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Standard Oil Subsidiary Argues Interest Expenses Paid by Affiliates Are Allowable Deductions of Subsidiary

SEP. 5, 2000

BP Exploration & Oil Inc. v. United States

DATED SEP. 5, 2000
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES
  • Case Name
    BP EXPLORATION & OIL INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
  • Court
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
  • Docket
    No. 00-5100
  • Authors
    Lee, William S.
    Bowen, Nancy T.
  • Institutional Authors
    Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP
  • Cross-Reference
    BP Exploration & Oil Inc. v. United States, 85 AFTR2d Par. 2000-617;

    No. 97-648 T (April 28, 2000) (For a summary of that opinion, see Tax

    Notes, May 8, 2000, p. 780; for the full text, see Doc 2000-12245 (10

    original pages) or 2000 TNT 85-5 Database 'Tax Notes Today 2000', View '(Number'.)
  • Code Sections
  • Subject Area/Tax Topics
  • Index Terms
    windfall profit tax, removal price
  • Industry Groups
    Mining and extraction
  • Jurisdictions
  • Language
    English
  • Tax Analysts Document Number
    Doc 2000-24105 (105 original pages)
  • Tax Analysts Electronic Citation
    2000 TNT 191-57

BP Exploration & Oil Inc. v. United States

 

=============== SUMMARY ===============

 

In a brief for the Federal Circuit, a subsidiary of Standard Oil has argued that interest expenses paid or incurred by affiliates for the benefit of the subsidiary are "allowable deductions" of the subsidiary.

BP Exploration & Oil Inc., previously known as Sohio Petroleum Company, was a wholly owned subsidiary of The Standard Oil Company of Ohio, and was included in the consolidated federal income tax return for the affiliated group of corporations of which Standard Oil was the common parent. The company itself was engaged in the business of finding and producing crude oil and gas, and owned interests in properties that produced crude oil subject to the windfall profit tax (WPT). BP timely filed and paid its WPT for 1984 and 1985 and later timely filed claims for refund for those same periods. During the IRS's examination of BP's refund request, the company amended its claims, taking the position that an allocable portion of the net interest expense that was paid by its affiliates should be taken into account in determining net income limitation for WPT purposes.

BP subsequently filed a suit for refund in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims on the same grounds that it had raised with the IRS in its amended claims for refund. The Court of Federal Claims granted the government's motion for summary judgment motion and held that the interest expense paid or incurred by Standard Oil and its affiliates could not be taken into account in determining BP's WPT liability. (For a summary of that opinion, see Tax Notes, May 8, 2000, p. 780; for the full text, see Doc 2000-12245 (10 original pages) or 2000 TNT 85-5 Database 'Tax Notes Today 2000', View '(Number'.)

BP argues that under the section 4988 regs that control the determination of the net income limitation for WPT purposes and for income tax purposes, taxpayers must reduce gross income by all "allowable deductions." BP contends that these "allowable deductions" include interest expense, which may be deductible either under section 163 or under section 162 as an ordinary and necessary business expense. In this case, BP insists the interest in issue was paid by Standard Oil and other members of the affiliated group for the benefit of BP.

The company also contends that under Revenue Ruling 84-68, 1984- 1 C.B. 31, and Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 119 (1984), when a parent corporation pays an expense for the benefit of its wholly-owned subsidiary, that payment is recharacterized for income tax purposes. Under this recharacterization, the parent corporation has made a capital contribution to the subsidiary, and the subsidiary has paid an expense the subsidiary may deduct as an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162. The oil company further asserts that interest expense on borrowings by other members of the affiliated group that were, in part, for the benefit of and provided to BP are recharacterized for income tax purposes as well. BP insists that this expense is recharacterized as a constructive distribution by the other members of the group to Standard Oil, followed by a contribution to the capital of BP by Standard Oil, and payment by BP. Therefore, the company maintains all the interest in issue in this case is an "allowable deduction" of BP for federal income tax purposes and must be taken into account in determining BP's net income limitation for WPT purposes.

 

=============== FULL TEXT ===============

 

APPEAL FROM THE

 

UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

 

IN 97-CV-648,

 

SENIOR JUDGE MOODY R. TIDWELL, III.

 

 

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, BP EXPLORATION & OIL INC.

 

 

September 5, 2000

 

 

Of Counsel:

 

 

Nancy T. Bowen

 

Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.

 

1301 McKinney, Suite 5100

 

Houston, Texas 77010-3095

 

(713) 651-5151

 

 

WILLIAM S. LEE

 

FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P.

 

1301 McKinney, Suite 5100

 

Houston, Texas 77010-3095

 

(713) 651-5151

 

 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST

 

 

Counsel for the appellant BP Exploration & Oil Inc. certifies

 

the following:

 

 

1. The full name of every party or amicus represented by me is:

 

 

BP Exploration & Oil Inc.

 

 

2. The name of the real party in interest (if the party named in

 

the caption is not the real party in interest) represented by me is:

 

 

Not applicable.

 

 

3. All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that

 

own 10 percent or more of the stock of the party or amicus curiae

 

represented by me are:

 

 

The Standard Oil Company (which owns 100 percent of BP

 

Exploration & Oil Inc.)

 

 

BP America, Inc. (which owns 100 percent of The Standard Oil

 

Company)

 

 

BP America Holdings Limited (which owns 100 percent of BP

 

America, Inc.)

 

 

BP Amoco p.l.c. (a publicly traded company which owns 100

 

percent of BP America Holdings Limited)

 

 

4. The names of all law firms and the partners or associates

 

that appeared for the party or amicus now represented by me in the

 

trial court or agency or are expected to appear in this court are:

 

 

Law Firm: Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.

 

 

Name of partners: William S. Lee

 

Nancy T. Bowen

 

 

William S. Lee

 

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

 

 

September 5, 2000

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

Certificate of Interest

 

Table of Contents

 

Table of Authorities

 

Statement of Related Cases

 

Statement of Jurisdiction

 

Statement of the Issue

 

Statement of the Case

 

Statement of the Facts

 

 

A. Facts

 

 

B. The Opinion of the Court Below

 

 

Summary of Argument

 

 

A. Statement of the Standard of Review

 

 

B. Introduction

 

 

C. The Court Below Erred, Because SPC's Alternative Position

 

Relies on and Fully Complies with the Requirements of Federal

 

Income Tax Law

 

 

D. The Court Below Erred in Concluding That SPC's Alternative

 

Position Violated Three Specific Requirements of Federal Tax

 

Law

 

 

E. The Chevron Case Does Not Control the Outcome of SPC's Case

 

 

Conclusion and Statement of Relief Sought

 

 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 

 

CASES:

 

 

Bemer v. United States, 282 F.2d 720 (1960)

 

 

Beyer v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1990)

 

 

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 77 AFTR 2d (RIA) 96-1412 (S.D.

 

Tex. 1995), aff'd mem, 81 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1966)

 

 

Cox v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1270 (1971), modified 58 T.C. 105 (1972)

 

 

Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940)

 

 

Esmond Mills v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1943)

 

 

Flood v. United States, 33 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994)

 

 

Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943)

 

 

Koppers United Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 103, (1943),

 

aff'd per curiam, 141 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1944)

 

 

Lenz v. Commissioner, 101 T. C. 260 (1993)

 

 

Little People's School, Inc. v. United States,, 842 F.2d 570 (1st

 

Cir. 1988)

 

 

McNutt-Boyce Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 462 (1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d

 

957 (5th Cir. 1963)

 

 

In re Estate of Nissen v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 230 (4th Cir.

