FOIA SUIT DISMISSED -- DOCUMENTS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE.

                 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

[1] The Department of Justice's renewed motion for summary judgment is before the Court. These consolidated cases concern two claims by the plaintiff, Fred W. Allnutt, Sr. ["Allnutt"], under the Freedom of Information Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. section 552 ["FOIA"]. In a Memorandum Opinion of May 23, 2000, the Court ruled on objections to a Report and Recommendation ["Report"] prepared by U.S. Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm ["the Magistrate Judge"] to resolve various pending motions.

[2] Inter alia, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny summary judgment to the Department of Justice ["DOJ"] with respect to FOIA exemption 7 ["the law-enforcement exemption"]. The law-enforcement exemption excludes certain documents from disclosure, if they were compiled for law-enforcement purposes. The exemption applies to the extent that producing the documents "would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law." 5 U.S.C. section 552 (b)(7)(E). DOJ objected to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation regarding the law-enforcement exception.

[3] The Court denied part of the Department of Justice's Motion for Summary Judgment, without prejudice, ordering the Department to submit a document ("Document 10" in the Court's prior opinion) to the Court for in camera review. The Court then ordered DOJ either to disclose the document to Allnutt or to renew its motion for summary judgment. DOJ has renewed the motion.

[4] Information withheld under the law-enforcement exemption must have been "compiled for law-enforcement purposes." Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1982). ¹ The Internal Revenue Service has the law-enforcement mandate required under the exemption. See, e.g., Lewis v. IRS, 823 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1987).

[5] The Court's prior Memorandum Opinion explained the shortcomings in DoJ's blanket assertion that all material related to civil bankruptcy litigation is compiled for law-enforcement purposes. The Court further noted that the record contained "almost no explanation of how Document 10 was generated, what its original purpose was, or how it came to be used in the bankruptcy case." Mem. Op. at 17. In camera review of the document has persuaded the Court that it was compiled for law enforcement purposes. The document is an internal memorandum of the Internal Revenue Service, describing research into Allnutt's tax filings in the 1980s. Data compiled in connection with an audit or collection effort related to an individual's income tax liability is subject to the exemption even if the information was compiled for civil enforcement purposes. Williams v. IRS, 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973); Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 2d 955, 956 (E.D. Mich. 1998). After his bankruptcy filing, Allnutt was indicted for conspiracy and tax evasion. Mem. Op. at 3. The data collection described in the document concerns Allnutt's tax liability, a subject of the civil bankruptcy litigation and of the related criminal case. The Court finds that it was compiled for law-enforcement purposes under the law-enforcement exemption.

[6] The government seeks to redact only the computer command codes used to access federal databases to obtain information, including Social Security numbers, on taxpayers. The release of such information could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law through access of unauthorized people to the databases. 5 U.S.C. section 552(b)(7)(E). The government has thus met the last part of its burden under FOIA's law-enforcement exemption, and the Court grants summary judgment to the Department of Justice on the remaining document.

                                   Joseph H. Young

ORDER

[7] In accordance with the reasons set forth in the attached memorandum of law, it is this 25th day of October, 2000, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED, that:

1. The Department of Justice's Motion for Summary Judgment BE, and the same IS, hereby GRANTED; and that

2. Final judgment BE, and the same IS, hereby ENTERED in favor of the defendants in these actions.

                                   Joseph H. Young