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Government Argues Individual Is Liable for Willful FBAR Penalty

APR. 6, 2020

Margaret J. Jones et al. v. United States

DATED APR. 6, 2020
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES
  • Case Name
    Margaret J. Jones et al. v. United States
  • Court
    United States District Court for the Central District of California
  • Docket
    No. 2:19-cv-00173
  • Subject Area/Tax Topics
  • Jurisdictions
  • Tax Analysts Document Number
    2020-13531
  • Tax Analysts Electronic Citation
    2020 TNTI 69-15
    2020 TNTG 69-24
    2020 TNTF 69-20

Margaret J. Jones et al. v. United States

MARGARET J. JONES, as EXECUTOR, ESTATE of JEFFREY L. JONES,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant/Counterplaintiff.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION

Memorandum in Support of the
United States of America's Motion
for Summary Judgment

Hearing Date: May 4, 2020
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Courtroom 10C
United States Courthouse
Santa Ana, California
Judge James V. Selna

NICOLA T. HANNA
United States Attorney
THOMAS D. COKER
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Tax Division

ANDREW T. PRIBE (CA SBN 254904)
JEREMY L. BURKHARDT (CA SBN 321744)
Assistant United States Attorneys
Federal Building, Suite 7211
300 North Los Angeles Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-6551
Facsimile: (213) 894-0115
E-mail: andrew.t.pribe@usdoj.gov
jeremy.burkhardt@usdoj.gov

Attorneys for the United States of America 


Table of Contents

I. Introduction

II. Statement of facts

III. Law regarding the FBAR reporting requirement

A. The FBAR requirement.

B. Elements for a willful violation of the FBAR-reporting requirements.

C. Willfulness includes reckless disregard of a statutory duty

IV. Jeffrey Jones willfully failed to file his 2011 FBAR

V. The amount of the penalty determined by the IRS is within the statutory maximum.

VI. Conclusion.

Table Of Authorities

Cases

Bedrosian v. United States, 912 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2018)

Brookwood v. Bank of America, 45 Cal.App.4th 1667 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)

Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 168 Cal. App. 4th 938 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)

California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974)

Eisenberg v. Citibank, N.A., No. 2:13-cv-1814, 2016 WL 6495347 (C.D. Cal. 2016)

Greer v. Commissioner, 595 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2010)

Huff v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 222, 230 (T.C. 2010)

Kabuki Restaurants, Inc., v. Chase Paymentech Solutions, No. 2:10-cv-04450 (Aug. 26, 2010), 2010 WL 11601186

Keith v. First Horizon Homes Loans, No. 2:11-cv-8130, 2012 WL 13012474 (C.D. Cal. 2012)

Marsicano v. Bank of America, No. 2:16-cv-6189, 2016 WL 10968664 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2016)

Norman v. United States, 942 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

Safeco Insurance Co. v. Burr, 51 U.S. 47, 57, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007)

United States v. Bohanec, 263 F.Supp.3d 881 (C.D. Cal. 2016)

United States v. Cohen, No. 17-cv-1652, 2019 WL 8231039 (C.D. Cal. 2019)

United States v. Doherty, 233 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2000)

United States v. Flume, 390 F.Supp.3d 847 (S.D. Tex. 2019)

United States v. Garrity, 304 F.Supp.3d 267 (D. Conn. 2019)

United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 58 S. Ct. 533, 82 L.Ed.2d 773 (1938)

United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Utah 2012)

United States v. Ott, No. 18-cv-12174, 2020 WL 913814, (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2020)

United States v. Schoenfeld, 344 F.Supp.3d 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2018)

United States v. Williams, 489 Fed. Appx. 655 (4th Cir. 2012)

United States v. Williams, No. 1:09-CV-00437, 2010 WL 34773311 (E.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2010)

United States v. Williams, No. 1:09-CV-00437, 2014 WL 3746497, *1 (E.D. Va. June 26, 2014)

Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875)

Statutes

12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(2)

31 U.S.C. § 5314

31 U.S.C. § 5321

31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)

31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A)

31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C)(i)

31 U.S.C. § 5331(a)(5)(C)(ii)

IRC § 61(a) (26 U.S.C)

IRC 7206(a)(1)

Other authorities

H.R. No. 91-975 (1970), 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4397, 1970 WL 5667

Regulations

31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(c)

31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(a)

31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(b)


 I. Introduction.

Every United States citizen who has a foreign financial account has the obligation to annually file a report of foreign bank and financial accounts.

