ABA Tax Section Says Scope Of Regs On Quid Pro Quo Contributions Should Be Expanded.

The American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Washington, has commented on the proposed regs under section 170(f)(8) regarding substantiation and acknowledgment of charitable contributions. It says that the proposed regs include some reasonable solutions to difficult problems, but it offers suggestions for improvement.

First, the tax section recommends that the provision permitting some charities and donors to disregard rights or privileges received as a quid pro quo in exchange for a membership payment of $75 or less should be indexed for inflation. It also suggests that the provision be expanded to cover organizations other than museums and membership organizations because many nonmember organizations provide de minimis benefits to donors. Furthermore, the tax section maintains, the provision in the proposed regs is far more workable than the 2 percent or fixed dollar limitation provided in Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471, and should replace it. Discounts offered by businesses that recognize a donor's membership card, it says, are no different from discounts offered by the organization itself and should be treated similarly under the quid pro quo rules.

The tax section also recommends that the regulations provide guidance to religious organizations concerning what constitutes an intangible religious benefit, what constitutes a quid pro quo, and what qualifies as a deductible payment. At a minimum, it says, the Service should provide examples of benefits that are not intangible, for example, pastoral counseling.

Finally, the tax section says that the Service should make clear that the substantiation requirements for gifts of $250 or more are not "recordkeeping" or "return" requirements that apply to charitable lead or other trusts or estates claiming deductions under section 642(c). If they are, it says, a generous grandfather period should be provided.

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February 13, 1996

Ms. Margaret M. Richardson

Re: Comments on Proposed Regulations Issued Pursuant to Section

Dear Ms. Richardson:

[1] I am enclosing comments on the above noted report as prepared by members of the Committee on Exempt Organizations. This report was reviewed by members of our Committee on Government Submissions.

[2] This report represents the individual views of the members who prepared it and does not represent the position of the American Bar Association or of the Section of Taxation.

Sincerely,

N. Jerold Cohen

Enclosure

cc: Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary Tax Policy, Department of

Comments on Proposed Regulations

Project No. 9511-023

[3] The following comments are the individual views of members of the Exempt Organizations Committee of the Section of Taxation who prepared them and do not represent the position of the American Bar Association or the Section of Taxation.

[4] These comments were prepared by individual members of the Exempt Organizations Committee of the Section of Taxation. Principal responsibility was exercised by Carolyn M. Osteen and Lawrence Katzenstein. The comments were reviewed by Richard Gallagher of the Committee on Government Submissions.

[5] Although many of the members of the Section of Taxation who participated in the preparation of these comments necessarily have clients affected by the federal tax principles addressed by these comments or have advised clients on the application of such principles, no such member (or the firm or the organization to which such member belongs) has been engaged by a client to make a government submission with respect to, or otherwise to influence the development or outcome of, the specific subject matter of these comments.

Contact Person: Douglas Mancino

Date: November 22, 1995

INTRODUCTION

[6] On August 4, 1995, the Internal Revenue Service issued a notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of public hearing with respect to rules relating to substantiation and acknowledgment. These proposed regulations include a number of reasonable solutions to difficult problems proposed by the statute. Foremost among these is the $75 membership quid pro quo provision at Proposed Treasury Reg. Section 1.170A-13(f)(8)(i)(B)(1). Allowing charities and their donors to disregard rights or privileges that members may exercise frequently in exchange for membership payments of $75 or less will help to simplify the administrative burdens of compliance with the statute. While these regulations represent a commendable effort, we would like to suggest certain areas and ways in which they might be expanded or improved.

BACKGROUND

Pre-1993 Limitations on Gifts Subject to Quid Pro Quo

[7] The Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for "contributions" to charitable organizations; courts have long accepted the notion that the term "contribution" is synonymous with "gift." As stated by the Supreme Court: "A payment of money generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the contributor expects a substantial benefit in return. . . . The sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate consideration." /1/ The expectation of the receipt of a quid pro quo for making a gift will negate any showing of detached and disinterested generosity.

