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Alliance Has Tax Treaty Concerns Regarding Debt-Equity Regs

JUL. 7, 2016

Alliance Has Tax Treaty Concerns Regarding Debt-Equity Regs

DATED JUL. 7, 2016
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July 7, 2016

 

 

The Honorable Mark J. Mazur

 

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy

 

U.S. Department of the Treasury

 

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

 

Washington, D.C. 20220

 

 

The Honorable John Koskinen

 

Commissioner

 

Internal Revenue Service

 

1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.

 

Washington, D.C. 20224

 

 

The Honorable William J. Wilkins

 

Chief Counsel

 

Internal Revenue Service

 

1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.

 

Room 3026

 

Washington, D.C. 20224

 

Re: Comments on Proposed Section 385 -- Regulations (IRS REG-108060-15)

 

Dear Sirs:

This letter is submitted on behalf of the International Alliance for Principled Taxation (IAPT or Alliance) in response to the invitation to comment on the proposed regulations under Section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code, issued on April 4, 2016 (the Proposed Regulations).

The IAPT is a group of major multinational corporations based throughout the world, and representing business sectors as diverse as consumer products, media, telecommunications, oilfield services, computer technology, energy, beverages, software, IT systems, and publishing. The group's purpose is to promote the development and application of international tax rules and policies based on principles designed to prevent double taxation and to provide predictable treatment to businesses operating internationally. We very much appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on the Proposed Regulations.

Our comments focus exclusively on the interaction between the Proposed Regulations and U.S. tax treaties.

Introduction

The Proposed Regulations contain a number of provisions under which certain related party indebtedness could be recharacterized as stock and treated as such for all federal tax purposes.1 Treasury officials have indicated in public remarks that this same recharacterization will apply for purposes of U.S. tax treaties. That treatment could affect in particular two issues that lie at the heart of tax treaties: (i) the withholding tax rate to be applied by the source State to payments on the instrument; and (ii) the double taxation relief to be given by the residence State.

The IAPT believes that serious questions surround the issue of whether the recharacterization contemplated by Proposed Regulations will in fact routinely apply for purposes of the provisions of U.S. treaties that govern withholding rates and double taxation relief. Since the publication of the Proposed Regulations in April, there has been much commentary about the extent to which the Proposed Regulations go beyond the traditional application of section 385 and jurisprudence on debt-equity distinctions in the United States. For the reasons outlined below, the IAPT is concerned that this characteristic of the Proposed Regulations will cause them to come into potential conflict with treaty concepts of "dividends" and "interest" and will give rise to risks of double taxation. To avoid this, we urge a reconsideration of the standards in the Proposed Regulations to bring them more in line with internationally recognized standards for distinguishing debt from equity.

Treaty Treatment of Dividends and Interest

The vast majority of U.S. treaties provide for reduced withholding rates on U.S. source dividends paid to residents of the other Contracting State. The most commonly applicable rates are zero or 5 percent for so-called "direct investment" dividends (i.e., dividends paid to a corporate shareholder that typically must own some minimum threshold of the voting stock of the payor corporation) and 15 percent for other dividends (i.e., so-called "portfolio" dividends). In a few cases the prescribed withholding rates on dividends are higher than that, and in a handful of cases the withholding rate on portfolio dividends is lower than 15 percent.

The vast majority of U.S. treaties also provide for reduced withholding rates on U.S. source interest paid to residents of the other Contracting State. While the U.S. Model Treaty position has long favored a zero rate on interest, many U.S. treaties allow some positive rate of reduced withholding on interest, with 5 percent or 10 percent being the most commonly allowed rates on interest other than contingent interest.

It is almost invariably the case under U.S. treaties that the allowable rate of U.S. withholding tax on interest is lower than the allowable rate of U.S. withholding tax on portfolio dividends. Very frequently, the allowable rate of U.S. withholding tax on interest is also lower than the allowable rate of U.S. withholding tax on direct investment dividends.

