UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Judge June L. Green
MEMORANDUM
[1] This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment Entered on August 21, 1997; Defendants' opposition thereto; Plaintiffs' reply; and Defendants' Supplement to their opposition. For the reasons set out below, Plaintiffs' motion is denied.
Background
[2] The background of this case is outlined in the court's Memorandum Opinion and will not be reiterated here. see Mem. Op. 2-3.
Standard
[3] This Court's decisions, entered on August 21, 1997, was that this case is not ripe for judicial review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). It is the judgment of this Court that its previous decision stands.
[4] The Court finds that Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration fails to satisfy the standard applied to said motions. To prevail on a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, courts generally require a party to show an intervening change in the law, newly discovered evidence, or to correct clear error. Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Rule 59(e) motion "need not be granted unless the district court finds there is an 'intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'") (citation omitted).
[5] This standard is applied so that litigants do not use motions for reconsideration as a means to relitigate issues already decided by the court.
Discussion
[6] On August 21, 1997, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims without prejudice, holding that they would not be ripe for judicial review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) until Defendants completed their agency process of records management. In their motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs argue that there has been a change in the law which would allow the National Archives Records Administration ("NARA") to inspect documents containing tax return information. The case cited in Plaintiffs' motion, Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1997), involved Field Service Advice Memoranda ("FSAs"), which are issued by the Office of Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). 117 F.3d at 608. Attorneys in the Office of the Chief Counsel prepare FSAs in response to requests from field personnel of either the Office of the Chief Counsel or the IRS. Id. FSAs provide legal guidance, usually regarding the situation of a particular taxpayer. Id. The Plaintiffs in that case requested IRS FSAs under the Freedom of Information Act. Id. The Appeals Court for the District of Columbia Circuit decided that portions of the FSAs did not constitute "return information" pursuant to 26 U.S.C. section 6103, and therefore, the IRS could not claim that section 6103 exempted it from releasing the FSAs for inspection. Id. at 616.
[7] Rather than asserting new law contrary to this Court's holding (as Plaintiffs claim), the above-mentioned ruling is in accord with this Court's decision in this action. The Plaintiffs claim that this Circuit's ruling in Tax Analysts holds that the IRS in the instant case cannot use section 6103 to except information from release. Plaintiffs are mistaken. The other Tax Analysts ruling does not change the essence of section 6103, it simply held that the legal analysis sections of the FSAs did not constitute tax return information, and therefore section 6103 would not apply to the documents in their entirety.
[8] Plaintiffs in the instant case want NARA to inspect certain IRS documents in order to determine their historic value so that ultimately the public might have access to them. The issue of disclosure of information pertaining to personal tax records is a highly sensitive one. Currently, the IRS and NARA are attempting to find a mutually acceptable way to allow NARA to appraise records consisting of or containing tax return information. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, April 8, 1997, p. 9; and Supplement to Defendants' Opposition, January 27, 1998. The Plaintiffs want to interrupt the agency's records preservation compliance process to discover if the otherwise exempt documents in question can be reformulated into records beyond the protection of section 6103 by removing identifying personal tax return information.
[9] In this action, the documents in question consist principally of files from the Office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, criminal investigative case files, and certain corporate tax returns. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Id., p. 9. The documents sought in the other Tax Analysts case were records that provided IRS field offices with advice about the tax laws in response to questions regarding specific factual situations. 117 F.3d at 616. The appeals court decided that the release of legal analysis sections of these documents could not be exempted by section 6103 and still be in accord with section 6110 of the Internal Revenue Code, which requires the IRS to disclose "any written determination" after removing identifying details and certain other information. Id. at 615. That court noted that a "written determination" is a "ruling, determination letter, or technical advice memorandum." Id. (quoting, 26 U.S.C. 6110(b)(1)). This decision was narrowly tailored to follow section 6110, not to change section 6103. The Plaintiffs have not shown that there is new law to apply in THIS case that applies to the documents at issue in this case; therefore, this claim fails under the standard for a motion for reconsideration.
[10] It should be noted that this Court's decision on August 21, 1997, contains comments on the exemption in section 6103 with regard to Plaintiffs' claim, but does not assert that Plaintiffs' claim in this area is ripe for review.
[11] Ripeness is the overarching issue here. Plaintiffs' claims are simply not ripe for review. As stated in the Court's Memorandum Opinion of August 21, 1997, an agency action must reach finality before review by a court, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 704. NARA and the IRS are currently working towards resolution of the circumstances which gave rise to the improper handling of agency records. While the issue of ripeness in this case does not hinge upon Defendants' compliance or noncompliance within a certain time frame, the Court is aware of Defendants' prediction for completion of the ongoing records preservation process as being April of 1998. The Court is loathe to intervene when final agency action has not taken place and the time frame for completion is reasonable, as it is in this case.
[12] Plaintiffs' posit a syllogism in support of their claim that discovery is appropriate in this case, which states that "[d]iscovery is appropriate where a Plaintiff disputes facts that Defendants claim deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction." See Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment Entered on August 21, 1997, p. 4. Plaintiffs' major premise in this syllogism is flawed, because Plaintiffs have not shown that there are any disputed issues of fact with regard to RIPENESS. "[A] mere unsubstantiated allegation of superior qualifications creates no 'genuine issue of fact.'" Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
[13] Additionally, Plaintiffs claim that the Court erred in deciding that lack of ripeness requires granting a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The cases upon which Plaintiffs rely to support their request for discovery are inapposite, as none addresses the issue of ripeness. Lack of ripeness denies the Court subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Shelter Creek Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1988).
[14] Plaintiffs point out that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was filed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter." While a question of subject matter jurisdiction can center around issues other than ripeness (see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, 1332), in the instant case, the issue deciding the 12(b)(1) motion is ripeness. The Plaintiffs have not shown that the Court erred in its judgment, and their claim thus fails.
Conclusion
[15] For the reasons set out above, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. Once the agency's record preservation process has been concluded and the process has been allowed an opportunity to take full effect, Plaintiffs may file a new complaint if they are dissatisfied with the results of the process. The Court will not interrupt that process now, and this action is dismissed. An appropriate Order is attached.
June L. Green
United States District Court Judge
Date: March 30, 1998