CBPP Discounts Features of New Stimulus Proposal
CBPP Discounts Features of New Stimulus Proposal
- AuthorsGreenstein, Robert
- Institutional AuthorsCenter on Budget and Policy Priorities
- Subject Area/Tax Topics
- Index TermsAMTbudget, federalCOBRAcorporate taxhealth care and insuranceincome tax, individualslegislation, taxtax reliefcapital gains
- Jurisdictions
- LanguageEnglish
- Tax Analysts Document NumberDoc 2001-31259 (10 original pages)
- Tax Analysts Electronic Citation2001 TNT 245-32
=============== SUMMARY ===============
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities Executive Director Robert Greenstein issued a December 18 report saying that the tax component of the new stimulus proposal, circulated by Ways and Means Chair William M. Thomas, R-Calif., represents a "significant step backward in the effort to develop a bipartisan stimulus package" that would be effective and fiscally responsible. Greenstein says that although the plan's proponents present it as more moderate than the House bill passed in October, its tax provisions are similar in many respects.
The new plan includes several multiyear tax cuts for corporations and high-income individuals that would be either inefficient in stimulating the economy or more effective if limited to one year. Also, Greenstein argues that the multiyear or permanent tax provisions will widen budget deficits in the years following the end of the recession.
Greenstein also writes that the new plan retains features of the original House bill that are "highly deleterious" to states. "The plan would cause states -- which already face budget deficits this year of $35 billion to $50 billion -- to lose an additional $5 billion in state revenue each year for the next three years," he says. Furthermore, the plan continues to exclude those measures extending unemployment insurance benefits to low-wage workers who would qualify if the wages they earned in recent months were counted. The plan also fails to extend unemployment insurance to those who meet all criteria for unemployment benefits, but are disqualified because they are available for part-time work rather than full-time work, Greenstein says.
Finally, the report indicates that the health insurance proposals in the new plan are unlikely to provide "adequate assistance" to many low- and moderate-income workers who lose their jobs. As a result, those individuals and their families would have to rely on Medicaid. However, Greenstein warns, with the new plan's increased pressure on states to cut budgets, Medicaid is a "prime candidate" for budget cuts.
"The plan includes several permanent tax cuts, which would further exacerbate the nation's long-term budget difficulties," Greenstein concludes.
=============== FULL TEXT ===============
December 18, 2001
New House Stimulus Proposal Retains Many Features
of Earlier House Bill
New Plan Filled with Costly Multi-Year or Permanent Tax Cuts that
Would Do Little to Stimulate the Economy
by Robert Greenstein
[1] The tax component of the new stimulus proposal circulated late Monday by Rep. Bill Thomas and likely to be brought to the House floor within the next day represents a significant step backward in the effort to develop a bipartisan stimulus package that would be effective as stimulus and fiscally responsible. Although its proponents present the plan as being more moderate than the stimulus bill the House passed in October, the plan's tax provisions are similar to those of the House-passed stimulus bill in many key respects.
[2] The plan includes numerous multi-year (and, in some cases, permanent) tax cuts for corporations and higher-income individuals that would either be inefficient in stimulating the economy or much more effective as stimulus if limited to one year. These multi-year or permanent provisions will widen budget deficits in years after the recession is over. While estimates from the Joint Tax Committee and the Congressional Budget Office are not yet available, the plan appears to cost well over $50 billion in the nine years after 2002 -- that is, in years where the economy is expected to be in recovery and stimulus is no longer needed. (This estimate is based on estimates provided by the Joint Tax Committee and CBO in recent weeks for identical or similar provisions in earlier stimulus packages.)
[3] Moreover, the multi-year nature of these provisions, under which they would remain in effect long after the downturn ends, makes sense only if one of the goals of the legislation is to heighten the chances that these corporate tax cuts will be extended when they are scheduled to expire and thus will become ongoing fixtures of the tax code, a course that would cost several hundred billion dollars over the coming decade. While the plan drops some tax provisions included in the original House bill -- such as a capital gains tax cut and large, retroactive corporate tax refunds -- the principal tax provisions of the House stimulus bill remain intact in whole or in large part, and the plan adds several new special interest tax provisions, such as changes in pension rules that would enable firms to reduce pension contributions and changes in the individual Alternative Minimum Tax that would principally benefit high-income taxpayers.
