Government Seeks Summary Judgment in FBAR Penalties Case

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN ALFAY SALAMA MARKUS,
Defendant.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN DIVISION

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Respectfully submitted by:

SEAN PAUL O'DONNELL
STEPHEN S. HO
Trial Attorneys, Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 227
Washington, D.C. 20044
(202) 514-9641
Sean.P.ODonnell@usdoj.gov
Counsel for the United States

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Table of Contents

STANDARD OF REVIEW

LEGAL BACKGROUND

ARGUMENT

CONCLUSION

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This case arises from John Alfay Salama Markus's conduct as a United States Army Corps of Engineers employee when he was stationed in Iraq. Markus accepted bribes from third parties in exchange for confidential bid information related to government contracts. Ex. D, Crim. Dkt. No. 2:11-cr-366-JLL (Plea Allocution) 22:24-27:17. He concealed his bribes in foreign bank accounts and attempted to repatriate the money without reporting the income to the United States government. Id. at 26:17-27:3. Markus was charged with 54 separate crimes related to this bribery scheme, including willfully failing to report his interests in bank accounts in Jordan and Egypt. Ex. A, Crim. Dkt. No. 2:11-cr-366-JLL, Doc. 14 (Indictment) at 1-51, 74-75. He pled guilty to willfully failing to report his interests in the Jordanian and Egyptian accounts. Ex. B, Crim. Dkt. No. 2:11-cr-366-JLL, Doc. 48 (Plea Agreement); Ex. C, Crim. Dkt. No. 2:11-cr-366-JLL Doc. 63 (Criminal Judgment) at 1; Ex. D, Plea Allocution 28:15-29:11.

This is a civil collection action brought by the United States to recover civil penalty assessments from Markus for willfully failing to disclose his interests in foreign bank accounts for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 tax years. All United States citizens such as Markus are required to report their foreign bank accounts to the Internal Revenue Service. In carrying out his criminal scheme, Markus willfully failed to report his interests in bank accounts held in Egypt and Jordan.

The United States seeks a civil judgment against Markus totaling almost one million dollars in civil penalties for this willful failure. Summary judgment should be granted because no genuine disputes of material fact exist and the United States is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

A district court determines de novo whether a defendant is liable for the penalty for failing to meet the reporting requirements of foreign accounts; the decision is based on the merits of the case presented to the district court. Bedrosian v. United States, No. 15-5853, 2017 WL 4946433, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2017); Moore v. United States, No. 15-5853, 2015 WL 1510007, at *4 (W.D. Wa. April 1, 2015); United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1201 (D. Utah 2012). The United States bears the burden of proving each element of its claim for this civil penalty by a preponderance of the evidence. Bedrosian, 2017 WL 4946433, at *3; McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

I. The Foreign Bank Account Reporting Requirement

Citizens of the United States such as Markus are subject to taxes on their income, regardless of where it is earned. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a); 26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1(b). The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, also known as the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), was enacted to ensure that citizens met the requirement to pay taxes on income earned abroad and “to detect and prosecute criminal activity.” See Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 et seq.); see also H.R. Rep. No. 91-975 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4395, 4397 (stating that the BSA was enacted to deal with major issues in law enforcement, one of which was the use of secret foreign bank accounts to evade income taxes); United States v. Simonelli, 614 F.Supp.2d 241 (D. Conn. 2008), quoting, 31 U.S.C. § 5311. Congress recognized that citizens' use of undisclosed foreign financial accounts caused significant federal tax losses as well as a gaping disparity in the enforcement of the internal revenue laws. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4397-98 (observing that “[s]ecret foreign financial facilities” offered the wealthy a “grossly unfair” but “convenient avenue of tax evasion”).

To fill the information gap, the BSA instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to require U.S. citizens “to keep records, file reports,” or both, when the citizen “makes a transaction or maintains a relation . . . with a foreign financial agency.” 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a). Pursuant to that statute, the Secretary published regulations requiring any citizen “having a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, a bank, securities or other financial account in a foreign country” to report certain details about the account to the Treasury Department. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(a).¹ The report must be made each year by filing a Form TD F 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, commonly known as an “FBAR.” See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(c); Remington Decl. 5; Ex. 1009, Markus's 2008 FBAR, USA-0019982000. An FBAR must be filed with the Treasury Department no later than June 30 “with respect to foreign financial accounts exceeding $10,000 maintained during the previous . . . year.” See id.