 

1965)

 

 

Reinhardt v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 511 (1985)

 

 

Sharp v. United States, 27 Cl. Ct. 52 (1992), aff'd, 14 F.3d 583

 

(Fed. Cir. 1993)

 

 

South American Gold & Platinum Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1297, aff'd

 

per curiam, 168 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1948)

 

 

Suntiger, Inc. v. Scientific Research Funding Group, 189 F.3d 1327

 

(Fed. Cir. 1999)

 

 

Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 119 (1984)

 

 

Ungerman v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1131 (1987)

 

 

United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955)

 

 

United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179 (1923)

 

 

Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523 (1943)

 

 

Young & Rubicam, Inc. v. United States, 410 F.2d 1233 (1969)

 

 

Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

 

 

STATUTES:

 

 

Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.):

 

 

Section 162

 

Section 163

 

Section 613

 

Section 613A

 

Section 4988

 

 

MISCELLANEOUS:

 

 

Treas. Reg. section 1.613-4

 

Treas. Reg. section 1.613-5(a)

 

Treas. Reg. section 51.4988-2(b)

 

Rev. Rul. 84-68, 1984-1 C.B. 31

 

Jacob Mertens, Jr., Mertens Law of Fed. Income Taxation section 21.93

 

at 152 (1990)

 

 

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

[1] No other appeal in or from the same civil action or proceeding in the Court of Federal Claims was previously before this Court or any other appellate court. We are unaware of any pending case which will directly affect this Court's decision in the instant appeal.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

[2] The appellant timely filed a claim for refund with the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") for taxes that it alleged were erroneously collected. That claim was not allowed by the IRS and the appellant filed a timely suit for refund in the United States Court of Federal Claims. That court had jurisdiction over the appellant's action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1491(a)(1).

[3] On April 28, 2000, the United States Court of Federal Claims entered a final judgment disposing of all claims with respect to all parties. (A1-9)

[4] This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1295(a)(3). The appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 5, 2000. (A205-206) The notice was timely under 28 U.S.C. sections 2107 and 2522.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

[5] Whether expenses paid or incurred by affiliates for the benefit of the taxpayer are "allowable deductions" of the taxpayer to be taken into account in determining the taxpayer's net income?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[6] The appellant, BP Exploration & Oil Inc., seeks refunds of windfall profit tax ("WPT") for the four taxable quarters of 1984 and for the taxable quarters of 1985 ending on June 30, September 30, and December 31. (A3, Add. 46) 1 During the periods in issue, the appellant's name was Sohio Petroleum Company ("SPC"), but as a result of a merger and a name change, BP Exploration & Oil Inc. is the successor in interest to SPC. (A3, 62-63, Add. 46) For purposes of clarity and consistency with references in the Court below, the appellant will hereafter be referred to as "SPC."

[7] During 1984 and 1985, SPC was engaged in the business of finding and producing crude oil and natural gas, and SPC owned interests in properties that produced crude oil subject to the WPT. (A4, Add. 47) SPC timely filed its quarterly federal excise tax returns regarding its WPT for the periods in issue and later timely filed claims for refund for those same periods. (Id.) During the IRS's examination of the claims for refund, SPC amended its claims, taking the position that an allocable portion of the net interest expense that was paid by its affiliates should be taken into account in determining SPC's net income limitation for WPT purposes. (A4, Add. 47)

[8] SPC filed a suit for refund in the United States Court of Federal Claims on September 26, 1997, raising the same grounds it had raised in the amended claims for refund. The United States (the "defendant") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 8, 1999, and SPC filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on June 8, 1999. (A4, Add. 47) On April 28, 2000, the Court granted the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, denied SPC's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and entered a Judgment for the defendant. (A1-9, Add. 45-52) BP Exploration & Oil Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 526 (2000). (A2-9, Add. 45-52) SPC filed a timely Notice of Appeal on July 5, 2000. (A205-206)

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

A. FACTS

[9] During 1984 and 1985, SPC was a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Standard Oil Company of Ohio ("Standard Oil"). (A3, Add. 46) SPC was included in the consolidated federal income tax returns for the affiliated group of corporations (the "Sohio group") of which Standard Oil was the common parent. (Id.)

[10] Although it carried on some limited refining, marketing, and other activities, Standard Oil was primarily a holding company. Its main responsibility was to provide management services, including financial services, to the Sohio group. (A3, 64, Add. 46) As part of those services, Standard Oil actively directed and controlled the day-to-day and long-term cash management system (including the financing structure) of the entire Sohio group. (A3, Add. 46) Specifically, Standard Oil was responsible for determining both the short-term and long-term cash needs of the Sohio group. (A3, 188-190, Add. 46) Based upon those needs, Standard Oil would decide whether it was necessary to issue debt to fund those needs and, if so, whether to issue the debt in the name of Standard Oil or in the name of one of the other members of the Sohio group. (A190-191)

[11] Most of the long-term debt for the entire Sohio group was issued in the name of Standard Oil, because Standard Oil was able to borrow money at lower interest rates due to its financial strength and excellent credit rating. (A75-76, 193) The amounts of Standard Oil's indebtedness in 1984 and 1985 (over $1 billion and over $1.3 billion, respectively) were much more than the amounts of funds Standard Oil needed for its limited active businesses. (A190-191) Standard Oil borrowed so that it would have enough cash to fund the anticipated cash needs of its subsidiaries, in addition to Standard Oil's own needs. (A190) Standard Oil borrowed for the general corporate purposes of the Sohio group, including SPC's business of finding and producing oil and gas, and paid or incurred interest expense on those borrowings. (A3, 64, 190, Add. 46)

[12] Standard Oil sometimes used its subsidiaries for the issuance of long-term debt for the benefit of the Sohio group, but Standard Oil unconditionally guaranteed that debt. (A76-79, 192-193) Standard Oil's guarantee reduced the interest rate otherwise payable on the debt because of Standard Oil's financial strength and excellent credit rating. (A193) Standard Oil's subsidiaries paid or incurred interest expense on amounts borrowed by the subsidiaries. (A3, 67, Add. 46) However, for the debts of certain small subsidiaries, Standard Oil itself would make the principal and interest payments on debts that were issued in the name of the subsidiary. (A193)

[13] Under this centralized financing system, Standard Oil borrowed (or used its subsidiaries to borrow) the funds necessary to satisfy the cash needs of all members of the Sohio group, including SPC. (A3, 64, 67, 190-192, Add. 46) These borrowings (1) benefited Standard Oil as a stockholder of its subsidiaries, (2) made Standard Oil's subsidiaries more profitable, and therefore more valuable to Standard Oil, (3) were not intended to, and did not, provide any direct benefit to Standard Oil's own active businesses, and (4) were not entered into to protect Standard Oil's own business standing or credit rating. (A193)

[14] The proceeds of these borrowings were deposited into a Master Funding Account that Standard Oil maintained in Cleveland, Ohio. (A191) All available cash of nearly the entire Sohio group, 2 including the proceeds of nearly all borrowings by any member of the group, was "swept" on a daily basis into the Master Funding Account. (A182-183, 188-191) The Master Funding Account was then used to fund the cash requirements of the entire Sohio group (including SPC) by transferring cash on a daily basis to fund each member's cash needs. (A3,182, 188-191, Add. 46) As a result of this centralized funding through the Master Funding Account, funds that were technically borrowed in the name of any member of the Sohio group or for any stated purpose were generally used for the benefit of ALL members of the Sohio group, including SPC. (A191-192)

B. THE OPINION OF THE COURT BELOW

1. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

[15] The issue in this case is whether SPC may take an allocable portion of the net interest expense that was paid or incurred by other members of the Sohio group into account in determining SPC's net income limitation for WPT purposes. (A5, Add. 48) The allocable portion of the net interest expense that was paid or incurred by other members of the Sohio group and that is in issue in this case is hereafter referred to as the "Interest in Issue." 3