[4] Furthermore, the new plan retains features of the House bill that are highly deleterious to states. The plan would cause states -- which already face budget deficits this year of $35 billion to $50 billion -- to lose an additional $5 billion in state revenue each year for the next three years. Since states must balance their budgets even in recessions, this would force states to institute still-larger budget cuts or tax increases this year, steps that would dampen the economy and undercut federal stimulus effects.
[5] In addition, the plan continues to exclude measures to extend unemployment insurance benefits for the coming year, at federal cost, to low-wage workers who would qualify if the wages they earned in recent months were counted and to workers who meet all other criteria for unemployment benefits but are disqualified because they are available for part-time rather than full-time work. Because many unemployed low-wage workers would still fail to qualify for unemployment benefits but could lose other assistance as a result of the larger state budget cuts that the plan would engender, some of the low-income unemployed could be made worse off by the plan. Finally, while larding costly tax breaks on corporations that would endure long after the downturn ends, the plan excludes even a modest, short-term increase in unemployment benefit levels.
The Plan's Tax Provisions
The plan's tax provisions include the following:
o Depreciation: The plan contains a generous depreciation
provision under which 30 percent of the cost of equipment and
other items could be deducted immediately. This provision
would make sense if it were to be in effect for one year.
Instead, the plan leaves the provision in effect for three
years, a move that substantially reduces its effectiveness as
stimulus but substantially increases the chances it will be
made an ongoing feature of the tax code. As Brookings analyses
have shown, making the provision effective for three years
lessens its stimulative effect because it enables firms to
wait a year or more and see what the economy looks like before
making purchases; firms could defer making purchases and still
get the tax break. Furthermore, because of its three-year
nature, the tax break would remain in effect long after the
downturn ends, making it more likely that it would come to be
seen as a normal feature of the tax code and thus making its
extension at the end of the three-year period more probable.
In fact, the tax break is designed so that it would expire on
September 11, 2004, shortly before the elections, making it
even more likely it would be extended at that time. If this
tax break is extended and remains in effect throughout the
decade, its cost -- according to the Joint Tax Committee --
will be nearly $230 billion over ten years.
o Corporate AMT: One of the areas where the plan appears
to be more moderate than the original House bill is with
regard to its treatment of the corporate Alternative Minimum
Tax. While there are changes here, however, they are not as
large as the rhetoric surrounding the new plan may suggest.
The new proposal does not formally repeal the corporate AMT,
but it largely guts the AMT so that the AMT would not have
much effect. Moreover, many of the corporations that would
receive large checks under the original House bill would still
get a substantial portion of these payments. The payments
would be spread over a number of years rather than paid up
front. Finally, since the proposal would largely eviscerate
the corporate AMT on a permanent basis, another of its effects
would be to enable a number of profitable corporations to
avoid paying any income tax.1
Individual AMT: These changes in the AMT would be
extended to the individual AMT as well. That would
result in further tax cuts for high-income individuals, as
these would be the people who would benefit most from the
changes that would be made in the individual AMT. The
provision making these changes in the individual AMT was
not part of the original House bill. It would be
permanent.
o Tax breaks for financial corporations with foreign
operations: The new bill would extend for five years a tax
break for multi-national financial corporations with overseas
operations. Under the "Subpart F" rules of current law, U.S.
firms are taxed on some types of income earned by foreign
corporations that they control, regardless of whether the
income is distributed back to the United States. The purpose
of these rules is to prevent international firms from using
internal organizational shifts and distorted internal pricing
practices to hide income from U.S. taxation. A temporary
provision, due to expire in 2002, exempts income earned in
banking, finance, and insurance from these rules and therefore
effectively provides a subsidy to income that is earned abroad
and not distributed back to the United States. The new
stimulus package would extend this special exemption for five
years, providing a significant tax benefit to firms in the
banking, finance, and insurance industries. This provision
would have little, if any, stimulative effect since the
measure would provide only five percent of its $6.5
billion in tax cuts in 2002. More than 95 percent of its tax
cuts would come in subsequent years. There is little practical
difference between this provision and the version of the
provision in the original House bill, which made this
provision permanent. Extending the provision for five years so
it is in effect for nearly half a decade after the recession
is over would set the provision up to be extended at the close
of the five-year period and become an ongoing part of the tax
code.