To alert citizens to the filing requirement, Schedule B of each year's Form 1040 contains the following check-the-box question:

See, e.g., Remington Decl. 5; Ex. F, Markus's 2008 IRS Form 1040 Income Tax Return, at 4 (Schedule B), USA-001935. The instructions for Schedule B require “Yes” to be checked on line 7a if the filer had authority to sign or direct the use of a foreign account. Id. Schedule B further refers taxpayers to Form TD F 90-22.1, that is, the FBAR, which provides specific instructions for reporting a financial interest in or authority over bank accounts, securities accounts, or other financial accounts in a foreign country. Id.; see Ex. G, TD-F 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, Rev. Oct. 2008 with Instructions, SEC.gov, https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/aml/f90221.pdf; McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 n.2.

II. The Civil Penalty for Willful Failure to File a Report of Foreign Bank Accounts

The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to impose a civil penalty on any person who does not comply with the requirement to report foreign bank accounts. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5). Where the failure is “willful,” the amount of this penalty cannot exceed the greater of $100,000 or 50 percent of the balance of the account at the time of the violation. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C)(i); 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(D). There is no reasonable cause exception for a willful violation. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C)(ii).

When distilled to its essence, a person is subject for the willful failure to file an FBAR under § 5321(a)(5) if:

Bedrosian v. United States, No. 15-5853, 2017 WL 1361535, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2017); United States v. Pomerantz, No. C16-689, 2017 WL 4418572, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2017); United States v. Toth, 2017 WL 1703936, at *4 (D. Mass. May 2, 2017); United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1201 (D. Utah 2012).

ARGUMENT

The Internal Revenue Service assessed penalties against Markus for his willful failure to meet his foreign account reporting obligations. Remington Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. H, IRS Forms 13448 Penalty Assessment Certification (Title 31 “FBAR”), USA 002013-2016. The penalties involved four accounts at two banks — one in Egypt (Banque Misr) and one in Jordan (Housing Bank for Trade and Finance) over a three-year time period:

Year	Bank Account	Account Number	Penalty Assessed
2007	Banque Misr	2393	$100,000
	Housing Bank I	70220	$372,427
	Housing Bank II	0201	$45,000
2008	Banque Misr	2393	$100,000
2009	Banque Misr	2393	$218,225
	Housing Bank III	80220	$6,362

The United States must prove the following to show that Markus is liable for the willful FBAR penalties for each year for the foreign bank accounts listed above: (1) that Markus was a citizen of the United States; (2) that Markus had an interest in or other authority over the foreign bank account; (3) that the foreign bank account had a balance that exceeded $10,000 at some point during the relevant reporting period; (4) that Markus willfully failed to file an FBAR for the account; and (5) that the penalty assessed by the IRS does not exceed the greater of $100,000 or 50% of the account balance.

I. Markus Was Obligated To Report Foreign Bank Accounts In 2007, 2008, And 2009

a. Markus is a United States citizen

Markus has been a United States citizen since at least 2003. Statement of Material Facts ¶ 1.

b. Markus had a financial interest in and authority over foreign bank accounts in 2007,2008, and 2009

i. Markus was the owner of Housing Bank accounts in 2007 and 2009

Markus concedes that he is the owner of each of the Housing Bank accounts during the relevant years. Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 16, 17.

ii. Markus Had an Ownership Interest In, and Authority Over, the Banque Misr Account in Egypt in 2007,2008, and 2009

Markus had “a financial interest in” and “signatory or other authority over” the Bank Misr account for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 tax years. The FBAR reporting requirement applies to persons who have “a financial interest in,” or “signatory or other authority over” a foreign financial account. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(a). A person has a financial interest in a financial account in a foreign country if “the owner of record or holder of legal title is a person acting as an agent, nominee, attorney or in some other capacity on behalf of the United States person — with respect to the account.” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(e)(2)(i) (emphasis added).

Markus's father, Alfy Salama Marcos Basily, is listed as the owner of record on the Banque Misr account, and Markus's brother, held a power of attorney over the account. Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 9, 10. However:

The facts above establish that Markus's family exercised authority over the Banque Misr account on his behalf to carry out his direction to dispose of funds in the account. Markus had a financial interest in the account and was required to report that interest by filing an FBAR. Indeed, in his plea, Markus admitted to opening, establishing control over, and using foreign bank accounts in Egypt to receive illegal bribe and kickback payments. Ex. D, Plea Allocution 25:6-11. Moreover, the count of Markus's criminal indictment to which he pled guilty specifically lists the Banque Misr account at issue in this case. Ex. A, Indictment at 35 ¶ 25, at 74-75; Ex. B, Plea Agreement; Ex. C, Criminal Judgment at 1.