[8] The receipt of a substantial return benefit may disqualify a charitable deduction. Thus, a payment for tuition is not a deductible gift, /2/ a payment for tickets to a football game or a concert is not deductible even if the donor does not attend, /3/ and a payment for a raffle ticket is not deductible /4/ because in each case the donor is presumed to receive a benefit that is commensurate with the payment made. A payment to obtain the right to occupy a retirement home cannot be deducted even though the payor did not want to occupy the facility immediately and had refused benefits. /5/ Similarly, where a taxpayer is directed to make charitable "contributions" in order to obtain or preserve some benefit, the contributions will not be deductible as charitable contributions, although they may be deductible as business expenses. /6/

[9] An incidental benefit such as the promotion of good will or naming a building or a professorship in honor of the donor is not considered the type of consideration that will disqualify a gift for the charitable deduction, /7/ but it is not clear what kinds of benefits will be considered "incidental." Contributions for participation in religious services, the saying of masses, and pew rents have been ruled to involve only incidental benefits that do not disqualify the contribution. /8/ However, in Hernandez v. Comm'r, /9/ the Supreme Court denied deductions for amounts paid to the Church of Scientology according to formal, fixed fee schedules. The Court found that the auditing and personal counseling in return for these payments had "external features strongly suggesting a quid pro quo exchange." Moreover, the Court maintained that expanding the charitable deduction to practices such as auditing would expand the deduction far beyond what Congress originally intended. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall declared that if the Scientologists' deductions were allowed, the tuition payments to parochial schools, church-sponsored counseling, or medical care provided in church- affiliated medical institutions could then be plausibly deducted. In Hernandez, the Court has clearly limited charitable deductions to circumstances where no formal system of exchange exists and has resolved a split of authority that had developed in the circuit courts of appeals. /10/

[10] On the other hand, if the taxpayer spends more than is required to obtain the benefit, the excess may be deductible as a charitable contribution. /11/ Thus, if the donor buys a ticket to a fund raising event in a situation where it can be clearly shown that the purchase price exceeds the fair value of the ticket, the donor may deduct the excess cost. /12/ This is an area in which there is considerable misunderstanding and in which the possibility for abuse is significant.

[11] In Rev. Rul. 67-246, which articulates the theory that the excess payment may be deductible, the IRS "suggested" that charities sponsoring fund raising events or providing a privilege or benefit in return for the donor's contribution should determine the value of the benefit and the amount of the contribution and state the respective amounts in making the solicitation and in acknowledging payment. However, many charitable organizations failed to follow this "suggested" course of action, and, responding to the concern expressed by Congress that some charitable organizations were not making adequate disclosure of the extent to which the contribution being solicited is not deductible, in 1988 the IRS instituted a "Special Emphasis Program" in which it attempted to ascertain the extent to which taxpayers were furnished accurate and sufficient information concerning the deductibility of their contributions. The IRS collected samples of fund raising materials, and pressure began to develop for legislation to force charities to make the allocation. /13/

[12] In Revenue Procedure 90-12 /14/ the IRS provided guidelines to assist charitable organizations in advising donors or patrons of the deductible amount of contributions or payments. No reduction of the donor's deduction will be required if one of two "safe harbors" applies:

a. The fair market value of benefits received does not exceed

b. The payment is $25 or more ($33 in 1995 after adjustment for

c. Newsletters or program guides, other than commercial quality

[13] The line between a quid pro quo that would defeat the charitable deduction completely and "inadequate" consideration that would reduce, but not eliminate, the charitable deduction was based on the donor's ability to demonstrate a donative intent and the inadequacy of the consideration received. For example, in Transamerica Corp, v. U.S. /15/ the taxpayer contributed self- destructing nitrate based -film to the Library of Congress. The Library was obliged to store, care for and maintain the film at its expense and was permitted to convert the film to safety film. The Library agreed that, except for access by the University of Wisconsin and the taxpayer, all use of the original and converted films would be limited to private research at the Library; no reproductions and no public screenings were allowed. The Library converted the film to safety film at a cost of more than $1 million. The Court disallowed the taxpayer's deduction on the ground that the benefit reserved by the taxpayer was more than incidental and, in the absence of a showing of donative intent and proof that the value of the benefit obtained was less than the value of the donated property, was sufficient to defeat the deduction completely. This case does not stand for the proposition that any substantial quid pro quo will defeat the gift, but rather for the principle that if the quid pro quo is more than incidental, the donor has the burden of showing donative intent and the inadequacy of the quid pro quo.