o Rate reductions: The plan retains the original House
provision to accelerate to 2002 the reductions in the 27.5
percent income tax rate that are now scheduled for 2004 and
2006. As various Brookings and CBPP analyses have shown, this
provision is mistargeted and would have little stimulative
effect. While expensive -- it would cost $54 billion -- it
would affect only the top quarter of all tax filers and would
confer the largest tax cuts on the top five percent of filers.
A married couple with two children that makes $65,000 a year
would receive nothing from the tax cut, while such a family
with income of $70,000 would receive $70 in 2002 and $210 over
four years. By contrast, a married filer with income of
$135,000 or above would receive $1,300 in 2002 and nearly
$4,000 over four years. High-income individuals spend a
smaller share (and save a larger share) of each additional
dollar of after-tax income they receive than do individuals
with more moderate incomes. As a result, this provision would
not have much stimulative effect.
Furthermore, more than three quarters of the $54-billion tax
reduction that this proposal would provide would come after
2002 -- that is, after the economy is expected to be in
recovery. Overall, the provision would be highly inefficient
as a stimulus measure, producing little bang for the buck.
o Deduction for Capital Losses: Under current law,
taxpayers may deduct net capital losses of up to $3,000
against ordinary income. The new proposal would increase the
permissible deduction amount to $6,000 in 2001 and 2002. This
proposal is likely to benefit primarily higher-income
taxpayers, given the concentrated distribution of financial
assets and the fact that the expanded deduction is more
valuable to taxpayers in higher tax brackets. It also may
induce additional stock market sales in the short run among
those who have net capital losses amounting to more than
$3,000, which could reduce stock prices. Since this tax cut
would be concentrated among higher-income taxpayers, most of
the tax break will be saved, not spent. It therefore would be
likely to provide little immediate stimulus to the economy.
Estimated Loss in Fiscal Year 2002 of State Tax Revenues
Due to Proposal(in millions of dollars)
_____________________________________________________________________
ALL STATES $5,430
Alabama $56 Montana $22
Alaska 70 Nebraska 33
Arizona 110 Nevada not affected
Arkansas 53 New Hampshire 42
California not affected New Jersey 260
Colorado 87 New Mexico 40
Connecticut 99 New York 710
Delaware 31 North Carolina 190
Florida 210 North Dakota 15
Georgia 180 Ohio 200
Hawaii 21 Oklahoma 48
Idaho 31 Oregon 100
Illinois 360 Pennsylvania 340
Indiana 180 Rhode Island 19
Iowa 60 South Carolina 58
Kansas 57 South Dakota 8
Kentucky 73 Tennessee 110
Louisiana 57 Texas 340
Maine 30 Utah 43
Maryland 120 Vermont 11
Massachusetts 270 Virginia 140
Michigan 60 Washington not affected
Minnesota 180 West Virginia 36
Mississippi 55 Wisconsin 140
Missouri 87 Wyoming not affected
ADDITIONAL AFFECTED JURISDICTIONS
District of Columbia 40 New York City 390
Note: These are CBPP estimates. The total for all the states is
identical to the Congressional Research Service estimate, but
the CRS estimates by state are not available.
o Leasehold Improvements: Under current law, changes made
to commercial office buildings to accommodate specific
occupants are depreciated over 39 years. The new package would
permanently shorten that depreciation period to 15 years. Such
a permanent change in the tax code is difficult to justify on
stimulus grounds, since only $78 million -- or one percent --
of its $7 billion ten-year cost would occur in 2002.
o Reduction in Employer Pension Contributions: The plan
also includes a new provision not contained in any previous
stimulus bill or any tax bill the House or Senate has approved
that would allow firms to reduce pension contributions to
pension funds for their employees.2
o Low-income Rebates: Finally, like the House bill and
most other stimulus packages, the plan includes a tax rebate
for lower-income workers who received no rebate or only a
partial rebate this summer. Because the rebate is a one-time
measure while most of the upper-income and corporate tax cuts
would be multiyear or permanent, the rebate accounts for only
about one-ninth of the cost of the plan's tax cuts over ten
years.
