformity — for instance, “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1 — but the Equal Protection Clause simply is not among them.

Indeed, the Constitution itself distinguishes between States and Territories for a variety of purposes, including representation in Congress, U.S. Const. Art. I, §§ 2-3; participation in presidential elections, Art. II, § 2; congressional power, Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2; delegation of legislative power, Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 323 (1937); appointments of officers, Financial Oversight & Management Board v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1658-1659 (2020); judicial tenure, American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828); and double jeopardy, Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2016). Congress, too, has enacted a variety of laws that distinguish Territories from States — including tax laws, see Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7; bankruptcy laws, see Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136. S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016); civil-rights laws, see Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 187 (1990); and healthcare laws, see King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2494 n.4 (2015). Put simply, a Territory differs from a State, and the Constitution allows Congress to recognize that difference.

2. A legislative classification satisfies the rational-basis standard if it is “rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest.” Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam). The application of that standard is particularly deferential in “the area of economics and social welfare.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). A classification relating to the “administration of public welfare assistance” does not violate the Constitution simply because it is “imperfect,” “ 'is not made with mathematical nicety,' ” or “ 'in practice results in some inequality.' ” Ibid. (citation omitted).

Torres and Rosario both establish that Congress's decision not to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico satisfies that test. In Torres, the Court identified “[a]t least three reasons” that support “the exclusion of per-sons in Puerto Rico from the SSI program.” 435 U.S. at 5 n.7. And in Rosario, it acknowledged that Torres had “concluded that [the exclusion of Puerto Rico from SSI] was rationally grounded on three factors,” and it held that the “same considerations” justified the different treatment of Puerto Rico under another welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 446 U.S. at 652.

First, the Court relied on “the unique tax status of Puerto Rico.” Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7; see Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652 (“Puerto Rican residents do not contribute to the federal treasury.”). Individuals who reside in Puerto Rico generally owe no federal income tax on income derived from sources in Puerto Rico, see 26 U.S.C. 933; corporations in Puerto Rico generally owe no federal corporate income tax on income connected with Puerto Rico, see 26 U.S.C. 881, 882, 7701; most federal excise taxes do not apply in Puerto Rico, see 26 U.S.C. 5314, 7652; and residents of Puerto Rico generally owe no federal estate and gift taxes on transfers of property in Puerto Rico, see 26 U.S.C. 2209. Congress has a legitimate interest in avoiding a one-sided fiscal relation-ship under which Puerto Rico shares the financial benefits but not the financial burdens of statehood, and declining to include Puerto Rico in the SSI program is a rational means of furthering that interest.

Second, this Court observed that “the cost of including Puerto Rico would be extremely great.” Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7; see Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652 (“[T]he cost of treating Puerto Rico as a State under the statute would be high.”). When the Court decided Torres in 1978, that cost would have been “an estimated $300 mil-lion per year.” 435 U.S. at 5 n.7. According to an estimate prepared by actuaries at the Social Security Ad-ministration, that cost now would be between $1.8 billion and $2.4 billion per year over the next ten years. See Memorandum from Michael Stephens, Supervisory Actuary, Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration, to Steve Goss, Chief Actuary, Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration, Estimated Change in Federal SSI Program Cost for Potential Extension of SSI Eligibility to Residents of Certain U.S. Territories — INFORMATION (Stephens Memo) 2 (June 11, 2020). Congress has a legitimate interest in limiting government expenditures, and excluding Puerto Rico from SSI is a rational means of advancing that interest.

Third, this Court explained that “inclusion in the SSI program might seriously disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.” Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7; see Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652 (“[G]reater benefits could disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.”). For example, labor economists have assembled empirical evidence showing that benefit pro-grams can “depress work effort” by “discourag[ing] employment” and “slow[ing] the accumulation of work experience and skill.” Gary Burtless & Orlando Sotomayor, Labor Supply and Public Transfers, in The Economy of Puerto Rico: Restoring Growth 131 (Susan M. Collins et al. eds., 2006). They have also assembled evidence indicating that, in light of wage levels and other economic conditions in Puerto Rico, benefit payments could be “relatively more attractive to a larger percentage of [the] Puerto Rican workforce,” and that “the negative effects” on the “labor supply” could thus be “larger” in Puerto Rico than in the States. Id. at 101, 116. Labor economists also have argued that “[t]he rapid expansion of government transfers in the 1970s and early 1980s produced these effects in Puerto Rico.” Id. at 131. Congress has a legitimate interest in avoiding economic disruption in Puerto Rico, including by maintaining the stability of the labor supply in Puerto Rico, and Congress could rationally conclude that treating Puerto Rico differently than the States for purposes of SSI (and other benefits programs) advances that interest.