As a result, if the Proposed Regulations apply under treaties to recharacterize indebtedness of a U.S. corporation to equity, the result could be to expand U.S. taxing jurisdiction in two significant ways. First, payments on the instrument, including not only payments of stated interest but also repayments of stated principal, may become subject to U.S. withholding tax as "dividends". Second, the rate of U.S. withholding tax would typically be higher than the rate that would apply to payments of interest. Because the recharacterized instruments typically will not carry voting rights and will not be characterized as voting stock, the relevant dividend withholding rate under treaties will often be the higher portfolio dividend rate, unless the holder otherwise owns sufficient voting stock to qualify for the direct investment rate. Because the Proposed Regulations would operate to recharacterize indebtedness issued to related corporations that are not direct shareholders of the issuer corporation, they would very frequently require application of the portfolio dividend rate.

Thus, a very common result if the recharacterization authorized by the Proposed Regulations applied under treaties would be that instead of a zero percent U.S. withholding tax on interest (and no U.S. withholding tax on principal), all payments on the instrument would be subjected to the 15 percent U.S. withholding tax applicable to dividends (assuming adequate earnings and profits).

Treaty Definitions of Dividends and Interest

The U.S. treaty definitions of "dividends" and "interest" have varied somewhat over time. The definition of "dividends" in the 1981 Draft U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty was as follows:

 

The term "dividends" as used in this Article means income from shares or other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as income from other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the laws of the State of which the company making a distribution is a resident.

 

This language is very similar to the definition in the OECD Model Tax Convention, which has read as follows since 1977:

 

3. The term "dividends" as used in this Article means income from shares, "jouissance" shares or "jouissance" rights, mining shares, founders' shares or other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as income from other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the laws of the State of which the company making the distribution is a resident.2

 

By 1996, the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty definition had changed to:

 

5. For purposes of the Convention, the term "dividends" means income from shares or other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as income that is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares under the laws of the State of which the payor is a resident.

 

In other words, the 1996 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty dropped the words "from other corporate rights" from the second half of the sentence. The 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty remained virtually unchanged (except that it changed the opening words to "For purposes of this Article"), and the 2016 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty also remained virtually unchanged (except that it added new text specifying that "dividends" does not include "distributions that are treated as gain under the laws of the Contracting State of which the company making the distribution is a resident").

More than 25 U.S. treaties currently in force include definitions of "dividends" that are based on the pre-1996 U.S. Model wording. A considerably smaller number (fewer than 20) include definitions that are based on the post-1996 U.S. Model wording. Other U.S. treaties have no definition or one that differs from both Models.

The definition of "interest" in the 2016 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty is as follows:

 

4. The term "interest" as used in this Article means income from debt-claims of every kind, whether or not secured by mortgage, and whether or not carrying a right to participate in the debtor's profits, and in particular, income from government securities and income from bonds or debentures, including premiums or prizes attaching to such securities, bonds or debentures, and all other income that is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from money lent under the law of the Contracting State in which the income arises. Income dealt with in Article 10 (Dividends) and penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded as interest for the purposes of this Convention.

 

Essentially the same language was found in the 1996 and 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaties. The 1981 Draft Model was also essentially the same, except that it did not yet include the clarification about the interaction between Articles 10 and 11.3

Application of Treaty Definitions to Cases Covered by the Proposed Regulations

There can be no question but that the definition of dividends in U.S. treaties, whether based on the pre-1996 or post-1996 wording of the U.S. Model, gives some deference to the characterization of a payment under U.S. domestic law for purposes of determining whether that payment can appropriately be withheld upon as a dividend. The important question is whether that deference is entirely unfettered, and whether a treaty partner is required to respect a characterization prescribed in section 385 regulations, no matter what those regulations may say or how broadly they may be drafted.

The IAPT believes the simple answer to that question is no. We believe it is critical in this regard to understand the international context in which the treaty provisions have been developed and interpreted, including in particular guidance provided by the OECD.