[16] Under the WPT statutory scheme, the first step in determining the net income limitation on the "windfall profit" on a barrel of crude oil is to determine the "taxable income from the property" for the year attributable to crude oil. See section 4988(b)(2)(A). (Add. 73) Treasury regulation section 51.4988-2(b) explains how to compute the "taxable income from the property." (Add. 91) That regulation first requires a determination of the "taxpayer's gross income from the property" attributable to taxable crude oil. (Id.) The regulation then directs the taxpayer to determine its "taxable income from the property" by subtracting from its gross income from the property "all allowable deductions attributable to the production of taxable crude oil that would be subtracted in determining taxable income from the property under section 613(a) . . . ." (Id.) (emphasis added) 4

[17] As the Court below recognized, the crucial issue in this case is the determination of SPC's "taxable income from the property" in computing its WPT net income limitation. (A6, Add. 48) The Court noted that both section 4988(b)(3) and Treasury regulation section 51.4988-2(b) referred to section 613 as the guide for determining the "taxable income from the property." (Id.) Section 613 is an income tax provision which permits certain taxpayers (but not SPC) 5 to deduct as a depletion allowance a percentage of their gross income from oil and gas wells and other natural deposits. (Add. 60) Much like the controlling WPT regulation, section 613 also provides for a net income limitation, which "caps" the amount of the percentage depletion deduction at 50 percent of the taxpayer's "taxable income from the property. . . ." (Id.) Treasury regulation section 1.613- 5(a) defines "taxable income from the property" as the gross income from the property less all "allowable deductions . . . which are attributable to mining processes . . . with respect to which depletion is claimed." (Add. 90) (emphasis added.) That regulation also states that "[i]n determining the taxpayer's taxable income from the property, the amount of any particular item to be taken into account shall be determined in accordance with the principles set forth in paragraph (d)(2) and (3) of section 1.613-4." (Id.) Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2) then states that "only costs actually paid or incurred shall be taken into consideration" in determining the taxpayer's gross income from mining, and further states that the "amount of any particular item to be taken into account shall . . . . be the amount used in determining the taxpayer's income for tax purposes." (Add. 78)

2. THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS

[18] The Court rejected SPC's position that the Interest in Issue may be taken into account in determining SPC's net income limitation for WPT purposes. The Court began its analysis by assuming SPC contended that federal income tax provisions are irrelevant to the proper interpretation of the WPT net income limitation. Based on this assumption, the Court concluded that SPC's position violated three specific requirements of federal tax law. According to the Court:

1. SPC's position ignores the requirement under section

 

4988(b)(3) of the Code and Treasury regulation section 51.4988-

 

2(b) that the "taxable income from the property" for purposes of

 

the WPT net income limitation must be computed the same as the

 

"taxable income from the property" is computed for purposes of

 

the income tax net income limitation under section 613(a) of the

 

Code and the regulations issued thereunder. (A8, Add. 51)

 

 

2. SPC's position contravenes the requirements of Treasury

 

regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2) that:

 

 

(a) "In determining the taxpayer's gross income from

 

mining by use of methods based on the taxpayer's costs,

 

only costs actually paid or incurred shall be taken into

 

consideration." (Id.)

 

 

(b) "The amount of any particular item to be taken

 

into account shall . . . be the amount used in determining

 

the taxpayer's income for tax purposes." (Id.)

 

 

3. SPC's position impermissibly (a) requires the net income

 

limitation for WPT purposes to be applied in a manner which

 

"crosses" separate company lines, and (b) has the effect of the

 

filing of a consolidated excise tax return. (A9, Add. 52)

 

 

[19] SPC brings this appeal from the adverse decision of the Court of Federal Claims which was based on the Court's erroneous conclusions stated above.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

[20] The conclusions which are the bases for the adverse decision of the Court below are erroneous, and the Court's judgment should be reversed.

[21] SPC presented two alternative positions to the Court below. One position was that SPC may take the Interest in Issue into account in computing its WPT net income limitation, whether or not SPC would be entitled to deduct that same expense for federal income tax purposes, because Congress intended to provide a true economic limitation on the taxable "windfall profit" subject to the WPT. The Court below rejected this position, and SPC is not pursuing it in this Appeal.

[22] SPC also presented an alternative position to the Court below, which is the subject of this Appeal. Under its alternative position, SPC acknowledges and agrees that federal income tax principles fully apply for purposes of computing its WPT net income limitation, and that the "taxable income from the property" must be computed the same for purposes of the WPT net income limitation as it is computed for purposes of the income tax net income limitation. As support for its alternative position, SPC relies on a 1984 IRS revenue ruling, a 1984 decision of the Claims Court, and other authorities that were issued and rendered under income tax law. Under these controlling income tax precedents, the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC both for income tax purposes and for WPT purposes. The Court below erred in rejecting SPC's alternative position, because that position is consistent with, and indeed is mandated by, controlling income tax law.

[23] SPC's alternative position may be summarized as follows:

[24] Under the regulations that control the determination of the net income limitation for WPT purposes and for income tax purposes, taxpayers must reduce gross income by all "allowable deductions." Treas. Reg. section 51.4988-2(b); Treas. Reg. section 1.613-5(a). (Add. 91, 90) The term "allowable deductions" is a term of art in the tax law with a well-established legal meaning. The term "allowable deductions" means the deductions which are permitted under the Internal Revenue Code, whether or not they were actually claimed on the taxpayer's return. Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523 (1943); Sharp v. United States, 27 Cl. Ct. 52 (1992), aff'd, 14 F.3d 583 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

[25] Interest expense (such as the Interest in Issue) may be deductible under section 163 of the Code, but may also be an ordinary and necessary business expense that is deductible under section 162 of the Code. McNutt-Boyce Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 462 (1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1963); Ungerman v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1131 (1987). Under these and similar authorities, the Interest in Issue may be tested to determine if it is an "allowable deduction" under section 162.

[26] In this case, the Interest in Issue was paid by Standard Oil and other members of the Sohio group for the benefit of SPC. (A3, 64, 67, 190-192, Add. 46) Both the IRS and the Claims Court have analyzed the income tax effect under section 162 when a parent corporation pays an expense for the benefit of its wholly-owned subsidiary. In Revenue Ruling 84-68, 1984-1 C.B. 31, and in Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 119 (1984), the IRS and the Claims Court both concluded that when a parent corporation pays an expense for the benefit of its wholly-owned subsidiary, that payment is recharacterized for income tax purposes. Under that recharacterization:

1. The parent corporation has made a capital contribution to the

 

subsidiary, and

 

 

2. The subsidiary has paid an expense the subsidiary may deduct

 

as an ordinary and necessary business expense under section 162

 

of the Code.

 

 

[27] Standard Oil paid interest expense on borrowings whose proceeds were, in large part, used for the benefit of and provided to Standard Oil's operating subsidiaries, including SPC. (A3, 64, 190- 191, Add. 46) When the Interest in Issue is analyzed under section 162 of the Code, that expense is an "allowable deduction" of SPC under the same reasoning followed by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 84-68 and by the Claims Court in Transamerica.

[28] Similarly, interest expense on borrowings by other members of the Sohio group which were, in part, for the benefit of and provided to SPC are recharacterized for income tax purposes. That expense is recharacterized as a constructive distribution by the other members of the group to Standard Oil, followed by a contribution to the capital of SPC by Standard Oil, and payment by SPC. See Cox v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1270 (1971), modified 58 T.C. 105 (1972) (transfer of funds between corporations under common control was constructive distribution to the parent).