This report is commonly called an FBAR. For a willful violation of this requirement, Congress imposed a penalty of up to 50% of the unreported account balances as of the date that the report is due or $100,000, whichever is greater.

Every United States taxpayer who files a schedule B with their federal income-tax return is given notice by the IRS of the FBAR-filing requirement through a series of questions about foreign accounts. Here, Jeffrey Jones had foreign accounts in 2011 and did not report them on an FBAR. He filed a 2011 federal income-tax return, stated under oath that he examined the return and the accompanying schedules and that they were true, falsely stated that he did not have foreign accounts, and did not report foreign income from those accounts.

Because Jeffrey Jones willfully failed to file an FBAR for 2011 he is liable for the willful FBAR penalty.

II. Statement of facts.

Jeffrey Jones was born in New Zealand.1 Margaret Jones was born in Canada, where they met and were married.2 They then moved to the United States and both became United States citizens in 1969.3 Jeffrey Jones died in March 2013.4 Margaret Jones is the executor of the Estate of Jeffrey Jones.5 During 2011, Jeffrey Jones individually maintained the following financial accounts in New Zealand:6

Bank/Institution

Account Number

2011 Maximum value (USD)

June 30, 2012, balance (USD)

ANZ Bank

xxxxxxxx-1016

$118,258

$121,674

ANZ Bank

xxxxxxxx-1017

$151,922

$157,042

Heartland

xx-xxxx-xxxxxx1-026

$561,120

$583,859

Morrison Kent

xx9146

$2,956,363

$2,917,574

Total

 

$3,787,663

$3,780,148

On April 9, 2012, Jeffrey Jones signed, under penalty of perjury, a federal income-tax return for tax year 2011, which was filed jointly with Margaret Jones.7 Although the Joneses had foreign income of $251,209 for 2011, they did not report that foreign income on their tax return.8 This yielded an understatement of tax of $51,104.9 Attached to the 2011 federal income-tax return was a schedule B.10 Part III of the schedule B to the 2011 federal income-tax return addresses foreign accounts and trusts.11 Question 7a in part III to the schedule B asks the following question: “At any time during 2011, did you have a financial interest in or signature authority over a financial account (such as a bank account, securities account, or brokerage account) located in a foreign country? See instructions.”12 Question 7a in part III to the schedule B also asks the following question: “If 'Yes,' are you required to file Form TD F 90-22.1 to report that financial interest or signature authority? See Form TD F 90-22.1 and its instructions for filing requirements and exceptions to those requirements.”13 The form TD F 90-22.1 is the report of foreign bank and financial accounts, or FBAR.14 Jeffrey Jones falsely reported on his 2011 federal income-tax return, signed under penalty of perjury, that he did not have any financial interest in a foreign financial account, when, in fact, he had financial interests in foreign financial accounts.15

Margaret Jones also had her own foreign financial accounts, and they both had additional joint foreign financial accounts, which they maintained for many years before 2011.16 They did not report income from these foreign bank accounts, which yielded understatements of tax, as set forth below:17

Tax year

Understatement of income from foreign accounts

Understatement of tax

2008

$381,285

$89,284

2009

$282,013

$63,705

2010

$244,436

$50,650

2011

$251,209

$51,104

2012

$245,192

$53,313

Total

$1,404,135

$308,056

 

From 1984 through 2012, the Joneses retained William Burke to prepare their federal income-tax returns.18 Neither Jeffrey Jones nor Margaret Jones ever told Burke about their foreign accounts, despite Burke admonishing them that he wanted to know about anything that may have tax consequences.19 Jeffrey Jones and Margaret Jones received foreign tax statements from the foreign financial institutions, but they never showed them to Burke or asked him about them.20