The question of whether domestic law could intervene to recharacterize a debt-claim as stock and recharacterize payments thereon as dividends under the OECD Model Tax Convention was analyzed in detail by the OECD in its 1986 report, "Thin Capitalisation" (Thin Capitalisation Report). Several conclusions were reached in that analysis.4

First, the majority view was that the exclusion of "debt-claims" from the first part of the dividends definition prohibits the treatment of interest as dividends pursuant to thin capitalization rules under that language. Second, it was agreed that payments on a debt instrument could be considered to fall under the part of the dividends definition relating to "income from other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares", but only in certain cases.5 Third, the cases in question were those where the contributor of the loan "effectively shared the risk of the company's business". Fourth, the question of whether the contributor of the loan effectively shared the risk of the borrowing company's business will normally have to be established by all relevant circumstances. Several factors were identified as potentially relevant for this purpose:

 

An indication that the risks of the business may perhaps be regarded as effectively shared by the creditor in this way may be derived from the fact that the loan very heavily outweighs any other contribution of capital to the debtor company (or replaces a substantial proportion of other capital which has been lost) and is substantially unmatched by redeemable assets. This may not be a sufficient indication under the laws of every country -- it might be necessary, for example, to show that the creditor would participate in any profits of the business or that the repayment of the loan was subordinated to claims of other creditors or to the payment of dividends, or that the level or payment of interest would depend on the profits, or that there were no fixed provisions for repayment of the loan by a definite date. However, there could well be other indications that the creditor effectively shared in the risks of the enterprise's business.

 

Finally, it was recommended that a clarification be given that the term "interest" as used in Article 11 did not include those items of income dealt with under Article 10, and that it would be desirable to remove any ambiguity about whether the reference to "corporate rights" excluded any possibility of treating interest on debt-claims as dividends under Article 10.

One can clearly see certain adjustments in subsequent treaty practice that were directly traceable to the analysis in the Thin Capitalisation Report. In the next update of its Model Tax Treaty (in 1996), the United States dropped the reference to "corporate rights" from its definition of dividends and inserted language in its interest definition to address the potential overlap between Articles 10 and 11. For its part, the OECD amended the Commentary on Article 10 in its next update to the OECD Model Tax Convention (in 1992) by adding new paragraph 25, which reads:

 

25. Article 10 deals not only with dividends as such but also with interest on loans insofar as the lender effectively shares the risks run by the company, i.e. when repayment depends largely on the success or otherwise of the enterprise's business. Articles 10 and 11 do not therefore prevent the treatment of this type of interest as dividends under the national rules on thin capitalisation applied in the borrower's country. The question whether the contributor of the loan shares the risks run by the enterprise must be determined in each individual case in the light of all the circumstances, as for example the following:
  • the loan very heavily outweighs any other contribution to the enterprise's capital (or was taken out to replace a substantial proportion of capital which has been lost) and is substantially unmatched by redeemable assets;

  • the creditor will share in any profits of the company;

  • repayment of the loan is subordinated to claims of other creditors or to the payment of dividends;

  • the level or payment of interest would depend on the profits of the company;

  • the loan contract contains no fixed provisions for repayment by a definite date.

What is interesting about this analysis is that it indicates that the question of whether a domestic law recharacterization of interest as dividends will be respected for treaty purposes will depend upon whether the recharacterization is justified based on a multi-factor analysis, and that the factors cited look quite similar to those found in section 385(b).6 This is very far from the potential results under the Proposed Regulations, which could call for recharacterization of debt as stock based on a single factor such as documentation of the instrument or actual or deemed use of the borrowed funds, without any reference to the broader question of whether repayment to the lender depends largely on the success or otherwise of the borrower's business.

Recommendation Regarding Alignment with Treaty Definitions of Dividends and Interest

Accordingly, the IAPT recommends that the standards in the Proposed Regulations be reconsidered in order to bring them closer to the traditional multi-factor analysis that has hitherto always prevailed under section 385 and general debt-equity jurisprudence. Otherwise, we believe there is a strong risk that U.S. treaty partners, seeing how far the Proposed Regulations' standards are from the basic inquiry of whether the creditor is effectively sharing the risks of the company, will have a justifiable basis for disagreeing that the Proposed Regulations can have the effect of allowing the United States to withhold at treaty dividend rates in lieu of treaty interest rates. As mere regulations, of course, the section 385 rules would not constitute the "supreme law of the land" that could override previously negotiated treaties, so the United States would be obliged to fight out the merits of its position in competent authority proceedings.

Double Taxation Relief Implications of Potential Conflict between United States and Treaty Partner on Characterization of Payments

The implications of such a potential disagreement between the United States and its treaty partners extend, of course, beyond the withholding rate applicable to payments on the instrument. The issue of the treaty partner's obligation to give double taxation relief is also at stake.