[29] When the authorities outlined above are applied to the facts of this case, the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC for federal income tax purposes. Under Treasury regulation section 51.4988-2(b)(1)(ii) all "allowable deductions" of SPC must be taken into account in determining SPC's net income limitation for WPT purposes. Accordingly, the Court below erred in rejecting SPC's alternative position. As discussed in more detail below, under SPC's alternative position:

1. The "taxable income from the property" is computed the

 

same for purposes of the WPT net income limitation as it is for

 

purposes of the income tax net income limitation;

 

 

2. The requirements of Treasury regulation section

 

1.613-4(d)(2) are satisfied, because (a) only costs actually

 

paid or incurred are taken into consideration, and (b) the

 

amounts of the items taken into account in determining the WPT

 

net income limitation are the correct amounts to be used in

 

determining the taxpayer's income for income tax purposes, under

 

the IRS's analysis in Revenue Ruling 84-68, 1984-1 C.B. 31, and

 

the analysis of the Claims Court in Transamerica Corp. v. United

 

States, 7 Cl Ct. 119 (1984); and

 

 

3. The net income limitation for WPT purposes is not

 

applied in a manner which (a) "crosses" separate company lines,

 

or (b) has the effect of the filing of a consolidated excise tax

 

(WPT) return.

 

 

ARGUMENT

 

 

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW SPC TO TAKE THE INTEREST

 

IN ISSUE INTO ACCOUNT AS AN "ALLOWABLE DEDUCTION" IN COMPUTING SPC'S

 

WPT NET INCOME LIMITATION.

 

 

A. STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

 

[30] In its Notice of Appeal, SPC appealed both the granting by the Court below of the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as the denial by the Court below of SPC's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The granting by the Court below of the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is subject to de novo review. See Suntiger, Inc. v. Scientific Research Funding Group, 189 F.3d 1327, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999). ("When a [lower] court GRANTS summary judgment, we review without deference to the trial court whether there are disputed material facts, and we review independently whether the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.") The denial by the Court below of SPC's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is subject to review for abuse of discretion. See Suntiger, 189 F.3d at 1333. ("We will not disturb the trial court's denial of summary judgment unless we find that the court has indeed abused its discretion in so denying.")

B. INTRODUCTION

[31] The judgment of the Court below should be reversed because the Court made two fundamental errors in considering SPC's alternative position. First, the Court erred when it assumed that under SPC's alternative position "federal income tax provisions are irrelevant to the proper interpretation of the WPT [net income limitation]." (A8, Add. 51) As shown below, that assumption is incorrect. SPC's alternative position does not treat federal income tax law as irrelevant, but instead is based upon and fully complies with the requirements of federal income tax law. Second, the Court also erred in concluding that SPC's alternative position does not compute "taxable income from the property" for WPT purposes as it is computed under the income tax net income limitation, that it contravenes the requirements of Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2), and that it impermissibly ignores the principle that separate companies are separate taxpayers.

C. THE COURT BELOW ERRED, BECAUSE SPC'S ALTERNATIVE POSITION

 

RELIES ON AND FULLY COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF FEDERAL

 

INCOME TAX LAW.

 

 

[32] The Court below initially erred in assuming that SPC's alternative position ignored the requirements of federal income tax law. In fact, as explained below, SPC's alternative position expressly relies upon principles of federal income tax law for the crucial conclusion that the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC for federal income tax purposes.

[33] Treasury regulation section 51.4988-2(b) provides that in computing the WPT net income limitation, the taxpayer's gross income from the property is reduced by "all allowable deductions attributable to the production of taxable crude oil that would be subtracted in determining taxable income from the property under section 613(a) . . . ." (Add. 91) The controlling regulation under section 613(a) likewise provides that in computing the income tax net income limitation, the taxpayer's gross income is reduced by all "allowable deductions." See Treas. Reg. section 1.613-5(a). (Add. 90)

[34] The Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC for federal income tax purposes. Under established federal income tax law, an "allowable deduction" means an expense that COULD HAVE BEEN deducted by SPC for income tax purposes. There is no requirement that SPC ACTUALLY have deducted the expense for income tax purposes. This conclusion is so well settled that it is a matter of hornbook law. For example, under Code section 1016(a)(2), the basis of property is to be reduced by at least the amount of depreciation that is "allowable." In construing this term, a leading hornbook states as follows:

The minimum amount of the downward adjustment of basis

 

because of depreciation . . . is the amount of the deduction

 

"allowable." This adjustment must be made WITHOUT REGARD TO

 

WHETHER OR NOT THE DEDUCTION WAS ACTUALLY TAKEN or, if taken,

 

without regard to whether or not the deduction reduced income or

 

diminished the tax burden.

 

 

Jacob Mertens, Jr., Mertens Law of Fed. Income Taxation section 21.93 at 152 (1990) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

[35] The case law also makes it clear that a deduction is "allowable" if it is permitted under the Code, whether or not the deduction was actually taken. For example:

1. Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523, 525 (1943):

 

 

[The predecessor to Code section 1016(a)(2)] makes plain that

 

the depreciation basis is reduced by the amount 'allowable' each

 

year WHETHER OR NOT IT IS CLAIMED. (emphasis added).

 

 

2. Sharp v. United States, 14 F.3d 583, 587, 588 (Fed. Cir.

 

1993):

 

 

In common usage, the word "allowable" means "permissible:

 

not forbidden: not unlawful or improper." Webster's Third New

 

International Dictionary (1986). Thus, a deduction is

 

"allowable" under the Code if some provision of the Code permits

 

it to be taken as a deduction and no other provision of the

 

Code acts to limit or forbid it as a deduction.

 

 

* * *

 

 

Thus, "allowable" deductions are those deductions permitted and

 

not otherwise forbidden or limited by the IRC, WHETHER OR NOT

 

THEY ARE ACTUALLY USED and regardless of their lack of tax

 

benefit. (emphasis added).

 

 

3. Flood v. United States, 33 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 1994):

 

 

The problem with the IRS's position is that it misconstrues

 

the meaning of "allowable as a deduction." Although not

 

explicitly defined in the tax code, these words are a term of

 

art, with a fixed meaning in the tax arena. [citation omitted].

 

A deduction is "allowable" if it is "permitted and not otherwise

 

forbidden or limited by the [code], whether or not [the

 

deduction is] actually used and regardless of [its] lack of tax

 

benefit." Sharp, 14 F.3d at 588.

 

 

4. Lenz v. Commissioner, 101 T. C. 260, 265 (1993):

 

 

Throughout the Code, a distinction is made between the terms

 

"allowable deduction" and "allowed deduction," which distinction

 

is not insignificant.

 

 

* * *

 

 

"Allowable deduction" generally refers to a deduction which

 

qualifies under a specific Code provision whereas "allowed

 

deduction," on the other hand, refers to a deduction granted by

 

the Internal Revenue Service which is actually taken on a return

 

and will result in a reduction of the taxpayer's income tax.

 

[citations omitted] Respondent in fact defined the terms

 

"allowable" and "allowed" in I.T. 2944, XIV-2 C.B. 126 (1935),

 

as follows:

 

 

The word "allowable" designates the amount permitted or granted

 

by the statutes, as distinguished from the word "allowed" which

 

refers to the deduction actually permitted or granted by the

 

Bureau.

 

 

5. Bever v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 153, 155 (4th Cir. 1990):

 

 

In other contexts, the Code distinguishes between

 

"allowable" deductions, those available to a taxpayer whether or

 

not they are actually claimed on a tax return, and "allowed"

 

deductions, those actually claimed by the taxpayer on a

 

particular return.

 

 

6. Reinhardt v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 511, 515-516 n. 6 (1985):

 

 

[Petitioners] may be drawing a distinction between a deduction

 

"allowed" and one "allowable." Sec. 1348(b)(2) provides in part

 

that the term personal service net income means personal service

 

income reduced by any deductions ALLOWABLE under sec. 62 which

 

are properly allocable to or chargeable against such personal

 

service income. Whether the automobile expenses were ALLOWED as

 

a deduction on petitioners' return is not determinative of

 

whether such expenses are allowable as a deduction under sec.