[14] 1993 saw the passage of the Onmibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("1993 Act") which contained several provisions designed to force charities to acknowledge explicitly any benefits which a donor may obtain in connection with a gift.

New Substantiation Rules

[15] As part of Congress' on-going effort to ensure that donors deduct only the true value of gifts to charity, and in part as "payment" for the repeal of the tax preference treatment or AMT on gifts of appreciated property, the 1993 Act included more stringent reporting requirements for donors and charities making or receiving gifts of as little as $75. /16/

Acknowledgment

[16] Any contribution of $250 or more made on or after January 1, 1994 will not be deductible for federal income tax purposes unless the donor has an acknowledgement from the charitable organization. The acknowledgement or receipt must contain three items:

a. the amount of cash contributed or, in the case of a noncash

b. a statement of whether or not the charitable donee provided

c. if any goods or services were provided, a description and

[17] Only gifts which are deductible for income tax purposes are affected. Gifts by private foundations and decedents' estates are not affected. Intangible religious benefits or incidental benefits such as increased name recognition need not be valued.

[18] A charity such as a United Way or community foundation organization may receive a contribution from a donor and distribute that contribution, whether pursuant to a donor's instructions or otherwise, to one or more charities as ultimate recipients. In that case, the original charitable recipient will be treated as the donee for acknowledgement purposes. /17/

Quid Pro Quo Disclosure

[19] In a further effort to ensure that donors do not deduct contributions when goods or services are received in return, the 1993 Act requires a charity which provides goods or services to the donor in return for a contribution of more than $75 made on or after January 1, 1994 to furnish the donor with a written statement indicating a good faith estimate of the value of the goods or services so provided. A specific disclosure either on the solicitation or receipt for the contribution must inform the donor that the deductible portion of the contribution is limited to the excess of the contribution over the value of the goods or services received in return. /18/

REGULATORY RELIEF

[20] Proposed Treasury Reg. Section 1.170(A)(13)(f)(8)(i)(B)(1) includes a $75 threshold which provides considerable relief to charities and their donors, allowing them to disregard rights or privileges that members only exercise frequently in exchange for a membership payment of $75, or less. Without such relief these organizations would have to struggle to place a practically indeterminable value on privileges such as free admissions or gift shop discounts that some members would take frequent advantage of but others would never use at all. The $75 amount was apparently taken from Section 6115 of the Code, which requires donees to disclose any quid pro quo contribution in excess of $75. While this dollar amount was perfectly reasonable when it was added to the Code in 1993 and its value in current dollars has not dropped significantly in the two years since enactment, in five or ten or fifteen years the $75 threshold may be worth so little as to be meaningless. Thus, we would suggest that the proposed regulations might be altered to index the $75 amount for inflation, assuming such action can be taken administratively.

$75 Threshold should be Expanded - Substituted for Rev Proc. 90-

[21] We would also like to suggest that the $75 threshold be extended to cover organizations other than the museums and membership organizations which would benefit under the proposed regulations. As the proposed regulation currently reads, one segment of the charitable community, membership organizations, receive favored treatment, but a similar rationale could be applied to various organizations that have donor benefits. Many non-member organizations provide de-minimis benefits to their donors -- for example, social service agencies and cultural organizations which conduct modest fund raising events for donors and supporters.

[22] An evening lecture event at a local college might include donors of $1,000 or more and friends. If coffee, white wine, soft drinks and hors d'oeuvres are provided, those benefits could easily exceed the $20 de minimis limit permitted by Rev. Proc. 90-12 for donors at the $1,000 level (but be well within a $75 limit). Many organizations rely on volunteer staff or overworked paid staff, who do not fully understand or accurately apply the Rev. Proc. 90-12 standards which are complex; in many such cases the organization will simply fix on the $66 amount, for example, without recognizing that the test involves a lesser of 2 percent or $66 amount. The $75 threshold, which is far more workable than the 2 percent or fixed dollar amount limitation described in Rev. Proc. 90-12, could be adopted as a general de minimis test for contributions or admission to cultural events and benefits where the value of food, entertainment, or other benefits offered (such as admissions to performances on an "as available" basis shortly before the event), does not exceed $75 and no donor may be invited to more than a fixed number, such as five, events per year. (Perhaps five per year would be a reasonable limitation to avoid abuse).