Separately, the FBAR reporting requirement can be triggered under the more general standard of “signature or other authority.” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(f). Regulations define such authority as “the authority of an individual (alone or in conjunction with another) to control the disposition of money, funds or other assets held in a financial account by direct communication (whether in writing or otherwise) to the person with whom the financial account is maintained.” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(f). Courts have repeatedly found that “other authority” exists where a foreign account is held by someone who acts on behalf of another, or an entity that is indirectly controlled by a U.S. person. See, e.g., United States v. Clines, 958 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1992) (defendant held “other authority” where defendant had “actual control of the funds,” despiteownership structure); McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d 1186 at 1202 (defendant had “other authority” where he could direct disbursement of funds despite “deliberately disguised ownership structure.”).

Under the plain language of 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(f), Markus had “other authority” over the Banque Misr account. See, e.g., Markus Dep. Tr. 99:10-20 (Q: “[Y]ou could control your own money in th[e Banque Misr] account, right? A: Yeah, I can control my own money.”). Therefore, the evidence establishes that Markus controlled the Banque Misr account, and no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Markus has an interest in the Banque Misr account that subjected him to the FBAR reporting requirement.

c. The Balance of the Accounts was Greater than $10,000 During the Relevant Calendar Years

From 2007 to 2009, the balance of the relevant accounts from 2007 to 2009 exceeded $10,000 at some point during the reporting period. The evidence shows that well over $10,000 was in the relevant accounts for the relevant years:

Year	Bank Account	Account Number	Transfer In (+)/Out (-)	Exhibits
2007	Banque Misr	2393	$299,000	Exs. 120K-SW, 120KT-SW
	Housing Bank I	70220	$200,000	Exs. 161-SW, 161T-SW
	Housing Bank II	0201	$90,000	Exs. 161-SW, 161T-SW
2008	Banque Misr	2393	$160,000	Exs. 120P-SW, 120PT-SW
2009	Banque Misr	2393	$100,000	Exs. 125-SW, 125T-SW
	Housing Bank III	80220	$580,000	Exs. 125-SW, 125T-SW

Therefore, Markus was required to report his interest in each of the accounts above to the Internal Revenue Service. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314.

II. Markus Willfully Failed to Report Foreign Accounts for 2007, 2008, and 2009

a. The Legal Standard for Willfulness

Markus willfully failed to file FBARs that reported his Egyptian and Jordanian bank accounts to the United States government for 2007, 2008, and 2009. Section 5321 authorizes apenalty for willful violations of the reporting requirement, but fails to define the term “willful.” 31 U.S.C. § 5321. In civil cases, willfulness includes both knowing and reckless violations of a standard. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007) (explaining that this definition is consistent with common law usage of the term, which treated reckless disregard of the law as a willful violation). The term willfulness includes all conduct that is voluntary, but not conduct that is merely accidental or unconscious. United States v. McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1205 (D. Utah 2012); Bedrosian v. United States, No. 15-5853, 2017 WL 4946433, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2017).

Reckless disregard of a statutory duty satisfies the willfulness standard. McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d at 1204; Bedrosian, 2017 WL 4946433, at *4. Recklessness is evaluated using an objective standard that evaluates whether an action entails “an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either know or so obvious that is should be known.” Bedrosian, 2017 WL 4946433, at *4 (quoting Safeco Ins. Co., 551 U.S. at 68). The relevant inquiry is whether the failure to disclose the information was purposeful instead of inadvertent, not whether the taxpayer subjectively believed he was not required to file an FBAR. See Lefcourt v. United States, 125 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that after it is established that a failure to disclose information was done purposefully, whether the filer believed he was legally justified in withholding the information is irrelevant); McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d at 1210 (finding that if subjective intent were required, every person would be able to escape liability by avoiding learning of the reporting requirements).

Acting with '“willful blindness' to the obvious or known consequences of one's actions” also satisfies the willfulness standard. Bedrosian, 2017 WL 4946433, at *4 (quoting McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d at 1205). In the tax reporting context, the government can show willful blindnessby evidence that the taxpayer made a “conscious effort to avoid learning about reporting requirements.” United States v. Williams, 489 Fed.Appx. 655, 659-60 (4th Cir. 2012). Evidence of conduct intended to “conceal or mislead sources of income or other financial information” is evidence of willful blindness and recklessness. Id. at 660.

