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Investors Council Testimony at Hearing on Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation

APR. 18, 2002

Investors Council Testimony at Hearing on Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation

DATED APR. 18, 2002
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES
  • Authors
    Teslik, Sarah
  • Institutional Authors
    Council of Institutional Investors
  • Cross-Reference
    For related coverage, see Tax Notes, Apr. 15, 2002, p. 295.
  • Subject Area/Tax Topics
  • Jurisdictions
  • Language
    English
  • Tax Analysts Document Number
    Doc 2002-9562 (5 original pages)
  • Tax Analysts Electronic Citation
    2002 TNT 76-53

 

Testimony of Sarah Teslik

 

Executive Director

 

Council of Institutional Investors

 

Senate Finance Committee

 

 

18 April 2002

 

 

[1] There is more corporate fraud, accounting fraud, and Wall Street fraud than there used to be.

[2] Why? It is not because people are more evil than they used to be. They are not. Human nature doesn't change.

[3] But it is human nature to act in one's self interest. There is more fraud because people have correctly figured out that it pays. Corporate fraud has huge upsides and few downsides. That is a key fact.

[4] Why does corporate, accounting and financing fraud pay better with fewer risks than it used to? Because our investor- protecting laws and regulations have been worn down by years of special interest lobbying. On top of that, decades of loophole finding have paid off better than any lottery.

[5] Why have special interests been so successful? Because corporate America, accountants and Wall Street interests are wealthy and organized and because millions of blue collar and middle class Americans are not. Most are not even aware of how current rules fail them.

[6] The point is this. People will behave badly if they are rewarded for it and risk little. That is the current state of our investor protection laws. Enron, Global Crossing and all the others happen because we let them. Our safety nets are failing us: outside auditors, boards of directors, rating agencies, analysts, the stock exchanges, the SEC and prosecutors.

[7] The most important safety net, however, is investors themselves. People will take care of their property unless laws prevent them. You maintain your cars and houses because they are yours. We investors are the owners of companies, and we would take actions to prevent the frauds of which we are the victims. But we can't. The rules that govern us, as carved and chipped at by special interests, prevent us.

[8] Most of these rules are outside your committee's jurisdiction. But I have included a few examples of existing laws that shackle us in my written remarks in case you are interested. They make for more gripping reading than most parts of the congressional record.

 

(1) If a shareholder buys a mere 5% of a company's stock, he/she has to file forms as if the government is tracking a pedophile rather than an owner. The only way a shareholder can avoid this is to file a form promising to be passive. I'm not making this up. So shareholders without expensive form-filing lawyers have to promise to remain inert. Large pension funds that might otherwise be willing to pressure a troubled company, and who do not seek control, remain inert rather than filing burdensome forms that bring litigation risks with them. These requirements should be reworked.

 

 

(2) The government tells us what issues we can and cannot bring up with our own employees -- company executives. The SEC decides what issues shareholders can raise for a shareholder vote. Have any of you read these rules? They take almost every issue a shareholder ought to want to raise off the table:

 

-- We cannot ask about anything that is "ordinary business" which covers almost everything we should care about.

 

 

-- We can't ask about anything that is extraordinary business either if an issue affects only a small part of the company.

 

 

-- We cannot ask about the thing we should most want to ask about -- the election of the company's actual board. I'm still not kidding.

 

[9] Many of the problems at Enron would be off limits for shareholders to raise under current rules.

[10] Worse, the SEC is free to, and often does, change its interpretations of these rules, without warning or recourse, so we don't know from one year to the next what we can ask.

 

(3) When the SEC does allow a shareholder to raise an issue for a vote, it requires the shareholder to send someone to the annual meeting, even though few companies require their own directors to attend and most shareholders vote by proxy and not in person. If the shareholder's rep isn't there, the company can cancel the vote. So if you are disabled, have a job, are not rich or can't travel, forget it.

 

 

(4) As if this isn't enough, companies can, and do, move their annual meetings to hard-to-reach places, even foreign countries, so shareholders can't get there. Annual meetings of major US companies have been held in Russia -- or in towns without airports in Alabama on Friday afternoons before holidays. I'm not kidding.

 

 

(5) Managers can call off a shareholder vote on election day if they see they are losing. (Though a Council member sued a company over this recently and more or less won.) Can you imagine if a US Senator could do this -- people would howl.

 

 

(6) If a shareholder wins a majority of votes cast for its proposal, companies can, with few exceptions, ignore the vote. Most do. Some companies ignore majority shareholder votes even when an issue passes year after year. This makes the shareholder franchise a joke.

 

 

(7) Shareholders used to get to vote once a year on directors. But this year AT&T and Comcast have agreed to bar shareholders from voting again on the board of the new company until 2005.

 

 

(8) Some shareholder ballot items are rigged. The New York Stock Exchange allows brokers to stuff ballot boxes and vote for management when shareholders with broker accounts don't vote. Most shareholders don't know this. Studies show this throws important votes. The SEC and NYSE ignore our pleas to fix this.

 

[11] The right way to combat these frauds is NOT for Congress to act as if it is the owner and take actions that shareholders should be taking. The right way to combat these frauds is to structure our accounting rules, our safety nets, our tax laws and our law enforcement so that the interests of the people who operate them are aligned with shareholders and (2) allow shareholders the freedom to protect their own investments against fraud.