Assistance for the Unemployed
Unemployment Insurance
[6] The new plan would provide an additional 13 weeks of unemployment benefits for workers in all states who lost their jobs after March 15 and have exhausted their regular benefits. This represents a marked improvement over the earlier House bill, which contained no comparable provision.
[7] However, the plan rejects all other temporary improvements in unemployment benefits contained in the Finance Committee stimulus plan. Those provisions would make more part-time and recently employed workers eligible for benefits when they are laid off and provide for a modest increase in unemployment benefits.
[8] The new plan retains a provision of the House bill that would speed up the transfer of $9.2 billion already slated to be shifted from the federal unemployment insurance trust funds to state unemployment accounts.3 While this transfer can help states whose unemployment accounts are running low on funds, it would neither offer much assistance to the unemployed nor do much to stimulate the economy. This is because most of the funds it would transfer to state unemployment accounts would not be spent. Most states would use a large share of these funds to strengthen the reserves in their state unemployment trust funds, rather than to expand or extend unemployment benefits. States have no way of knowing how long or deep the recession will be, and they understandably are concerned that their reserves be adequate to weather the recession.
[9] A new survey of states conducted by the National Association of State Workforce Agencies confirms that most states would not use any of these funds to expand or extend unemployment benefits.4 The survey findings, which have been known for a number of weeks, also demonstrate that statements about this provision made in documents circulated late Monday by Rep. Bill Thomas are misleading. The Thomas documents declare that states would have the option of using these transferred funds to extend unemployment insurance coverage to laid-off part-time workers and to workers who would be eligible if the wages they earned in recent months were counted. This may suggest that Rep. Thomas has moderated his position on these matters. In fact, the new proposal represents no progress on these issues. States have long had the option to count more recent wages and to cover part-time workers; most states have declined to do so because of the potential impact on state unemployment insurance tax rates. That is why the Senate Finance Committee bill would cover part-time workers and count more recent wages for a one-year period at 100 percent federal cost. Moreover, the recent survey by the National Association of State Workforce Agencies, in which states were specifically asked what uses they would make of the $9.2 billion in transferred funds if the House proposal became law, shows most states would not spend any of the transferred funds either to extend coverage to these workers or to improve unemployment benefits in other ways. The survey found that "most responding states said they would not expand or extend benefits if they received the $9.3 billion in transferred funds." Most of the 38 states that responded specifically said they would not use these funds to count more recent wages, to extend coverage to part-time workers, or to increase the weekly benefit amount.
[10] These survey findings also are supported by Congressional Budget Office estimates. CBO estimates indicate that if the $9.2 billion in funds are transferred now, only a very small fraction of these funds (probably less than $1 billion) will actually be used in fiscal year 2002 to maintain or expand benefits.
[11] Temporarily expanding unemployment insurance benefits would be highly effective as economic stimulus. In a recent analysis, Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and Brookings Institution senior fellow Peter Orszag noted that "in a recession, the primary problem is that the nation's firms face a reduction in demand for their products -- not that they lack available workers, equipment, or anything else needed to produce goods and services."5 Increasing unemployment benefits addresses this critical demand problem by boosting consumer spending and thereby helping other workers keep their jobs. 6 Stiglitz, Orszag, and other economists also have noted by increasing aggregate demand, improvements in unemployment benefits would be more effective in providing economic stimulus and reducing lay-offs than most of the tax cuts included in the new package.