Neither Jeffrey Jones nor Margaret Jones filed an FBAR for 2011 reporting their foreign accounts by the due date of June 30, 2011.21 On November 18, 2018, the Internal Revenue Service assessed a penalty against Jeffrey Jones under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C)(i) of $1,890,074 for his willful failure to report his foreign accounts for 2011.22

III. Law regarding the FBAR reporting requirement.

A. The FBAR requirement.

Citizens of the United States are subject to taxes on their income, regardless of where it is earned.23 This premise is helpful in understanding the importance of the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, enacted by Congress in 1970. As discussed by the Supreme Court in the 1974 case California Bankers Association v. Shultz, the Bank Secrecy Act “was enacted by Congress in 1970 following extensive hearings concerning the unavailability of foreign and domestic bank records of customers thought to be engaged in activities entailing criminal and civil liability.”24 The Court said that the Act and its implementing regulations “generally require United States citizens . . . to file reports of their relationships with foreign financial institutions.”25 Indeed, the express purpose of the Act is to require the maintenance of records and require the making of certain reports which “have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.”26

According to the House Report on the bill, Congress received “considerable testimony” regarding the “serious and widespread use of foreign financial facilities located in secrecy jurisdictions” for violating American law including their use “by Americans to evade income taxes, conceal assets illegally and purchase gold[.]”27 According to the report, “[o]ne of the most damaging effects of an Americans' use of secret foreign financial facilities it is undermining the fairness of our tax laws.”28 The report called the use of “secret foreign bank account[s]” the “largest single tax loophole permitted by American law,” and one that caused the “debilitating effect” of “hundreds of millions” of dollars in lost tax revenues.29 Investigating such secret bank accounts is time consuming and expensive.30 The civil FBAR penalties serve to offset these losses to the United States. As noted by the district court in United States v. Schoenfeld, the civil FBAR penalty acts “as a safeguard for the protection of revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud.”31

B. Elements for a willful violation of the FBAR-reporting requirements.

To be found liable for the willful FBAR penalty under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5), the United States must prove the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. The person is a United States person (defined as a United States citizen, resident alien, or entity created under United States law);

2. The person had an interest in or authority over a foreign financial account;

3. The financial account had a balance that exceeded $10,000 at some point during the reporting period; and

4. The person willfully failed to disclose the account.32

The Court's determination of these elements is de novo.33 There is no dispute as to the first three elements.34

Additionally, while within the discretion of the Internal Revenue Service,35 the amount of the penalty may not exceed the statutory maximum, which is $100,000 or 50% of the account balances at the time of the violation.36 The time of the violation is the due date for the FBAR, which is June 30 of the year following the year for which the report must be filed.37

C. Willfulness includes reckless disregard of a statutory duty.

Willfulness is not defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5321. But the Supreme Court has clarified in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Burr that when “willfulness” is a statutory condition for imposing civil liability, the Court has “generally taken it to cover not only knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well.”38 Indeed, willfulness extends to one's careless disregard of one's obligation to act.39 Thus, as explained by the district court in United States v. McBride, “'willfulness' may be satisfied by establishing the individual's reckless disregard of a statutory duty, as opposed to acts that are known to violate the statutory duty at issue.”40 An improper motive is not necessary to establish willfulness in the civil context.41

Relying on Safeco, the Third Circuit in Bedrosian v. United States held that recklessness is determined under an objective standard.42 The United States bears the burden of proving such willfulness by a preponderance of the evidence.43 But the Government is not required to prove that the taxpayer had actual knowledge of the FBAR reporting requirement.44 Willfulness is simply conduct that is voluntary, as opposed to accidental or unconscious.45 Congress expressly did not provide for a reasonable-cause exception to the willful penalty.46