“An improper motive or bad purpose is not necessary to establish willfulness in the civil context.” McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d at 1204 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, direct evidence of intent is not required to establish a violation was willful — persons who fail to file an FBAR are not likely to admit they knew of the filing requirement and chose not to comply with it. Id. at 1205. Willfulness can be shown through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the facts before the court. Id.

Markus acted willfully in failing to file FBARs for calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009.

b. Markus Willfully Failed To File An FBAR For 2007.

Markus's testimony shows that he willfully failed to report his Egyptian and Jordanian bank accounts in 2007 (that is, the Banque Misr and the Housing Bank I and II accounts). Markus did not report these accounts because he was engaged in a criminal scheme to defraud the American government, and reporting the accounts would have alerted the United States government to his criminal activity. See Ex. D, Plea Allocution 25:6-11. At his plea allocution, Markus admitted to opening, establishing control over, and using foreign bank accounts in both Jordan and Egypt to receive illegal bribe and kickback payments. Id. He stated that he engaged in his criminal kickback scheme from July of 2006 through July of 2009. Id. at 22:24-23:8. When he received an illegal bribe, he would actively conceal these illegal proceeds in the foreign accounts at issue in this case. See Exs. 120L-SW, 120LT-SW; Exs. 161-SW, 161T-SW; see Williams, 489 Fed.Appx. at 660 (concealing or misleading sources of income or other financial information is evidence of willful blindness and recklessness).

Markus also testified at his deposition that he provided confidential bid information in exchange for a kickback of 5 percent of the value of each federal contract his co-conspirators were awarded. Markus Dep. Tr. 107:16-114:20; Exs. 162-SW, 164-SW. The funds in the accounts Markus neglected to report were the proceeds of bribes and kickbacks paid by two of his co-conspirators in 2007. Markus Dep. Tr. 172:24-175:10; Exs. 120L-SW, 120LT-SW.

The McBride court counseled that evidence of improper motive or bad intent is not required to show willfulness, but in this case, improper motive and bad intent are present. 908 F.Supp.2d at 1204 (internal citations omitted). Markus is far more culpable than the willful defendant envisioned by McBride.. Markus never reported the accounts because his bribery and kickback scheme would have been discovered, subjecting him to criminal prosecution. See Markus Dep. Tr. 172:24-175:10; Exs. 120L-SW, 120LT-SW. And that is precisely what happened when the government learned of his illegal activities. Markus's engagement in a criminal scheme from 2006 through 2009 shows that he knowingly and consciously failed to report his interest in foreign bank accounts in 2007. See McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d at 1205; Bedrosian, 2017 WL 4946433, at *4.

If Markus's failure to report his accounts in 2007 was not knowing and conscious, it was at least reckless. Markus gambled that his illegal activity would never be discovered. He readily admits he never investigated whether he had to report his accounts to the United States government, something a criminal would be loathe to do. Markus Dep. Tr. 138:2-7.

Thus, Markus willfully failed to report his foreign bank accounts in 2007.

c. Markus Willfully Failed To File An FBAR For the Banque Misr Account in 2008.

Markus actually filed an FBAR for calendar year 2008 for his Jordanian accounts, but omitted the Banque Misr account from that filing. Ex. 1009, Markus's 2008 FBAR. Furthermore, Markus never disclosed the existence of Egyptian account to his tax return preparer for tax year 2008, Dennis Tomsky. Tomsky Dep. Tr. 18:4-19:4. Because Markus actually filed an FBAR in 2008 for his Jordanian accounts, he clearly knew of the reporting requirement for the Egyptian account and voluntarily elected not to report it. See McBride, 908 F.Supp.2d at 1205 (D. Utah 2012) (willfulness includes conduct that is voluntary).

Markus thus knew of the requirement to report his foreign bank accounts, but willfully failed to file an FBAR containing all of his foreign bank accounts for 2008, reporting only his Jordanian accounts and not disclosing the Egyptian account.

d. Markus Is Estopped From Challenging The FBAR Penalties For 2009 Because He Pled Guilty To Willfully Failing To File FBARs for That Period.