[23] The membership benefits exception could reasonably be further extended to cover organizations such as universities which provide donors with benefits including discounts at the university bookstore, free parking at campus events, and so forth. It would be enormously helpful to fix a value which could be utilized for such items as free parking or discounts. Since there will inevitably be variations in the value of such items depending on geographic location and time of day or year, no value which an organization fixed on parking would be correct at all times. Discounts in ticket prices, bookstore sales and similar items could also have an assigned arbitrary value such as $10 which would help many organizations honestly seeking to advise donors. Since such discounts are disregarded entirely in the context of membership organizations, perhaps they can be disregarded by donors to non-member organizations also. We would suggest that there is no reason to treat these charities differently simply because they do not have members as such.

Donor Benefits from Sources other than the Donee

[24] The proposed regulations provide that certain membership benefits which may be exercised frequently during the year may be disregarded. Many charities, however, are the beneficiaries of discounts offered by donors, such as businesses seeking promotion of their own interests. The businesses recognize a donor's membership card and provide discounts which encourage the donor to trade with the particular merchant. For example, a store selling records and compact discs may agree with a symphony orchestra or public broadcasting station that any contributor over a certain level receive a store discount. The merchant uses the informal relationship with the local charity as a means to attract customers and good will. From the perspective of the charitable organization, this is no different than a discount offered by the organization itself and should be treated similarly and ignored for purposes of the quid pro quo rules.

Intangible Religious Benefits

[25] Under the new substantiation and quid pro quo provisions, religious organizations must make decisions about what constitutes an intangible religious benefit, what constitutes a quid pro quo, and what their members should consider deductible payments. The proposed regulations should provide guidance for religious organizations to follow in making determinations about what constitutes an intangible religious benefit. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a substantial lack of uniformity in how various payments to religious organizations are treated, even within the same denomination.

[26] Many religious organizations provide benefits to congregants which, although they may be in part educational, are in fact primarily religious in nature. For example, a church may offer Sunday school or bible study classes or a synagogue may provide Bar Mitzvah or confirmation classes to congregants. The regulations should provide that such religious benefits, provided by churches, synagogues or the like, will be deemed to be intangible religious benefits even though they are provided to congregants rather than the public at large so long as no secular educational requirement is fulfilled or credit or degree is awarded in connection with such classes.

[27] Although it may not be possible to address the entire range of issues by regulation, we believe, at a minimum that the Service should provide examples of benefits that are not intangible (e.g. pastoral counseling, fees for attendance at recreational church camps) and those that are (pew rents, admission fees for special religious services, membership fees at church or synagogues).

Substantiation in Cases of Payment of Insurance Premiums

[28] Charitable organizations are occasionally made the owners of life insurance policies insuring the lives of their donors. Typically, the donor makes a gift of the life insurance policy to the charity which is acknowledged in the manner required by Section 170(f)(8). Subsequently, the donor makes policy premium payments for which he is entitled to an income tax deduction. Although in some cases, the donor will contribute funds to the charity to cover the charity's premium obligation, in many other cases the donor will receive a bill from the insurer and will simply make payment directly to the insurer. In that situation, the charity will not know the date or amount of the premium payment or even whether the premium was paid at all. The donor could, however, produce confirmation from the insurer that he has made the payment and that the policy is owned by the charity. Substantiation by the charity in such cases should not be a requirement of deductibility.

Contributions or Grants by Trusts or Estates.

[29] Although the proposed regulations make it clear that the rules regarding substantiation of gifts of $250 or more do not apply to gifts TO charitable lead trusts or charitable remainder annuity or unitrasts, we are concerned that a technical issue may exist with respect to grants BY trusts and estates, and particularly charitable lead trusts.