Health Insurance for the Unemployed
[12] The health insurance provisions of the package also are problematic. The principal such provision would provide a tax credit for 60 percent of health insurance premiums that laid-off workers pay. A second proposal would increase funding for a small Labor Department blockgrant program known as the National Emergency Grants program and make the provision of health insurance one of the allowable uses of the block-grant funds. Both of these proposals are poorly designed and likely to prove of limited effectiveness.
o The tax credit could be used either to purchase employer-based
coverage through COBRA or to purchase insurance in the
individual health insurance market. With the costs of a family
health insurance policy under COBRA averaging around $7,000,
it is unlikely that many unemployed workers particularly
those with low or moderate incomes could afford to pay 40
percent of COBRA premium costs while unemployed.7
o The aspect of the plan that would make the tax credit
available for the purchase of insurance in the individual
market is particularly problematic. The individual market is
largely unregulated and lacks the advantages of group
insurance purchased through employers. Many plans sold on the
individual market impose high deductibles and offer limited
coverage. Furthermore, premiums in the individual market can
vary based on risk factors such as age and medical history.
The new proposal lacks substantive insurance-market reforms to
ensure that individual health insurance policies that provide
adequate coverage will be made available at affordable prices
to unemployed workers in the individual health insurance
market. Under the proposal, states would have to guarantee
that some form of individual coverage is made available to
laid-off workers who previously had employer-based coverage,
but similar requirements are part of current law and most
states comply with them simply by allowing individuals who
otherwise cannot secure coverage to purchase insurance through
"high-risk pools." Because premiums for policies sold through
high-risk pools generally are unaffordable and the coverage
provided is usually limited, few individuals purchase
insurance through these pools.
The likely reason for inclusion of this tax credit in the
package is that supporters of the credit view its inclusion as
an opening for subsequent establishment of a broader
individual tax credit for the purchase of health insurance.
Rep. Bill Thomas has essentially said as much. Subsequent
efforts almost surely would be made to broaden this credit for
unemployed workers into a general individual health insurance
tax credit for the purchase of insurance in the individual
market (rather than a credit limited to the unemployed). Such
a general individual health insurance credit could encourage
significant numbers of businesses not to provide health care
coverage. Similarly, the credit could encourage younger,
healthier individuals to leave the employer-based system for
the individual market, leaving the older, less healthy workers
in the pools of workers that employers insure. Such a
development would drive up premiums for employer-based
coverage.
o The plan also would provide $3 billion to $5 billion through
the National Emergency Grants program. That program -- which
is currently funded at about $200 million a year and provides
grants each year to respond to job dislocations in a modest
number of areas that have experienced events such as a plant
closing or a natural disaster -- is likely to provide neither
an effective nor an expeditious way to provide health
insurance to unemployed workers. 8 This grant program
is designed to address the need for job training and related
employment services in a modest number of individual
localities, not to respond to problems created in most or all
states as a result of a national recession or to provide
health insurance for unemployed workers who lack it. For
example, its "first-come, first-served" funding
allocation procedures are inadequate and inappropriate for
distributing $3 billion to $5 billion across most areas of the
country during a recession.
Of particular note, the program has no experience in
purchasing health insurance or providing health care coverage.
States would likely need a number of months to make decisions
and develop eligibility rules and procedures for what would
effectively be a new health insurance program, to determine
the nature and scope of the insurance coverage to be offered,
to contract with health insurers and plans, and to train and
hire new staff. By the time health insurance coverage could be
provided to workers, the recession could well be over.
[13] Given these shortcomings, the health insurance proposals in the new stimulus plan are unlikely to provide adequate assistance to many low-and moderate-income workers who lose their jobs. As a result, more of these individuals and their families would need to rely on Medicaid. But a perverse outcome of the plan is that Medicaid coverage in a number of states would likely be scaled back in response to the budget shortfalls that the recession has created and that this plan would aggravate. As noted above, the plan includes tax provisions that would significantly reduce state revenues while providing no offsetting state fiscal relief.
[14] Overall, the plan would increase pressures on states to cut their budgets. In many states, Medicaid is a prime candidate for budget cuts. Cuts in Medicaid may further limit the options available to some low-and moderate-income families that are seeking health care coverage during the recession.