Markus pled guilty in his criminal case to willfully failing to file an FBAR for 2009 for the Jordanian and Egyptian accounts. He is collaterally estopped from challenging the assessment of a civil penalty based on that same conduct. Markus cannot challenge his 2009 FBAR civil penalty assessment because he pled guilty to willfully failing to file FBARs for his bank accounts in Egypt and Jordan for calendar year 2009. “Under collateral estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). A party who admits criminal conduct in a guilty plea is collaterally estopped from challenging a civil penalty based on that conduct, and the plea's preclusive effect extends to all issues that are necessarily admitted in the plea. Anderson v. Comm'r. Internal Revenue, 698 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2012); S.E.C. v. Desai, 145 F.Supp.3d 329, 334 (D.N.J. 2015).; United States v. Dickinson, 547 F.Supp. 734, 735-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (criminal conviction for Title 31 failure to report exportation of currency estopped defendant from challenging civil penalty assessment for the same conduct). Preclusion applies only if four conditions are met: (1) the issue decided in the prior action is the same as the one presented; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) it was determined by a final judgment; and (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment. Anderson, 698 F.3d at 164.

Here, Markus pled guilty to intentionally and willfully failing to file an FBAR for calendar year 2009 for his Egyptian and Jordanian accounts. Ex. C, Criminal Judgment at 1; Ex. D, Plea Allocution 28:15-29:11. The FBAR penalty in this case is the civil analog of the FBAR crime to which Markus pled guilty. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 5321 with 31 U.S.C. § 5322. At his plea, Markus specifically admitted to the following facts under oath:

These factual issues were heard and adopted by the court. (“J. Linares: All right. I am going to accept your guilty plea. I think your plea to all three counts is supported by your testimony of the facts.”). Therefore, these particular facts were litigated and determined in Markus's criminal case. These facts were the predicate to his criminal conviction and the issuance of a final judgment and these admissions estop Markus from challenging the civil FBAR assessments for the Banque Misr and Housing Bank III accounts in 2009. Ex. C, Crim. Dkt. No. 2:11-cr-366-JLL Doc. 63 (Criminal Judgment) at 1; see Anderson, 698 F.3d at 164. Therefore, Markus, as a matter of law, willfully failed to report the Banque Misr and Housing Bank III accounts in 2009.

III. The IRS Assessed Willful Penalties Against Markus for 2007, 2008, and 2009.

Markus is a United States citizen who willfully failed to report his interests in foreign bank accounts with a balance of greater than $10,000 to the United States Government in 2007, 2008, and 2009. Section 5321 imposes a maximum penalty for failing to comply with the reporting requirements which cannot exceed the greater of $100,000 or 50% of the balance in the account at the time of the violation. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C), (D). The IRS assessed penalties against Markus within the limits of section 5321 for the following amounts:

Year	Bank Account	Account Number	Exhibit Showing Account Balance	Account Balance	Penalty Assessed
2007	Banque Misr	42393	Ex. 120K, 120KT-SW	$299,250	$100,000
	Housing Bank I	70220	Ex. 127-SW, 127T-SW	$744,854	$372,427
	Housing Bank II	70201	Ex. 161T, 161T-SW	$90,000	$45,000
2008	Banque Misr	42393	Ex. 120H-SW; Ex. M, Funds Transfer From Banque Misr to Wachovia, Bates No. USA-001453	$364,950	$100,000
2009	Banque Misr	42393	Ex. B, Plea Agreement at 13 ¶ 13.	$400,000	$218,2252
	Housing Bank III	80220	Ex. 125-SW, 125T-SW	$680,000	$6,362

The penalties assessed against Markus for the Banque Misr accounts in 2007 and 2008 are $100,000. The penalties assessed against Markus for Housing Bank I and II in 2007 are 50% of the account balance identified for each of the accounts. The penalty assessed against Markus for Housing Bank III is less than 50% of the account balance. Therefore, the penalties assessed against Markus are within the boundaries set by statute. As of November 13, 2017, the balance of unpaid penalty assessments owed by Markus was $1,052,101.29, including interest accrued under 31 U.S.C. § 3717. Ex. H, Balance Due Calculation; Beasley Decl. ¶ 4.

CONCLUSION

There is no dispute that Markus engaged in a criminal scheme to take bribes and kickbacks between 2006 and 2009. He hid the bribes and kickbacks in foreign bank accounts in Egypt and Jordan in calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009. Reporting the existence of the accounts to the United States government would have exposed Markus to potential criminal liability, so he willfully failed to report them. After Markus was criminally convicted of all of this conduct, the IRS assessed civil penalties against him for his willful failure to report the accounts. Because there is no genuine dispute as to any of these facts, the United States motion for summary judgment should be granted.

Dated: November 22, 2017

Respectfully Submitted,

SEAN P. O'DONNELL
STEPHEN S. HO
Trial Attorneys, Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 227
Washington, D.C. 20044
202-514-9641 (v)
202-514-6866 (f)
Sean.P.O'Donnell@usdoj.gov