[30] Proposed amendments to paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of Treas. Reg. sections 1.642(c)-1(a) and 1.642(c)-2(e) were published in the Federal Register on May 5, 1988. According to the announcement accompanying publication of these proposed amendments, the purpose of the proposed amendments was to impose on donors claiming deductions under Section 642(c) the then new appraisal requirements with respect to deductions in excess of $5,000 claimed for charitable contributions of certain property.

[31] The proposed amendment with respect to 1.642(c)-1 would permit a deduction under Section 642(c) in lieu of Section 170(c) "(provided that the recordkeeping and return requirements for charitable contributions contained in section 1.70A-13 are satisfied)."

[32] The proposed amendment with respect to 1.642(c)-2 would deny the set-aside deduction under paragraphs (a), (b)(2), or (c) of 1.642(c)-2 "unless the recordkeeping and return requirements for charitable contribution deductions contained in section 1.170A-13 are satisfied."

[33] We recommend that it be made clear that the substantiation requirements for gifts for $250 or more are not "recordkeeping" or "return" requirements that apply to charitable lead or other trusts or estates in claiming deductions under Section 642(c) or that, if they are (which we do not believe they are intended to be), that a generous grandfathering period be allowed since application of these substantiation rules under any provision other than Section 170(c) would be a considerable surprise to the taxpayer community.

CONCLUSION

[34] The proposed regulations provide extremely helpful guidance in dealing with a number of difficult and complex problems posed by the legislation. Nevertheless, many of the charitable organizations attempting to administer their programs in light of the new legislation are frustrated and confused by the valuation problems posed by modest quid pro quo arrangements with donors. By expanding the $75 threshold to permit it to cover a range of de minimis benefits and substituting that for the 2 percent or dollar amount limits imposed by Rev. Proc. 90-12, a number of these problems could be resolved. The proposed regulations represent a serious effort by the Treasury to provide reasonable interpretation of rules which have been widely misunderstood is very encouraging to a large number of charitable organizations confronting a confusing array of rules.

FOOTNOTES

/1/ U.S. v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 86-1 USTC paragraph 9482 (1986). In this case the Court held that ABA members who purchased life insurance from the ABA's affiliated tax-exempt foundation at a premium equal to or less than that available from a commercial insurer could not deduct the policy dividends assigned to the Endowment because the purchasers did not "voluntarily" make the assignment, and the Court viewed the assignment as a "payment" for the life insurance. The deduction was subsequently rescued by changing the program so that the assignment was voluntary. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8725056. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8707003 a Section 501(c)(3) alumni association which received dividends and death benefits through insurance activities and provided insurance to members similar to the American Bar Association was permitted to retain tax exempt status so long as insurance activities were insubstantial. Income from insurance activities was unrelated; however, dividends payable to members and assigned expressly by members to the organization could be deducted as charitable contributions. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9029042.

/2/ See e.g., Winters v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 778, 72-2 USTC paragraph 9729 (2d Cir. 1972); Rev. Rul. 79-99, 1979-1 C.B. 108 (contribution in lieu of tuition not deductible [to extent it does not exceed the fair market value of the child's education]). Compare Seed v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 265 (1971) (contributions for vacations); Blake v. Commr, T.C. Memo 1981-579, 42 T.C.M. 1336 (1981), aff'd, 697 F.2d 473, 83-1 USTC paragraph 9121 (2d Cir. 1982) (gift of stock to charity in expectation of purchase of yacht at an inflated price not deductible).

/3/ Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 (where price of ticket to athletic event or fund raiser equals fair market value of admission, no deduction even if ticket unused; if price exceeds fair market value, excess may be taken as charitable deduction).

/4/ See e.g., Goldman v, Comm'r, 46 T.C. 136 (1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1967).

/5/ See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9423001.

/6/ See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8749020 (Sept. 1, 1987) in which the IRS ruled that payments to local charities which the holder of an interim broadcast license was ordered to make by the FCC in order to retain the license were not deductible as charitable contributions but rather as business expenses under IRC Section 162. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9309006 in which an operator of a grocery claim made contributions to charities and other organizations as a form of goodwill advertising to keep the grocer's name before the public. The ruling said the gifts were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses though that analysis did not extend to payments to clubs or other non-charitable organizations.