Regardless of whether a treaty partner generally uses a credit or exemption method for providing double taxation relief in its treaties, the relevant article typically provides that the treaty partner, as the residence State, will provide relief on interest income under the treaty only in the form of a credit for the U.S. withholding tax. As indicated above, the withholding rate on interest is likely to be lower than the withholding rate on dividends under most treaty scenarios implicated by the Proposed Regulations. While the same type of obligation may also be true of dividends, there are many treaties that call for the treaty partner as residence State to exempt intercorporate dividends entirely or to give an indirect credit for the underlying U.S. corporate tax paid by the dividend-paying corporation. In some cases, those latter benefits are available only if the dividend recipient owns some threshold percentage of the voting stock of the dividend-paying corporation. In any event, though, the treaty partner would almost invariably have to give greater double taxation relief for payments properly characterized as dividends under a treaty than for interest payments.

Where there is a conflict between the United States and its treaty partner as to the characterization of a payment as interest (or principal repayment) or dividends, the question obviously arises as to what the extent is of the treaty partner's obligation to give double taxation relief.

In the Thin Capitalisation Report, the OECD said that the residence State would be obligated to give relief based on treating the payment as a dividend where the double taxation relief article specifically referred to income defined as dividends under Article 10 and the source State's rules conformed to the Report's conclusions about treating the interest as dividends. Where the source State's rules go beyond the Report's conclusions in treating interest as dividends (i.e., where they apply beyond situations where the contributor of the loan effectively shared the risks of the borrowing company's business), the residence State would not be obligated to give double taxation relief based on dividend treatment. This could mean that the residence State would only have to give a credit for the withholding tax applicable under the treaty to interest payments. Such relief is unlikely to provide full relief from the juridical double taxation that will likely arise due to the higher dividend withholding rate, and it will not provide any relief from the recurrent corporate taxation that would arise with respect to the distributed profits. In other words, if the standards of the Proposed Regulations are not viewed by the treaty partner as consistent with the standards for treating interest as dividends under Article 10, the effect of the Proposed Regulations will likely be serious double taxation of both the juridical and economic type.

Subsequent to the Thin Capitalisation Report, language was added to the Commentary on Article 23 of the OECD Model Tax Convention to address generally the obligations of the residence State to give double taxation relief in situations where the two States classify the income item differently.7 That guidance indicates that the residence State, in giving double taxation relief, should in certain cases follow the source State's classification of the income item where differences in the domestic law of the two States cause the item to be classified under different treaty articles by the two States. Where, however, the different classification is due not only to differences in domestic law but also to different interpretations of the treaty (e.g., different views as to whether a particular domestic law rule in the source State allows the recharacterization of interest as dividends), the residence State is not obligated to follow the source State classification. In such cases, where the residence State does not believe that the source State has taxed "in accordance with the Convention", the two States are encouraged to resolve the issue through the mutual agreement procedure.

Recommendation Regarding Alignment with Treaty Definitions for Purposes of Ensuring Double Taxation Relief

As just discussed, the Proposed Regulations could give rise to serious juridical and economic double taxation if U.S. treaty partners have a legitimate basis for believing that the recharacterization standards under the Proposed Regulations are too far removed from the basic question of whether the creditor is effectively sharing in the risks of the borrowing company's business. The IAPT therefore recommends that the Proposed Regulations be amended to be in line with that basic standard in order to reduce or eliminate the possibility of that double taxation.

Nondiscrimination Issue

A great many U.S. treaties also include a Nondiscrimination Article which contains language along the following lines: "Except where the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 9 (Associated Enterprises), paragraph 5 of Article 11 (Interest), or paragraph 4 of Article 12 (Royalties) apply, interest, royalties, and other disbursements paid by a resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State shall, for the purpose of determining the taxable profits of the first-mentioned resident, be deductible under the same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned State."8 Paragraph 5 of Article 11 refers to situations where, "by reason of a special relationship between the payer and the beneficial owner or between both of them and some other person, the amount of the interest, having regard to the debt-claim for which it is paid, exceeds the amount which would have been agreed upon by the payer and the beneficial owner in the absence of such relationship".