 

1348.

 

 

[36] The Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC under section 162, under both established case law and the IRS's own rulings. Even though Standard Oil or other members of the Sohio group actually deducted the interest expense as such under section 163, the expense may also be tested to determine if it qualifies as a business expense deductible under section 162. This principle has been followed in a number of cases, including McNutt-Boyce Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 462 (1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam). In that case, to qualify for an exception from the definition of "personal holding company," the taxpayer had to prove that its deductions "allowable under section 162" equaled 15% or more of its gross income. The taxpayer could qualify for that exception only if interest that was deductible under section 163 was also allowable as a deduction under section 162 as a business expense. 38 T.C. at 464. Citing a series of cases, the Tax Court held that interest expense that was deductible under Code section 163 may also qualify as an "allowable deduction" under Code section 162:

In at least three cases, all affirmed by three separate

 

circuits, we have held under the 1939 Code that certain INTEREST

 

was an ordinary and necessary expense paid or incurred during

 

the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business and

 

deductible under section 23(a)(1)(A) of the 1939 Code, which is

 

the counterpart of section 162(a) of the 1954 Code,

 

notwithstanding the Commissioner's contention that the interest

 

was deductible only under section 23(b) of the 1939 Code, which

 

is the counterpart of section 163(a) of the 1954 Code, and was

 

not therefore an expense attributable to a trade or business

 

carried on by the taxpayer. See James J. Standing, 28 T.C. 789,

 

affd. 259 F.2d 450 (C.A. 4, 1958); Frank Polk, 31 T.C. 412,

 

affd. 276 F.2d 601 (C.A. 10, 1960); and Elmer Reise, 35 T.C.

 

571, affd. 299 F.2d 380 (C.A. 7, 1962).

 

 

McNutt-Boyce Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. at 466.

[37] Similarly, in Ungerman V. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1131, 1137 (1987), the Tax Court held that the deduction claimed by the taxpayer under section 163 for interest expense was also "deductible as an administration expense under section 212," with the result that the taxpayer was therefore not subject to the alternative minimum tax.

[38] When the holdings of McNutt-Boyce, the earlier cases cited in the McNutt-Boyce opinion, and Ungerman are applied to the facts of this case, the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" under section 162. More importantly, the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC. Under both the case law and the IRS's rulings, when a parent corporation (such as Standard Oil) pays an expense to benefit the separate business activities of a subsidiary, that expense is an "allowable deduction" of the subsidiary (in this case, SPC).

[39] A summary of the facts will be helpful in applying the section 162 cases and rulings to this case. First, Standard Oil was primarily a holding company which owned the stock of subsidiaries, and had only limited business activities of its own. (A3, 64, Add. 46) Standard Oil borrowed far more funds than it needed or used in its own business activities. (A190-191) Standard Oil borrowed for the general corporate purposes of the Sohio group, including SPC's business of finding and producing crude oil and natural gas, and Standard Oil paid or incurred interest expense on those borrowings. (A3, 64, 190, Add. 46) Likewise, under Standard Oil's centralized cash management and financing system, subsidiaries borrowed funds (and paid interest thereon) necessary to satisfy the cash needs of all members of the Sohio group, including SPC. (A3, 64, 67, 190-192, Add. 46)

[40] When the interest expense paid or incurred by Standard Oil (as parent) is tested under section 162, that interest expense is not deductible by Standard Oil, but is an "allowable deduction" of its subsidiaries, including SPC. The IRS and the courts have considered similar scenarios in which a parent corporation has paid or incurred an expense which benefits the separate business activities of its subsidiary, but does not benefit the parent's own business activities.

[41] In Revenue Ruling 84-68, 1984-1 C.B. 31, the IRS analyzed and ruled on the issue of whether "a parent corporation [may] deduct as a business expense under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code cash bonuses it pays to employees of its wholly-owned subsidiary or may the bonuses be deducted by the subsidiary." The IRS stated its legal analysis and holdings as follows:

It is implicit in section 162 that a taxpayer may not

 

deduct the expenses of another, even though those expenses would

 

otherwise be ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses.

 

See Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590

 

(1943), 1943 C.B. 1016; Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940),

 

1940-1 C.B. 118. A parent corporation may not therefore deduct

 

compensation paid by it to the employees of its wholly-owned

 

subsidiary, even though the indirect benefit of their services

 

inures to the parent corporation as sole shareholder of the

 

employer. Columbian Rope Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 800

 

(1964), acq. on other issues, 1965-1 C.B. 4.

 

 

A cash payment by a shareholder for the benefit of a

 

corporation in which the shareholder owns stock is recognized

 

for federal income tax purposes as a contribution of capital to

 

the corporation. Estate of A. P. Steckel v. Commissioner, 26

 

T.C. 600 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 253 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1958);

 

South American Gold & Platinum Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1297

 

(1947), aff'd per curiam 168 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1948).

 

 

In the present situation because the cash bonuses paid by

 

[the parent] to employees of [the subsidiary] is deemed to be a

 

capital contribution by [the parent] to [the subsidiary], the

 

bonuses paid to [the subsidiary's] employees is therefore deemed

 

to be paid from [the subsidiary's] own funds. See Anderson v.

 

Commissioner, 67 T.C. 522 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 583 F.2d 953

 

(7th Cir. 1978).

 

 

Rev. Rul. 84-68, 1984-1 C.B. 31 (Add.94)

[42] The IRS summarized its conclusions in Revenue Ruling 84-68 as follows:

The parent corporation may not deduct as a business expense

 

under section 162 of the Code the cash bonuses that it pays to

 

employees of its wholly owned subsidiary. Because the parent's

 

payment of cash bonuses to its subsidiary's employees is treated

 

as a contribution to the subsidiary's capital accompanied by a

 

constructive payment by the subsidiary of the cash bonuses to

 

its employees, the cash bonuses may be deducted by the

 

subsidiary under section 162 of the Code. . . .

 

 

Id. (Add.94)

[43] The Claims Court analyzed the same basic issue in Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 119 (1984). That case considered whether a parent corporation was entitled to deduct the "spread" between the exercise price and the market price of parent corporation stock that had been issued to employees of a wholly-owned subsidiary. The parent corporation, Transamerica Corporation ("Transamerica") had established a stock option plan under which employees of its wholly-owned subsidiary, Occidental Life Insurance Company ("Occidental"), could acquire Transamerica stock. Transamerica claimed the deductions when Occidental employees made disqualifying dispositions of the Transamerica stock they had acquired under Transamerica's stock option plan. Transamerica claimed the deductions on its SEPARATE corporate income tax return. Transamerica and Occidental were prohibited from filing a CONSOLIDATED income tax return, because Occidental was a life insurance company, and section 1504(b)(2) prohibits insurance companies from joining in the filing of a consolidated income tax return. The IRS disallowed the deductions Transamerica claimed, and Transamerica sued for a refund in the Claims Court.

[44] In denying the deductions and refunds claimed by the parent corporation, the Claims Court stated its legal analysis and conclusions as follows: "It is well established that a stockholder is not entitled to a deduction under section 162 for compensation paid to the officers or other employees of a corporation for services rendered by them to the corporation." 7 Cl. Ct. at 124. The Claims Court cited as supporting authority Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), Young & Rubicam, Inc. v. United States, 410 F.2d 1233 (1969), and Berner v. United States, 282 F.2d 720 (1960). The Claims Court went on to conclude that "[a] parent corporation's payment of its subsidiary's business expense, whether in cash, in kind or in stock, is not an expense of the parent's business, but A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAPITAL OF OR ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE SUBSIDIARY AND AN EXPENSE OF THE SUBSIDIARY." 7 Cl. Ct. at 125 (emphasis added). The Claims Court cited as supporting authority South American Gold & Platinum Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1297, aff'd per curiam, 168 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1948), Koppers United Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 103, (1943), aff'd per curiam, 141 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1944), and Esmond Mills v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1943).