/7/ See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8145020 (payments by newspaper publishing company to fund a first grade reading program in the local school system were treated as deductible charitable contributions by donor company in spite of some business benefit).

/8/ Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 C.B. 49; Rev. Rul. 71-580, 1971-2 C.B. 235; Rev. Rul. 78-366, 1978-2 C.B. 241.

/9/ 109 S.Ct. 2136, 89-1 USTC paragraph 9347 (1989) affirming 819 F.2d 1212 (1st Cir. 1987) and 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987). See also U.S. v. American Bar Endowment, note 4 above, where taxpayers were unable to deduct insurance premium paid to charity in excess of market premium.

/10/ The Second, Sixth and Eighth Circuits had held that the auditing payments were deductible, even though the member could not have received the auditing services without having made the payment, on the ground that the payments were made for religious purposes and the courts ought not to become entangled in trying to value the religious benefit that the payor receives from making the payment. Staples v. Comm'r, 821 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987); Foley v. Comm'r 844 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1988); Neher v. Comm'r, 852 F.2d 848 (6th Cir. 1988). However, the Tax Court and the First, Fourth, Tenth and the Ninth Circuits had held that even though the auditing services may be religious, since the services were personal in nature and could not be obtained without making the payment, they were a sufficient quid pro quo to disqualify the claimed charitable deduction. Graham v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 575, aff'd 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1987); Miller v. Comm'r, 829 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1987); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 819 F.2d 1212 (1st Cir. 1987); Christiansen v. Comm'r, 843 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1988).

/11/ See Osborne v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 575 (1986), in which the taxpayer conveyed to a city property on which he had constructed a drainage facility. Although he was obligated to make some expenditures for drainage, he expended more than was required and was permitted to deduct a portion of the expenditure in excess of the mandated amount; and see Maier Brewing Co. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1987- 385, 54 T.C.M. 46 (1987). But compare Allen v. Commr, 92 T.C. 1 (1989) where the taxpayer was denied a deduction for a contribution to a charitable organization made with funds donated from an affiliated organization since funds originated with donee.

/12/ Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.

/13/ See IRS Publication 1391 (June 1988) a copy of which was mailed to 400,000 charitable organizations; that publication referred to the concern of Congress as expressed by the House Budget Committee and included a copy of Rev. Rul. 67-246 with a request from the IRS that each charitable organization "keep this ruling in mind" if it sponsors a fund raising event. Clearly the nation's charities were being given a chance to police themselves. See Silk, Charitable Deductions and Procedures, Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 1988 at 741. IRC Section 6113, added by the 1987 Act, now requires any organization not described in Section 170(c) (i.e. non-charitable organizations which are not eligible to receive deductible contributions) with annual gross receipts of $100,000 or more to state explicitly in any fund raising material that contributions made to such an organization are not deductible; Section 6710 provides a penalty of $1,000 per day for each day on which such a failure occurred, with a maximum penalty of $10,000; the maximum is not applicable if the requirement is intentionally disregarded by the organization. See also questions and answers issued September 28, 1988 by Robert I. Brauer, IRS Assistant Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations to explain new IRS education program on charitable contributions.

/14/ 1990-1 C.B. 471, amplified by Rev. Proc. 92-49, 1992-1 C.B. 987.

/15/ 90-1 USTC paragraph 50,255 (Fed. Cir., 1990).

/16/ Sections 170(f)(8) and 6115. See Ruge and Speizman, Substantiation and Disclosure of Charitable Contributions: Congress Asks for More, TAX NOTES (Nov. 1, 1993) 609.

/17/ Temp. Reg. section 1.170A-13T(c). The regulation makes specific reference to a Principal Combined Fund Organization for the purpose of the Combined Federal Campaign as an example of the sort of organization which receives estimated contributions; however, the regulation seems to apply equally to a community foundation or donor- advised fund.

/18/ Section 6115.

END OF FOOTNOTES