Thus, such a Nondiscrimination provision prevents the United States from denying a deduction for interest paid to a resident of the treaty partner where interest paid to a U.S. resident under the same conditions would be deductible, unless the situation involves the payment of greater than arm's length interest as described in Article 11(5). The Proposed Regulations raise a concern in this regard, as they would deny interest deductions in certain cases involving payments by a U.S. corporation to a related foreign corporation, while interest paid in the same circumstances by the U.S. corporation to a related U.S. corporation would remain deductible.9 There are no grounds on which it could be plausibly argued that the denial of interest deductions under the Proposed Regulations is based upon an application of the arm's length standard. Accordingly, the effect of the Proposed Regulations may be in conflict with treaties containing such Nondiscrimination protection (and thus may have to bow to such treaties).

 

* * * * *

 

 

For all the reasons stated above, we urge a reconsideration of the standards in the Proposed Regulations in order to avoid the likelihood of serious conflicts with U.S. treaty obligations. Triggering such conflicts will likely lead to expensive and contentious disputes, costing both U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. government.

Once again, the IAPT appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the Proposed Regulations.

Sincerely yours on behalf of the

 

Alliance,

 

 

Mary C. Bennett

 

Baker & McKenzie LLP

 

Counsel to the Alliance

 

Washington, DC

 

FOOTNOTES

 

 

1 Prop. Reg. § 1.385-1 permits the IRS to treat a debt instrument as in part indebtedness and in part stock "to the extent that an analysis" as of the instrument's issuance "of the relevant facts and circumstances . . . under general federal tax principles results in the determination that the [instrument] is properly treated for federal tax purposes as indebtedness in part and stock in part". Prop. Reg. § 1.385-2 authorizes the IRS to treat a debt instrument as stock if certain prescribed documentation preparation and maintenance requirements are not satisfied. The general rule of Prop. Reg. § 1.385-3 authorizes the IRS to treat a debt instrument as stock in certain cases where it is issued in a distribution, in exchange for certain related party stock, or in exchange for property in an asset reorganization. In addition, a "funding rule" in Prop. Reg. § 1.385-3 would allow certain debt instruments to be treated as stock if they are issued with a principal purpose of funding a transaction described in the general rule, and the funding rule deems such a purpose to exist if the instrument is issued during a period beginning 36 months before and ending 36 months after the funded company makes the relevant distribution or acquisition.

2 The 1963 OECD Model Tax Convention had been the same, except that it used the words "assimilated to income from shares by the taxation law of the State" instead of "which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the laws of the State".

3 A very similar definition can be found in Article 11 of the OECD Model Tax Convention ("The term "interest" as used in this Article means income from debt-claims of every kind, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate in the debtor's profits, and in particular, income from government securities and income from bonds or debentures, including premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, bonds or debentures. Penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded as interest for the purpose of this Article.").

4 See Thin Capitalisation Report, paragraph 56 et seq.

5 The Thin Capitalisation Report referenced a "narrow interpretation" of the "income from other corporate rights" language which would have excluded its application to interest payments on debt-claims, but that narrow interpretation was rejected in the context of the Report's conclusions and the Report recommended removing the source of the ambiguity that narrow interpretation could cause.

6 Section 385(b) reads as follows:

 

(b) Factors

The regulations prescribed under this section shall set forth factors which are to be taken into account in determining with respect to a particular factual situation whether a debtor-creditor relationship exists or a corporation-shareholder relationship exists. The factors so set forth in the regulations may include among other factors:

 

(1) whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate consideration in money or money's worth, and to pay a fixed rate of interest,

(2) whether there is subordination to or preference over any indebtedness of the corporation,

(3) the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation,

(4) whether there is convertibility into the stock of the corporation, and

(5) the relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation and holdings of the interest in question.

7 See Commentary on Article 23 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, paragraphs 32.1 et seq.

8 See, e.g., Article 24(4) of the 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty.

9 See, e.g., Prop. Reg. § 1.385-1(e), which treats members of a consolidated group as one corporation and therefore exempts payments between members of such a U.S. group from the interest deduction denial.

 

END OF FOOTNOTES
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