[45] Under the legal reasoning adopted by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 84-68 and the Claims Court in Transamerica, Standard Oil may not deduct under section 162 the interest expense that was paid for the benefit of SPC. Instead, Standard Oil's payment of that expense is treated for income tax purposes as a contribution to SPC's capital, followed by a constructive payment of the expense by SPC. Similarly, the payments of such expenses by other members of the Sohio group are treated for income tax purposes as constructive distributions to Standard Oil, followed by contributions to SPC's capital and constructive payments of the expense by SPC. See Cox v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1270 (1971), modified 58 T.C. 105 (1972) (transfer of funds between corporations under common control was constructive distribution to the parent). Accordingly, under section 162 the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC for federal income tax purposes.

[46] As shown by the analysis outlined above, the Court below erred when it concluded that under SPC's alternative position "federal income tax provisions are irrelevant to the proper interpretation of the WPT [net income limitation]." (A8, Add. 51) Instead, SPC's alternative position is based upon and fully complies with the requirements of federal income tax law under which the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC for federal income tax and WPT purposes.

D. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SPC'S ALTERNATIVE

 

POSITION VIOLATED THREE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF FEDERAL TAX

 

LAW.

 

 

[47] The Court below started with the erroneous assumption that under SPC's alternative position, the requirements of federal income tax law are irrelevant to the proper interpretation of the WPT net income limitation. Based upon that initial assumption, the Court went on to compound the error by concluding that SPC's alternative position violated three specific requirements of federal tax law. According to the Court below:

1. SPC's position ignores the requirement under section

 

4988(b)(3) of the Code and Treasury regulation section 51.4988-

 

2(b) that the "taxable income from the property" for purposes of

 

the WPT net income limitation must be computed the same as the

 

"taxable income from the property" is computed for purposes of

 

the income tax net income limitation. (A8, Add. 51)

 

 

2. SPC's position contravenes the requirements of Treasury

 

regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2) that:

 

 

(a) "In determining the taxpayer's gross income from

 

mining by use of methods based on the taxpayer's costs,

 

only costs actually paid or incurred shall be taken into

 

consideration." (Id.)

 

 

(b) "The amount of any particular item to be taken

 

into account shall . . . be the amount used in determining

 

the taxpayer's income for tax purposes." (Id.)

 

 

3. SPC's position impermissibly (a) requires the net income

 

limitation for WPT purposes to be applied in a manner which

 

"crosses" separate company lines, and (b) has the effect of the

 

filing of a consolidated excise tax return. (Id.)

 

 

As shown below, these three conclusions are erroneous and do not justify either the granting of the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or the denial of SPC's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

1. UNDER SPC'S ALTERNATIVE POSITION, THE "TAXABLE INCOME

 

FROM THE PROPERTY" FOR PURPOSES OF THE WPT NET INCOME

 

LIMITATION IS COMPUTED THE SAME AS THE "TAXABLE INCOME

 

FROM THE PROPERTY" FOR PURPOSES OF THE INCOME TAX NET

 

INCOME LIMITATION.

 

 

[48] The first legal conclusion of the Court below is in error. Under SPC's alternative position, the "taxable income from the property" for purposes of the WPT net income limitation is computed the same as the "taxable income from the property" for purposes of the income tax net income limitation.

[49] As outlined in the preceding section, SPC's alternative position follows to the letter the requirements of federal income tax law under section 162 to conclude that the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC. It is in accordance with federal INCOME tax law, as illustrated by Revenue Ruling 84-68 and Transamerica, that the payment is recharacterized as a contribution by Standard Oil to the capital of SPC, followed by the actual payment of the expense by SPC. It is in accordance with federal INCOME tax law, as illustrated by Virginian Hotel, Sharp, McNutt-Boyce, and other authorities, that the recharacterized expense is an "allowable deduction" of SPC.

[50] Since the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC for federal income tax purposes, it would be taken into account in computing SPC's "taxable income from the property" for purposes of the income tax net income limitation. The controlling regulation under section 613(a) defines "taxable income from the property" as "gross income from the property . . . less all allowable deductions . . . which are attributable to mining processes." Treas. Reg. section 1.613-5(a). SPC merely contends that the same "allowable deduction" should likewise be taken into account in computing the "taxable income from the property" for purposes of the WPT net income limitation under Treasury regulation section 51.4988-2(b). Thus, under SPC's alternative position, the "taxable income from the property" for purposes of the WPT net income limitation is computed the same as the "taxable income from the property" for purposes of the income tax net income limitation.

[51] The Court below ruled that "[i]t is clear from the plain language of the statute that "taxable income from the property" for WPT [net income limitation] purposes is determined based on federal income tax provisions." (A8, Add. 51) SPC's alternative position fully satisfies that requirement, and the Court below erred in rejecting SPC's alternative position.

2. SPC'S ALTERNATIVE POSITION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE

 

REQUIREMENTS OF TREASURY REGULATION SECTION 1.613-

 

4(d)(2).

 

 

[52] Treasury regulation section 1.613-5(a) governs the computation of the net income limitation for income tax purposes. That regulation provides that "[i]n determining the taxpayer's taxable income from the property, the amount of any particular item to be taken into account shall be determined in accordance with the principles set forth in paragraph (d)(2) and (3) of section 1.613-4." Treas. Reg. section 1.613-5(a). The Court below concluded that SPC's alternative position contravenes the requirements of Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2) that

(a) "In determining the taxpayer's gross income from mining

 

by use of methods based on the taxpayer's costs, only costs

 

actually paid or incurred shall be taken into consideration";

 

and

 

 

(b) "The amount of any particular item to be taken into

 

account shall . . . be the amount used in determining the

 

taxpayer's income for tax purposes."

 

 

The Court below erred, because SPC's alternative position does not violate either of the requirements of the regulation that are outlined above.

a. ONLY COSTS ACTUALLY PAID OR INCURRED BY SPC ARE

 

TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.

 

 

[53] SPC's alternative position does not violate the requirement outlined in (a) above that "only costs actually paid or incurred shall be taken into consideration." As an initial matter, the Court below apparently had no quarrel with the conclusion that the Interest in Issue was actually paid or incurred by some member of the Sohio group. In fact, the parties had stipulated that the Interest in Issue was actually paid or incurred by Standard Oil or other members of the Sohio group. (A64, 67, 70-72)

[54] Instead, the Court below apparently concluded that SPC's alternative position violated the first requirement of Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2) because "plaintiff [SPC] admittedly did not pay or incur the interest expense at issue . . ." (emphasis added) (A8-9, Add. 51-52) That conclusion is erroneous, however, because it ignores the legal analysis in Revenue Ruling 84-68, Transamerica, and the other authorities that are outlined above. Under that analysis, the Interest in Issue is recharacterized as an expenditure of SPC and is treated for tax purposes precisely as if it had been actually paid or incurred by SPC. This point is particularly well illustrated by Revenue Ruling 84-68. Section 162, like Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2), requires that the expenditure in issue be "paid or incurred" if it is to be deductible. See section 162(a) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses PAID OR INCURRED during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. . . .") (Add. 53) (emphasis added). The IRS obviously concluded that this requirement was satisfied in Revenue Ruling 84-68, even though the expenditure was actually paid by the parent for the benefit of the subsidiary: "Because the parent's payment of cash bonuses to its subsidiary's employees is treated as a contribution to the subsidiary's capital accompanied by a constructive payment by the subsidiary of the cash bonuses to its employees, the cash bonuses may be deducted by the subsidiary under section 162 of the Code . . . ." (Add. 94) The same conclusion should be reached here. The Sohio group's payment of interest expense for the benefit of SPC is recharacterized as a contribution to SPC's capital and a constructive payment by SPC. Accordingly, the Interest in Issue is paid or incurred BY SPC for income tax (and WPT) purposes.

b. THE AMOUNT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IS THE AMOUNT USED

 

FOR TAX PURPOSES.