In sum, recklessness is an objective standard that looks to whether conduct entails “an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should have been known,” according to this Court (Pregerson, J.) in United States v. Bohanec.47 As set forth by the Third Circuit in Bedrosian, “[w]ith respect to IRS filings in particular, a person recklessly fails to comply with an IRS filing requirement when he or she (1) clearly ought to have known that (2) there was a grave risk that the filing requirement was not being met and if (3) he or she was in a position to find out for certain very easily.”48 The subjective motivations of the individual and “overall 'egregiousness'” of the individual's conduct are irrelevant, according to the Third Circuit.49

IV. Jeffrey Jones willfully failed to file his 2011 FBAR.

Here, the undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that Jeffrey Jones willfully failed to report his foreign accounts as he was required to do under the law.

As set forth above, a person recklessly fails to comply with the FBAR filing requirement when he or she (1) clearly ought to have known that (2) there was a grave risk that the filing requirement was not being met and if (3) he or she was in a position to find out for certain very easily.50

Those conditions are satisfied here. Indeed, the IRS gives notice of the FBAR-reporting requirement to every United States taxpayer who files a Schedule B. A schedule B to a federal income-tax return is entitled “Interest and Ordinary Dividends.” The schedule B has three parts, each of which are identified on the left-hand side by the part number and title, which appear in bold text that is larger than the rest of the schedule B. Part III of the schedule B appears as follows:51

image part iii foreign accts and trusts

Because Jeffrey Jones filed a schedule B, he had notice of the FBAR-reporting requirement. Below is the schedule B from the Joneses' 2011 federal income tax return as well as their certification that they read their return.52

Part iii foreign accting and trusts and signature

Jeffrey Jones certified: “Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return and accompanying schedules and statement, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, they are true, correct, and complete.” Jeffrey Jones stated under oath that he read the “return and its accompanying schedules.” The schedule B specifically asked: “At any time during 2011, did you have a financial interest in or signature authority over a financial account (such as a bank account, securities account, or brokerage account) located in a foreign country.” Jeffrey Jones falsely answered “no.” The schedule B goes on to warn the taxpayer that: “If 'Yes,' are you are required to file TD F 90-22.1 [FBAR] to report that financial interest or signature authority?”

Jeffrey Jones declared under penalty of perjury that he reviewed the schedule B. Accordingly, the evidence shows that he had actual knowledge of the FBAR reporting requirement.

Even if he did not read the return, however, he is deemed to have knowledge of its contents. Courts have long held that a person who signs a document is deemed under the law to know its contents. In 1875, the Supreme Court in Upton v. Tribilcock observed that if someone did not read what they signed, it was the person's “own fault.”53 The Court said that it “will not do” for a person to “enter into a contract, and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained. If this were permitted, contracts would not be worth the paper on which they were written. But such is not the law.”54 A person signing a contract “must stand by the words of his contract; and, if he will not read what he signs, he alone is responsible for his omission.”55 This basic principle of law has been continually reaffirmed by this Court and other courts. For example, in Kabuki Restaurants, Inc., v. Chase Paymentech Solutions, LLC, this Court (Nguyen, J.) said: “It is the duty of signatories to read what they are signing.”56 And in Marsicano v. Bank of America, this Court (Phillips, J.) said that “Reasonable diligence requires the reading of a contract before signing it.”57

This general rule that a person is deemed to have read and is bound by the documents the person signs applies to federal tax returns; even more so because the federal tax return is signed under oath and subject to criminal penalty for presenting false information.58 A person who signs a federal tax return has constructive knowledge of its contents.59 As noted by the Federal Circuit in Norman v. United States, whether or not a taxpayer has read the signed return “is of no import because a taxpayer who signs a tax return will not be heard to claim innocence for not having actually read the return, as he or she is charged with constructive knowledge of its contents.”60 The taxpayer's failure to read her tax return in Norman supported the finding of recklessness for purposes of the FBAR penalty.61 This conclusion was recently reaffirmed in United States v. Ott, where the district court reiterated that a taxpayer is “not shielded from liability [for an FBAR penalty] for failure to read the content of his tax returns[.]”62 The court also concluded that Ott's failure to discuss the hundreds of thousands of dollars in his foreign accounts with his longtime accountant, and relying on his own beliefs about his obligations without verifying his beliefs with the accountant, was also evidence of recklessness.63