3. The court of appeals' contrary rationales lack merit. To begin, the court emphasized that Torres and Rosario were “[s]ummary dispositions.” App., infra, 15a. This Court has explained, however, that “the lower courts are bound by summary decisions by this Court.” Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-345 (1975). The court of appeals relied on Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979), Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977) (per curiam), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), for the proposition that the precedential effect of a summary decision is limited to the precise result reached by this Court. App., infra, 15a. Each of those cases, however, concerned the precedential effect of an “unexplicated summary affirmance” issued “without opinion.” Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176 (citation omitted); see Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 182; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 671. Those cases are inapposite here, because Torres and Rosario were summary reversals accompanied by per curiam opinions, not one-line summary affirmances. And “[w]hen an opinion issues for the Court,” lower courts remain bound not just by its “result,” but also by its “ 'explications of the governing rules of law.' ” Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) (citation omitted).

Next, the court of appeals emphasized that Torres involved the right to travel rather than equal protection. App., infra, 14a. That is true, but the Court in Torres applied the rational-basis test — the same test that governs the equal-protection challenge at issue here. See Torres, 435 U.S. at 5. The court of appeals identified no sound reason to believe that the exclusion of Puerto Rico from SSI satisfies the rational-basis test for purposes of the right to travel, yet fails the same test for purposes of equal protection. To the contrary, the Court in Torres noted that the plaintiff in that case had also raised an equal-protection claim, but stated that the district court there “apparently acknowledged that Congress had the power to treat Puerto Rico differently, and that every federal program does not have to be extended to it,” because “Puerto Rico has a relation-ship to the United States 'that has no parallel in our history.' ” Id. at 3 n.4 (citation omitted).

The court of appeals similarly distinguished Rosario on the ground that it involved block grants to state and territorial governments under Aid to Families with De-pendent Children rather than direct aid to individual recipients under SSI. App., infra, 14a. The court failed to explain, however, why that distinction should make any constitutional difference. In any event, the Court in Rosario explicitly described the two programs as “similar,” and explicitly stated that the “same considerations” justify treating Puerto Rico differently under both programs. 446 U.S. at 652.

The court of appeals also criticized the adequacy of each of the justifications set out in Torres and Rosario, describing portions of this Court's reasoning in those cases as “dubious,” “defunct,” “ 'troubling,' ” “no longer available,” and worthy of “suspicion.” App., infra, 16a-19a & n.10, 23a (citation omitted). As an initial matter, a lower court has a constitutional obligation to follow the precedents of this Court, “for it is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997). The court of appeals thus was required to follow Torres and Rosario, regardless of whether it agreed with this Court's reasoning. In any event, the criticisms of the Court's reasoning lack merit.

The court of appeals stated that the first justification discussed in Torres and Rosario — Puerto Rico's unique tax status — cannot justify Congress's decision not to include Puerto Rico in the SSI program, because some Puerto Rico residents pay at least some federal taxes and because the particular individuals who benefit from SSI are likely to have low incomes and are thus unlikely to owe income taxes in the first place. App., infra, 21a, 27a. Under rational-basis review, however, Congress retains the power to rely on generalizations and to make “rough accommodations. ” Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (citation omitted). A law does not violate that rational-basis test simply because “the classification involved * * * is to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979). Here, it is not irrational for Congress to rely on the generalization that most federal taxes do not apply to the Commonwealth, even though some residents of Puerto Rico do pay certain federal taxes in certain circumstances. Nor is it irrational for Congress to focus on the tax status of the populace of the Commonwealth as a whole, rather than on the tax status of the particular individuals who would receive SSI benefits.

The court of appeals next concluded that the second justification cited in Torres and Rosario — cost — could not “alone” justify Congress's decision not to extend SSI to Puerto Rico. App., infra, 31a (emphasis omit-ted). But this Court has recognized that the government has a legitimate interest in “protecting the fiscal integrity of Government programs, and of the Government as a whole,” Lyng v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 485 U.S. 360, 373 (1988), and that “[a]dministrative convenience and expense * * * are alone a sufficient justification” for a classification under rational-basis review, Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511 (1937) (emphasis added). To be sure, a desire to save money might not justify “random” measures, such as the “elimination from coverage of all persons with an odd number of letters in their surnames.” App., infra, 30a (quoting Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 493 (1977)). But the distinction between Territories and States is constitutionally grounded and routine, not “random.” See p. 11, supra.