 

 

[55] SPC's alternative position also satisfies the second requirement of Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2). That regulation provides that the amount of any item to be taken into account shall be the amount used in determining the taxpayer's income for tax purposes. The Court below concluded that this requirement was violated because the Interest in Issue was not actually deducted in determining SPC's separate income for tax purposes. (A9, Add. 52) In other words, the Court below apparently interpreted Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2) to require that SPC must actually have already deducted the Interest in Issue in determining its own separate income for federal income tax purposes. That interpretation is in error.

[56] The controlling WPT regulation requires a taxpayer such as SPC to take into account all "allowable deductions" in computing its WPT net income limitation. Treas. Reg. section 51.4988-2(b). The corresponding income tax regulation, section 1.613-5(a), also requires a taxpayer to take into account all "allowable deductions" in computing its income tax net income limitation. The term "allowable deductions" is a term of art in the tax law, with a well- established meaning. The term "allowable deductions" must be construed and applied in accordance with its long-accepted meaning and usage. "Words with a fixed legal or judicially settled meaning must be presumed to have been used in that sense." In re Estate of Nissen v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 1965); see also United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 187 (1923). Under this well- established meaning, an "allowable deduction" is one that is permitted under the Code, whether or not a taxpayer such as SPC actually claims the deduction. See Sharp v. United States, 14 F.3d 583, 588 ("[A]llowable deductions are those deductions permitted and not otherwise forbidden or limited by the IRC, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE ACTUALLY USED and regardless of their lack of tax benefit.") (emphasis added).

[57] Both the controlling WPT regulation and the corresponding income tax regulation require that all "allowable deductions" be taken into account in computing the net income limitation. Applying the well-established meaning of the term "allowable deductions," that means the Interest in Issue must be taken into account whether or not it was ACTUALLY deducted by SPC. In contrast, the Court below interpreted Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2) to require that the Interest in Issue must ACTUALLY have been deducted by SPC before it may be taken into account in computing the net income limitation. The interpretation of Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2) adopted by the Court below is misdirected, because it would completely contradict and eviscerate the well-established meaning of the term "allowable deductions." See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955):

"The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and

 

not to destroy." Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,

 

301 U.S. 1, 30. It is our duty "to give effect, if possible, to

 

every clause and word of a statute," Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107

 

U.S. 147, 152, rather than to emasculate an entire section, as

 

the Government's interpretation requires.

 

 

[58] Instead of the interpretation adopted by the Court below, a more reasonable interpretation of Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2) would harmonize that regulation with the requirement in the controlling WPT regulation that all "allowable deductions" be taken into account in computing the net income limitation. See Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (harmonizing otherwise inconsistent clauses in a statutory scheme); Little People's School, Inc. v. United States, 842 F.2d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1999) (harmonizing two provisions of the Internal Revenue Code). Under that more reasonable interpretation, the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC that may be taken into account in computing its WPT net income limitation, whether or not SPC ACTUALLY deducted that expense for income tax purposes. Under Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2), however, the AMOUNT of that "allowable deduction" would be limited to the amount that SPC could have deducted for INCOME TAX PURPOSES, as compared to any different amount it might have been entitled to claim for financial reporting or other purposes. This interpretation is supported by the explicit language of Treasury regulation section 1.613-4(d)(2):

The amount of any particular item to be taken into account shall

 

. . . be the amount used in determining the taxpayer's income

 

for tax purposes. For example, the depreciation lives, methods,

 

and records used for tax purposes, if different from those used

 

for book purposes, shall be the basis for determining the amount

 

of depreciation to be used.

 

 

SPC's interpretation complies with both the requirement of the controlling WPT regulation that all "allowable deductions" be taken into account in computing the net income limitation, as well as the requirement 1.613-4(d)(2) that the amount taken into account be the amount allowable for TAX (and not financial reporting) purposes.

3. SPC's ALTERNATIVE POSITION DOES NOT COMPUTE THE NET

 

INCOME LIMITATION IN A MANNER WHICH IMPERMISSIBLY

 

"CROSSES" SEPARATE COMPANY LINES, AND ALSO DOES NOT

 

HAVE THE EFFECT OF THE FILING OF A CONSOLIDATED EXCISE

 

TAX RETURN.

 

 

a. SPC's ALTERNATIVE POSITION DOES NOT IMPERMISSIBLY

 

"CROSS" SEPARATE COMPANY LINES.

 

 

[59] SPC's alternative position respects SPC as a separate company and as a separate taxpayer from the other members of the Sohio group, and does not compute the net income limitation in a manner which impermissibly "crosses" separate company lines. This conclusion is illustrated by the IRS's own analysis in Revenue Ruling 84-68. In that ruling, the IRS expressly acknowledged the principle that separate companies are separate taxpayers when it concluded that "a taxpayer may not deduct the expenses of another, even though those expenses would otherwise be ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses. See Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943), 1943 C.B. 1016; Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), 1940-1 C.B. 118." Yet, the IRS found no violation of that principle when it allowed the subsidiary to deduct an expense that had actually been paid by its parent corporation. Similarly, the Claims Court acknowledged that separate companies are separate taxpayers when it concluded that "[a] parent corporation's payment of its subsidiary's business expense, whether in cash, in kind or in stock, is not an expense of the parent's business . . . ." Transamerica, 7 Cl. Ct. at 125. Yet, the Claims Court found no violation of that principle when it recharacterized the expense as a contribution to the capital of the subsidiary, followed by the SUBSIDIARY'S deemed payment of the expense. Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 119 (1984).

[60] In Revenue Ruling 84-68 and Transamerica, the IRS and the Claims Court did not ignore the principle that separate companies are separate taxpayers. Instead, in both cases, the IRS and the Claims Court recharacterized the expenditure made by the parent for the benefit of the subsidiary in accordance with its substance. In Revenue Ruling 84-68, "the parent's payment of cash bonuses to its subsidiary's employees is treated as a contribution to the subsidiary's capital accompanied by a constructive payment by the subsidiary of the cash bonuses to its employees." (Add. 94) Similarly, in Transamerica, the Claims Court concluded that "[a] parent corporation's payment of its subsidiary's business expense . . . is not an expense of the parent's business, but a contribution to the capital of . . . the subsidiary and an expense of the subsidiary." 7 Cl. Ct. at 125. The same is true under SPC's alternative position. That position respects the principle that separate companies are separate taxpayers, but (like Revenue Ruling 84-68 and Transamerica) recharacterizes the Interest in Issue as a contribution to the capital of SPC, followed by a deductible payment of that expense by SPC.

b. SPC's ALTERNATIVE POSITION DOES NOT HAVE THE

 

EFFECT OF THE IMPERMISSIBLE FILING OF A

 

CONSOLIDATED EXCISE TAX RETURN.

 

 

[61] SPC's alternative position also does not have the effect of the impermissible filing of a consolidated excise (WPT) tax return. In fact, it is irrelevant to SPC's alternative position that SPC and other members of the Sohio group were permitted to file a consolidated tax return for INCOME tax purposes, but were prohibited from filing a consolidated tax return for EXCISE (WPT) tax purposes. This conclusion again is illustrated by Revenue Ruling 84-68 and by TransAmerica. In Revenue Ruling 84-68, the IRS did not find it necessary to mention whether the parent and the subsidiary filed or were permitted to file a consolidated income tax return. The IRS did not find it necessary to mention consolidated return requirements because it did not rely upon those requirements as the reason it allowed the subsidiary to deduct the expense that had actually been paid by the parent. The same is true of the Transamerica case. The Claims Court did not mention consolidated return requirements because it did not rely upon those requirements as the reason it recharacterized the expense that had actually been incurred by the parent as (in substance) an expense of the subsidiary. In fact, the consolidated return requirements could not have been the reason for the decision in Transamerica, because the subsidiary was actually PROHIBITED from filing a consolidated income tax return with the parent. See TransAmerica, 7 Cl. Ct. at 120. ("As a life insurance company, Occidental [the subsidiary] was prohibited by I.R.C. section 1504(b) from joining Transamerica in the filing of a consolidated income tax return.")