Based on Jeffrey Jones's signing of his federal tax return and stating that he examined his return, under penalties of perjury, Jeffrey Jones clearly ought to have known that he had a duty to file an FBAR. The IRS placed Jeffrey Jones on notice of the FBAR filing requirement through the disclosure requirement contained in the schedule B. Jeffrey Jones chose to ignore that warning and did not file an FBAR. Even if he did not have actual knowledge of his FBAR-reporting obligations, he could have easily found out about them by reading his federal income-tax return or by talking to Burke, his tax-return preparer. To find otherwise would render the tax return not worth the paper it was written on, to paraphrase the Supreme Court's decision in Upton.

Additionally, Jeffrey Jones never mentioned his foreign accounts to his longtime tax-return preparer, William Burke. Nor did Jeffrey Jones show to Burke the foreign tax-reporting statements he received. As in Ott, this also supports Jeffrey Jones's reckless disregard of his statutory obligations.

V. The amount of the penalty determined by the IRS is within the statutory maximum.

Under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C)(i), Congress established the maximum amount of the FBAR penalty at the greater of $100,000 or 50% of the amount in the account on June 30 of the year following the reporting period (that is, when the report is due).64 Here, as of June 30, 2012, the total balance of Jeffrey Jones's individual foreign accounts was $3,780,148. The IRS assessed a penalty of $1,890,074 against Jeffrey Jones for 2011, which is 50% of that amount. And so, the IRS did not assess greater than the statutory maximum.

VI. Conclusion.

Jeffrey Jones signed under penalty of perjury that he reviewed his tax returns and its schedules. Schedule B provided him with actual notice of his obligation to report his foreign accounts. Despite this notice, he did not report his foreign accounts. Indeed, he falsely stated that he did not have any foreign accounts and did not report the associated foreign income derived from those accounts, nor did he tell his tax-return preparer about the accounts or the foreign income. And so, he is liable for the willful FBAR penalty as a matter of law.

Dated: April 6, 2020

NICOLA T. HANNA
United States Attorney
THOMAS D. COKER
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Tax Division 

ANDREW T. PRIBE
Assistant United States Attorney

FOOTNOTES

1U.S. statement of fact, ¶ 1.

2Id., ¶¶ 2-3.

3Id., ¶¶ 4-5.

4Id., ¶ 8.

5Id., ¶ 9.

6Id., ¶ 10.

7Id., ¶ 12.

8Id., ¶ 13.

9Id., ¶ 14.

10Id., ¶ 15.

11Id., ¶ 16.

12Id., ¶ 17.

13Id., ¶ 18.

14Id., ¶ 19.

15Id., ¶ 20.

16Id., ¶¶ 11, 22.

17Id., ¶ 23.

18Id., ¶ 24.

19Id., ¶ 25.

20Id., ¶¶ 26-28.

21Id., ¶¶ 29-30.

22Id., ¶ 31.

23See § 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. (IRC) (“gross income means all income from whatever source derived”); Huff v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 222, 230 (T.C. 2010) (stating that “U.S. citizens are subject to Federal taxation on worldwide income.”).

24416 U.S. 21, 25-26, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974).

25Id. at 35.

26Id. at 26 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(2)) (internal quotations omitted).

27H.R. No. 91-975 (1970), 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4397, 1970 WL 5667.

28Id.

29Id.

3030Id.

31344 F.Supp.3d 1345, 1372 (M.D. Fla. 2018).

3231 U.S.C. §§ 5314 and 5321(a)(5)(A); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.306(c) and 1010.350(a) and (b).

33United States v. Williams, No. 1:09-CV-00437, 2010 WL 34773311, *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2010), rev'd on other grounds, 489 Fed. Appx. 655 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1201 (D. Utah 2012).