[12] How do you, the Finance Committee do this? Give us the necessary information to track the money. If we can track it, we can try to tie it to proper goals. There is a reason that companies have been lending rich CEOs millions of dollars: combining loans and stock options allows CEOs to hide it when they dump company stock. We are hoping new SEC rules do close this loophole. There is a reason many companies give their directors cushy side agreements that fit through disclosure loopholes -- directors can be co-opted without owners knowing it. There is a reason companies use accounting loopholes to delay or hide bad news. One reason stock option plans is that it has been hard for shareholders to track them, so pay is somewhat hidden [sic]. Recently enacted SEC rules hopefully will close this disclosure gap. So close any disclosure loopholes that prevent us from tracking the money. If we can track it, we have a better shot at structuring it to prevent abuse and reward proper goals.

[13] Second, help us use CEO pay to encourage good behavior and deter bad. Don't let CEOs set their own pay -- shareholders need to vote on stock option plans. Do not let executives print up stock, options like counterfeit money -- the Council supports charging stock options to earnings and thus Senator Levin's bill. Do not allow executives to increase their compensation through fraud or the buying off of directors with conflict-creating deals -- the Council supports real board independence and the disclosure of all board conflicts.

[14] On expensing stock options. We believe that current disclosure requirements allow important information to be hidden in footnotes. We believe that options have value, that they are compensation, that they are more easily abused than cash and that expensing improves comparability and eliminates the inequitable disparate treatment we now have of expensing only certain kinds of options, especially performance-based indexed options which investors favor.

[15] Figuring out how to tie executives' interests to the long- term success of companies isn't hard. But acting on these things is. I understand the tremendous pressure you are all under not to charge options to earnings-so I understand that it will take remarkable courage for you to act on this. I keep thinking that if we could somehow harness the pressure executives are applying to you not to charge options to earnings and direct it, say, at finding Osama Bin Laden, he'd be sitting here today. I wish the same energy would be directed at employees' and shareholders' interests.

[16] I realize that those of you supporting Senators Levin and McCain are profiles in courage, and I thank you. You are clearly in good company -- Warren Buffett, Alan Greenspan, AIMR, TIAA-CREF and the Council's many members. We would like to work with you on this and any other ways we can keep our markets clean. The fact that we've had a good run of it the past 200 years doesn't guarantee our future. Only you can do that.

 

COMMON ARGUMENTS AGAINST OPTION EXPENSING

 

 

1. Stock option[s] for employees are impossible to value. Traditional valuation models do not work for employee stock options.
a. Just because stock options are difficult to value -- as are other things on corporate income statements and balance sheets -- that doesn't mean the appropriate value is 0.

 

 

b. The Council's policy doesn't address valuation issues -- it simply recognizes the basic principle that options have value and represent compensation that should be reflected on income statements. Instead the Council recommends that the appropriate parties host roundtables to hear from experts on this issue. And we also recommend that companies must disclose their valuation assumptions, so investors can assess the quality of the reported numbers.

 

 

c. Valuation approaches have grown far more sophisticated since the FASB first proposed expensing. We understand there are legitimate approaches to be used to expense options.

 

 

d. We understand that it is standard practice in Europe for companies to offload their option programs to investment banks -- who obviously value the options before the transaction is completed. So market-based option valuation is occurring now.

 

2. Stock options are currently reflected in the diluted EPS.

 

The diluted EPS only reflects in-the-money outstanding options, and this is useful information. However it doesn't get at what this proposed policy is about -- that options have value, are compensation and should appropriately be reflected on corporate income statements.

 

3. This information is already incorporated in the footnotes to the financial statements. Why the need to put on the income statement?

 

We think this information is too important to be relegated solely to, and some would say hidden in, the footnotes to the annual report, It's appropriate for all compensation expenses to be deducted from the reported income statement.

 

 

Besides, if the information is already disclosed in the footnotes, why the resistance to putting it front and center on reported income statements?

 

4. This is a corporate governance issue, not an accounting issue. Why not continue to push for shareholder approval of option plans?

 

If shareholders have learned anything from Enron, it's the value of full and accurate disclosure. If stock options have value and reflect compensation -- which we all agree is the case -- then they should appropriate be included with other compensation and deducted from income statements.

 

5. Expensing would kill the U.S. growth machine by destroying small firms' ability to grant options to compensate employees.

 

This argument is absurd. The expensing effect is disclosed in footnotes, something sophisticated investors/analysts use, and this hasn't stopped awards.

 

 

From a historical perspective, this argument is ridiculous, This country has experienced terrific growth over the decades, including BEFORE the creation of options.

 

6. Stock prices will take a hit when options have to be expensed.

 

The expensing effect is disclosed in footnotes, something sophisticated investors/analysts use, and this hasn't been cited as a reason for declining stock prices. And, if stock prices are overvalued because options aren't expensed (something Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan has alleged), then it's even more important for these awards to be expensed on income statements, so investors can reassess the valuations of portfolio companies.

 

7. Expensing would harm the comparability of reported financials, since evaluation methods may vary so tremendously and yield terrifically different results.

 

The Council's policy doesn't address valuation issues. We recommend leaving that debate and discussion to appropriate experts. We will urge a consistent approach and disclosure of methodologies.

 

 

In some ways, expensing would improve comparability of reported financials by ensuring that companies that primarily use cash compensation can be compared to ones that more heavily rely on stock compensation. This approach ensures that all compensation expenses are reflected on income statements.
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES
  • Authors
    Teslik, Sarah
  • Institutional Authors
    Council of Institutional Investors
  • Cross-Reference
    For related coverage, see Tax Notes, Apr. 15, 2002, p. 295.
  • Subject Area/Tax Topics
  • Jurisdictions
  • Language
    English
  • Tax Analysts Document Number
    Doc 2002-9562 (5 original pages)
  • Tax Analysts Electronic Citation
    2002 TNT 76-53
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