[62] Instead of relying on the consolidated return requirements, both the IRS and the Claims Court recharacterized the parent's payment of the expense in issue as a contribution to the capital of the subsidiary, followed by a deductible payment of the expense by the subsidiary. The same is true here. SPC's alternative position does not rely on any consolidated return requirements as the reason the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC. In fact, it is completely irrelevant under SPC's alternative position whether SPC and the other members of the Sohio group are either permitted to file or prohibited from filing a consolidated tax return for income tax, excise (WPT) tax, or any other tax. Instead, the Interest in Issue is recharacterized under federal income tax principles, and treated as a contribution to the capital of SPC, followed by a deductible payment of the expense by SPC. It is that recharacterization that makes the Interest in Issue an "allowable deduction" of SPC for purposes of computing the WPT net income limitation, and not any consolidated return requirement.

E. THE CHEVRON CASE DOES NOT CONTROL THE OUTCOME OF SPC'S CASE.

[63] The Court below also cited Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 77 AFTR 2d (RIA) 96-1412 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd mem, 81 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1996). On the specific facts involved in that case, Chevron held that a wholly-owned subsidiary could not take a portion of the interest expense paid by its parent into account in computing the subsidiary's WPT net income limitation. Chevron does not control the outcome of this case, because the facts and resulting legal analysis in that case are very different from the facts and resulting legal analysis in this case. In Chevron, the parent borrowed over $13 billion to purchase the stock of Gulf Corporation from the shareholders of Gulf Corporation. All of the funds borrowed by the parent went to former Gulf Corporation shareholders. Unlike the facts of this case, none of borrowed funds were used in the business of (and for the benefit of) Gulf Oil Corporation, the oil producing subsidiary of Gulf Corporation that was subject to the WPT.

[64] Because of the very different facts involved in that case, the taxpayer in Chevron could not possibly rely on the same authorities and legal analysis SPC relies on in this case. The crucial distinction is that, unlike the facts of Chevron, some of the funds Standard Oil and the other members of the Sohio group borrowed were used by SPC in its oil and gas business. (A3,64,67,190-192, Add. 46) Under the IRS's analysis in Revenue Ruling 84-68 and the Claims Court's analysis in Transamerica, interest expense Standard Oil and the other members of the Sohio group paid on funds borrowed for the benefit of SPC is recharacterized as a capital contribution to SPC, and the payment by SPC of an expense that is deductible BY SPC for income tax purposes. SPC's alternative position in this case fully respects the legal conclusions the court reached in Chevron. That is, and as discussed above, under SPC's alternative position, principles of income tax law (and not merely cost accounting principles) are respected in computing the WPT net income limitation; the costs taken into account in computing the WPT net income limitation are, under the income tax authorities cited above, treated as having been paid or incurred by SPC, the separate WPT "taxpayer"; and SPC does not rely on any provisions relating to the filing of a consolidated tax return to conclude that the Interest in Issue is an "allowable deduction" of SPC for purposes of the WPT net income limitation.

CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

[65] The judgment of the Court below that, as a matter of law, SPC may not include the Interest in Issue as an "allowable deduction" in computing SPC's net income limitation for WPT purposes should be reversed. The case should be remanded to the Court below for the determination of the amount of SPC's WPT refunds for the four taxable quarters of 1984 and for the taxable quarters of 1985 ending on June 30, September 30, and December 31.

Dated September 5, 2000.

 

 

Of Counsel:

 

 

Nancy T. Bowen

 

Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.

 

1301 McKinney, Suite 5100

 

Houston, Texas 77010-3095

 

(713) 651-5151

 

 

William S. Lee

 

Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.

 

1301 McKinney, Suite 5100

 

Houston, Texas 77010-3095

 

(713) 651-5151

 

 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[66] This is to certify that two copies of the Brief for the Appellant have been served upon opposing counsel by mailing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on September 5, 2000, addressed to:

Charles Bricken

 

U.S. Department of Justice

 

Tax Division

 

Appellate Section

 

P.O. Box 502

 

Washington, D.C. 20044

 

 

William S. Lee

 

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

[67] The undersigned certifies that the foregoing brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B). Excluding those portions of the brief listed in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) and Federal Circuit Rule 32(b), the brief contains less than 11,000 words.

Dated September 5, 2000

 

 

William S. Lee

 

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

 

FOOTNOTES

 

 

1 Reference to (A___) are to the separately bound record appendix. References to (Add.___) are to the Addendum of authorities filed with this brief.

2 The one exception to this general rule was Sohio Pipe Line Company. That company's cash was not commingled with the cash of Standard Oil and the other members of the Sohio group, because Sohio Pipe Line Company was regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and was required to maintain segregated records and accounts. (A3, 189, Add. 46)

3 SPC determined the Interest in Issue as follows: (a) a portion of the net interest expense of Standard Oil and its subsidiaries other than SPC was allocated to SPC based on SPC's capital expenditures in relation to the total capital expenditures of the Sohio group for the year; (b) the portion allocated to SPC was allocated among SPC's oil and gas producing, non-producing, and other activities based on the relative modified direct expenses of the activities; (c) the portion allocated to SPC's oil and gas producing activities was allocated among SPC's producing properties on the basis of their relative gross income; and (d) the portion allocated to a producing property was allocated between the crude oil and the natural gas produced from the property based on the relative gross income from the oil and from the natural gas. (A70-71)

4 Under the WPT statutory scheme, the taxpayer's "taxable income from the property" is divided by the number of barrels of taxable crude oil sold for the year to derive the net income limitation per barrel. See section 4988(b)(2)(B). (Add. 73) The resulting net income limitation acts as a "cap" on the amount of windfall profit subject to the WPT. Under the WPT statute and regulations, the amount of "windfall profit" subject to the WPT cannot exceed 90% of the net income attributable to a barrel of taxable crude oil. This final step in determining the WPT net income limitation is not in controversy in this appeal.

5 Because other members of the Sohio group, including Standard Oil, were "retailers" and/or "refiners," under section 613A(d)(2) and (4) (Add. 70), SPC was not eligible to claim any deduction for percentage depletion on its income from oil and gas. (A63)

 

END OF FOOTNOTES
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES
  • Case Name
    BP EXPLORATION & OIL INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
  • Court
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
  • Docket
    No. 00-5100
  • Authors
    Lee, William S.
    Bowen, Nancy T.
  • Institutional Authors
    Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP
  • Cross-Reference
    BP Exploration & Oil Inc. v. United States, 85 AFTR2d Par. 2000-617;

    No. 97-648 T (April 28, 2000) (For a summary of that opinion, see Tax

    Notes, May 8, 2000, p. 780; for the full text, see Doc 2000-12245 (10

    original pages) or 2000 TNT 85-5 Database 'Tax Notes Today 2000', View '(Number'.)
  • Code Sections
  • Subject Area/Tax Topics
  • Index Terms
    windfall profit tax, removal price
  • Industry Groups
    Mining and extraction
  • Jurisdictions
  • Language
    English
  • Tax Analysts Document Number
    Doc 2000-24105 (105 original pages)
  • Tax Analysts Electronic Citation
    2000 TNT 191-57
Copy RID