The court of appeals also asserted that the government had “abandon[ed]” Torres's and Rosario's third justification for excluding Puerto Rico from SSI — namely, the interest in avoiding disruption of Puerto Rico's economy. App., infra, 18a. Contrary to the court's suggestion, the government explicitly argued in the district court that it was rational for Congress to conclude that the “influx of federal SSI payments might disrupt Puerto Rico's economy.” D. Ct. Doc. 59-1, at 12 n.9 (Oct. 10, 2018). And although the government focused on Torres' and Rosario's first two rationales in the court of appeals, it did not abandon the third rationale; to the contrary, it argued that Congress's decision was rational “[f ]or the reasons the Supreme Court relied on in [ Torres] and [Rosario], including Puerto Rico's unique tax status, and the cost of extending benefits to the territories.” Gov't C.A. Br. 10 (emphasis added). In any event, under rational-basis review, the government does not bear the burden of coming for-ward with rationales for the law; rather, “[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).

The court of appeals also found that the economic rationale for excluding Puerto Rico from SSI was no longer sound “considering the present circumstances of Puerto Rico's economic affairs.” App., infra, 17a n.10. Under rational-basis review, however, the question is whether “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification” — not whether a court regards the classification as wise in light of current economic conditions. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). The proper forum for debating current economic conditions is Congress, not the Judiciary.

Finally, the court of appeals emphasized that Congress has made SSI available in the Northern Mariana Islands. App., infra, 34a-37a. But as the court of appeals acknowledged, Congress had already taken that step before Torres and Rosario. Id. at 34a. In neither case did this Court suggest that Congress's decision undermined the rationality of its treatment of Puerto Rico.

In any event, nothing in the Constitution precludes Congress from according distinctive treatment to the Northern Mariana Islands. The Constitution instead leaves Congress free to treat one Territory differently than another, and Congress has often done so. See, e.g., Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1868 (discussing the United States' “unique political relationship” with Puerto Rico); Chase Manhattan Bank (National Ass'n) v. South Acres Development Co., 434 U.S. 236, 239 (1978) (per curiam) (discussing Congress's “unique” treatment of Guam). Here, Congress had a sound reason to treat the Northern Mariana Islands differently than Puerto Rico and other Territories: the United States had committed to extend SSI to the Islands in the covenant establishing the Islands as a commonwealth, but had made no comparable negotiated commitment with respect to other Territories. See p. 3, supra.

4. The district court, for its part, stated that Torres and Rosario are “outdated” and should be “revisit[ed].” App., infra, 55a, 58a. That suggestion lacks merit. First, “it is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” Khan, 522 U.S. at 20. The district court should therefore have followed Torres and Rosario, regardless of whether it considered those precedents “outdated.” Second, Torres and Rosario were in any event correctly decided. As explained above, those cases accord with this Court's jurisprudence concerning equal protection and rational-basis review. Third, under the doctrine of stare decisis, there exists no sound basis for revisiting Torres and Rosario. The decisions are longstanding; they accord with the surrounding body of equal-protection jurisprudence; they are workable; they have not been undermined by subsequent developments; and Congress has relied on them for the past four decades in designing federal pro-grams and determining their applicability in the Territories.

B. The Decision Below Warrants This Court's Review

1. The court of appeals' decision warrants summary reversal. In Torres, the Court, applying rational-basis review, summarily reversed a lower court's decision holding that the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the SSI program violated the constitutional right to travel. 435 U.S. at 5. And in Rosario, the Court summarily reversed a lower court's decision holding that the exclusion of Puerto Rico from another federal welfare program violated the principle of equal protection. 446 U.S. at 652. For the same reasons that summary reversal was proper there, it is proper here.

More broadly, this Court has often summarily re-versed decisions of lower courts that contradict control-ling precedents of this Court. See, e.g., Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (per curiam); Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam). Here, this Court's decisions in Torres and Rosario establish that Congress's decision not to include Puerto Rico in the SSI program comports with the guarantee of equal protection. Yet the court of appeals disregarded those decisions, going so far as to disparage their reasoning as “dubious,” “defunct,” “ 'troubling,' ” “no longer available,” and worthy of “suspicion.” App., infra, 16a-19a & n.10, 23a (citation omitted).

2. If this Court does not summarily reverse the decision below, it should grant plenary review. The Court's intervention is necessary because the court of appeals has held that an Act of Congress violates the Constitution. The Court has recognized that judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is “the gravest and most delicate duty” of the Federal Judiciary. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (citation omitted). The Court has therefore applied “a strong presumption in favor of granting writs of certiorari to review decisions of lower courts holding federal statutes unconstitutional,” even in the absence of a circuit conflict. Maricopa County v. Lopez-Valenzuela, 574 U.S. 1006, 1007 (2014) (statement of Thomas, J., respecting the denial of the application for a stay); see, e.g., United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1578 (2020); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1755 (2017); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 9 (2015); Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 46 (2015); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 714 (2012) (plurality opinion); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 14 (2010); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 132-133 (2010).

