Court Won't Reconsider Decision Allowing Lien Foreclosure

The factual background of this matter is recited in the Court's Memorandum Opinion of October 9, 2014. (Docket No. 26.) In the portion of that Opinion relevant here, the Court considered the parties' arguments concerning Eichhorn's percentage of ownership in real property upon which the Government placed a tax lien. The Court first noted that Kentucky law does not permit introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary the terms of an unambiguous deed. Accordingly, the Court looked solely to the deed itself, which unambiguously conveyed the property to its three original owners as "joint tenants with remainder in fee simple to the survivor of them." (Docket No. 15-2, General Warranty Deed, at 3.) The Court found that following certain conveyances, Eichhorn ultimately owned one-third of the property in a tenancy in common with Orionmegan, which owned two-thirds. The Court ordered foreclosure of the federal tax liens against Eichhorn's one-third interest and sale of the property, with proceeds to be distributed in accordance with the rights of the parties. Eichhorn now moves the Court to reconsider this conclusion.

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit instructs that a motion for reconsideration should only be granted on four grounds. "Under Rule 59, a court may alter or amend a judgment based on: '(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.'" Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010)(quoting Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, given the interest in a decision's finality, this court and others have held that "[s]uch motions are extraordinary and sparingly granted." Marshall v. Johnson, 2007 WL 1175046, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2007) (citing Plakson Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1995)); accord Rottmund v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1992).

Because it points to no newly-discovered evidence or an intervening change in the law, the Court assumes that Eichhorn considers the previous Memorandum Opinion a clear error of law. Litigants who challenge previously entered judgments as manifest errors of law confront a high standard -- one that requires the "wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent on the part of the court." Dorger v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 2:08-56, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61686, at *3 (citing Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that "[a] 'manifest error' is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party")). Eichhorn is entitled to the relief it seeks only if the previous was "dead wrong" and "so egregious that an appellate court could not affirm it." Id. at *3-4 (quoting H &A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, No. 4:02-458, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25797, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2005)). The Court cannot find that Eichhorn has satisfied this exacting standard, particularly given the deed's unambiguous nature.

Moreover, the Kentucky statute enumerating the general powers of a corporation permits the entity "the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including without limitation power to . . . [p]urchase, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal with . . . any legal or equitable interest in property . . ." KRS 217B.3-020(d). On its face, the statute permits a business entity to hold real property just as an individual would -- presumably including in a joint tenancy.