34Complaint (dkt. 1, filed Jan. 8, 2019), ¶¶ 18-20, 34, 45.

35United States v. Williams, No. 1:09-CV-00437, 2014 WL 3746497, *1 (E.D. Va. June 26, 2014).

3631 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C)(i).

3731 C.F.R. § 1010.306(c).

38551 U.S. 47, 57, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007).

39See Safeco, 551 U.S. at 57; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 242-43, 58 S. Ct. 533, 82 L.Ed.2d 773 (1938) (noting that “willfully,” as used in a civil-penalty provision, includes “conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not one has the right to so act”).

40908 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1204 (D. Utah, 2012) (citing Safeco Ins. Co., 551 U.S. at 57).

41McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.

42912 F.3d at 153. See also United States v. Bohanec, 263 F.Supp.3d 881, 889 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (Pregerson, J.).

43United States v. Flume, 390 F.Supp.3d 847, 854 (S.D. Tex. 2019); United States v. Garrity, 304 F.Supp.3d 267, 270 (D. Conn. 2019); Bohanec, 263 F.Supp.3d at 889; McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d at 1201.

44See Safeco Ins. Co., 551 U.S. at 57 (finding that willfulness in civil context includes not only knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well); Bedrosian, 912 F.3d at 153.

45McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d at 1205 (collecting cases).

4631 U.S.C. § 5331(a)(5)(C)(ii).

47263 F.Supp.3d at 899. See also Bedrosian, 912 F.3d at 153.

48912 F.3d at 153 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). See also United States v. Cohen, No. 17-cv-1652, 2019 WL 8231039, *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2019) (Fitzgerald, J.).

49Bedrosian, 912 F.3d at 153 (finding reversible error where district court based its determination of non-willfulness on individual's subjective motivations and overall egregiousness of his conduct “which are not required to establish willfulness in this context.)”.

50Bedrosian, 912 F.3d at 153.

51Exhibit EE to Keli Kim decl.

52Exhibit A to Kim. decl.

5391 U.S. 45, 50 (1875).

54Id.

55Id.

56No. 2:10-cv-04450, 2010 WL 11601186, *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010). See also Eisenberg v. Citibank, N.A., No. 2:13-cv-1814, 2016 WL 6495347, *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016) (Snyder, J.) (“On July 26, 2006, when plaintiff signed the loan paperwork, plaintiff had constructive notice of her loan's terms.”).

57No. 2:16-cv-6189, 2016 WL 10968664, *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2016) (Phillips, J.) (quoting Brookwood v. Bank of America, 45 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1674 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). See also Keith v. First Horizon Homes Loans, No. 2:11-cv-8130, 2012 WL 13012474, *5 (C.D. Cal. April 4, 2012) (Feess, J.); Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 168 Cal. App. 4th 938, 959 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).

58See, e.g., IRC 7206(1) (“Any person who willfully makes and subscribes any return . . . which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter . . . shall be guilty of a felony[.]”).

59Norman v. United States, 942 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2019); United States v. Williams, 489 Fed. Appx. 655, 659 (4th Cir. 2012); Greer v. Commissioner, 595 F.3d 338, 347 n. 4 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Doherty, 233 F.3d 1275, 1285 n. 10 (11th Cir. 2000).

60942 F.3d at 1116 (quoting Greer, 595 F.3dat 347 n. 4) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

61942 F.3d at 1117.

62No. 18-cv-12174, 2020 WL 913814, *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2020).

63Id. at *7.

6431 C.F.R. § 1010.306(c).

END FOOTNOTES

DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES
  • Case Name
    Margaret J. Jones et al. v. United States
  • Court
    United States District Court for the Central District of California
  • Docket
    No. 2:19-cv-00173
  • Subject Area/Tax Topics
  • Jurisdictions
  • Tax Analysts Document Number
    2020-13531
  • Tax Analysts Electronic Citation
    2020 TNTI 69-15
    2020 TNTG 69-24
    2020 TNTF 69-20
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