This Court's review also is necessary because the decision below “conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 10(c). Beyond the conflict with Torres and Rosario, the decision below also conflicts with this Court's broader jurisprudence on rational-basis review. For example, the court of appeals demanded a close fit between the exclusion of Puerto Rico from SSI and the distinctive treatment of Puerto Rico under federal tax laws, see App., infra, 20a-28a, but this Court has explained that a law survives rational-basis review “[e]ven if the classification involved * * * is to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive,” Bradley, 440 U.S. at 108. The court of appeals insisted that “cost alone” cannot justify a classification, App., infra, 31a (emphasis omitted), but this Court has described “convenience and expense” as “alone a sufficient justification” under rational-basis review, Carmichael, 301 U.S. at 511. And the court of appeals, engaging in its own searching assessment, rejected as “dubious” and “defunct” the avoidance of economic disruption that this Court had found rational in Torres. App., infra, 18a-19a. But this Court has emphasized that rational-basis review “gives the federal courts no power to impose * * * their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy,” Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486.

The importance of the question presented under-scores the need for this Court's review. SSI is a major federal program, and its extension to Puerto Rico would have significant consequences. According to an esti-mate cited by the court of appeals, the extension of SSI to Puerto Rico could apply to more than 300,000 Puerto Rican residents each month. See App., infra, 32a-33a. The Social Security Administration estimates that ex-tending SSI to Puerto Rico would cost approximately $23 billion over the next ten years. Stephens Memo 2.

The court of appeals' decision concerns Puerto Rico, but Congress has also excluded other Territories, apart from the Northern Mariana Islands, from the SSI pro-gram. One court has already held, in reliance on the court of appeals' decision in this case, that Congress's decision not to include Guam in the SSI program violates the Fifth Amendment. See D. Ct. Doc. 77, at 7-20, Schaller v. U.S. Social Security Administration, No. 18-cv-44 (D. Guam June 19, 2020). The Social Security Administration estimates that extending the SSI program to other Territories beyond Puerto Rico would cost a further $700 million over the next ten years. Stephens Memo 2.

Finally, the court of appeals' decision concerns the SSI program, but Congress has enacted a wide range of statutes that treat Puerto Rico and other Territories differently than the States for purposes of federal fund-ing. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 2012(r) (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program); 42 U.S.C. 623(a)-(b) (Child Welfare Services Program); 42 U.S.C. 801(a)(2) (Coronavirus Relief Fund); 42 U.S.C. 1308(a)(1) (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families); 42 U.S.C. 1308(f )-(g), 1396d(b) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. 1395w-114(a) (Medicare); 42 U.S.C. 1760(f ) (School Lunch Program). And the United States District Court in Puerto Rico has already held, in reliance on the court of appeals' decision here, that Congress has violated the Constitution by treating Puerto Rico differently from the States for purposes of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and the Medicare Part D Low-Income Subsidy. See Peña Martínez v. Azar, No. 18-1206, 2020 WL 4437859 (Aug. 3, 2020). Additional challenges to the differential treatment of Puerto Rico remain pending. See, e.g., Consejo de Salud de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. United States, No. 18-cv-1045 (D.P.R. filed Jan. 29, 2018) (challenging differential treatment of Puerto Rico under Medicaid, Medicare, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program). The spillover consequences of the decision below heighten the need for this Court's review.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

JEFFREY B. WALL
Acting Solicitor General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
VIVEK SURI
Assistant to the Solicitor General
ABBY C. WRIGHT
LAURA E. MYRON
Attorneys

SEPTEMBER 2020

FOOTNOTES

*The motion to dismiss explained that the government's complaint cited two statutes as bases for the district court's jurisdiction, but that the reference to one of those statutes, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(4), had been a mistake. App., infra, 51a; D. Ct. Doc. 23, at 3. Respondent acknowledged, and the court held, that the court had jurisdiction over the case under the other statute cited in the complaint, 28 U.S.C. 1345, which confers jurisdiction over “all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States.” App., infra, 52a-53a (citation and emphasis omitted). The motion also argued that, to the extent respondent's answer raised counterclaims, the court lacked the power to hear them because respondent had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. D. Ct. Doc. 23, at 8. But the court read the answer as raising “affirmative defenses” rather than counterclaims, and it held that it could properly “address the merits of the United States' overpayment claim, and the constitutional challenge as an affirmative defense to [respondent's] liability.” App., infra, 53a.

END FOOTNOTES

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