Conclusion
[15] The new offer package consists primarily of multi-year tax cuts for businesses and upper-income individuals that would be of limited effectiveness as stimulus, while offering relatively modest assistance for the unemployed and no fiscal relief to states. With the Administration projecting unified budget deficits at least in 2003 and 2004, there is little rationale for enacting proposals that would produce substantial revenue losses in these years but constitute inefficient and ineffective ways of stimulating the economy now. Furthermore, by fashioning key business tax cuts in the package as multi-year cuts that extend beyond the period for which the recession is forecast, the plan would virtually ensure there will be significant pressure to make these tax breaks permanent, creating yet another danger for the budget. In addition, the plan includes several permanent tax cuts, which would further exacerbate the nation's long-term budget difficulties.
FOOTNOTES
1 In determining whether a firm must pay the corporate AMT, a number of adjustments and "preferences" are added to the firm's income as calculated for regular tax purposes. The most important of these adjustments is for depreciation.
The proposal would delete depreciation tax breaks from those added to a firm's income in calculating the firm's AMT liabilities. An examination of IRs corporate tax return data for 1998, the most recent such data available, shows that the depreciation adjustment in the AMT accounted for more than 100 percent of the adjustments and preferences added to income for the calculation of corporate AMT payments. (Depreciation can be more than 100 percent because there are some items that are subtracted.) Thus, removing depreciation from the calculation would largely gut the AMT.
These changes also would enable corporations to secure billions of dollars of tax credits, as would have been the case under the House stimulus bill. It was these credits that would have resulted in huge checks being written to a number of corporations under the House bill. Corporations have build up credits from prior payments of the AMT. They may use these credits to reduce their regular corporate income tax liability if -- and only if -- the credits do not reduce their tax liability below the level at which they would have an AMT liability. If the corporate AMT is eviscerated to the point that few corporations have a significant AMT liability. then corporaitons will be able to use these credits to reduce their regular tax liability. This is what would happen under the corporate AMT provision in the new plan. Many corporations would be able to receive billions of dollars of tax credits, although the credits would be spread over a number of years rather than paid in full now.
2 Funding requirements for defined benefit pension plans depend on an interest rate: The higher the interest rate, the lower the pension contribution a firm is required to make, since a higher interest rate means that smaller contributions to a pension fund are needed to provide workers a given level of pension benefits in future years. Accordingly, firms are allowed to make lower pension contributions when interest rates are high but must make larger contributions when interest rates are low. As interest rates have fallen in recent months, the required contributions into defined benefit plans have risen, balancing the lower contributions that many firms made when interest rates were high. The new stimulus package would artificially raise the assumed interest rate used to determine the required level of pension contributions for the next two years, thereby reducing the contributions that firms are required to make. Some adjustment to the assumed interest rate may be justified because the 30-year bond is disappearing, but it appears that the adjustment included in the new package will exceed what can be justified on this basis.
3 Under current law, $5 billion will be transferred to states under the Reed Act in 2002. The proposal also would make $4 billion that would not have been transferred until 2003 available in 2002, making a total of $9.2 billion available in 2002, and would provide these funds quickly after enactment.
4 The survey, "How Would Your State Use An Accelerated Reed Act Distribution? A Summary of A State Survey by the National Association of State Workforce Agencies" is available on the NASWA website (www.naswa.org).
5 Peter Orszag and Joseph Stiglitz, "Tax Cuts Are Not Automatically the Best Stimulus: A Response to Glenn Hubbard," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, November 27, 2001.
6 Peter Orszag, "Strengthening Unemployment Benefits Would Be Much More Effective in Saving Jobs than Most Corporate Tax Cuts," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, November 14, 2001.
7 Another problem is that only unemployed workers eligible for unemployment insurance could receive the tax credit. A substantial number of low-income unemployed workers do not receive unemployment insurance. Indeed, because the plan does not include the proposals in the Senate Finance Committee stimulus bill that would expand access to unemployment insurance to part-time workers and low- wage workers who would be eligible if wages they earned in recent months were counted, a substantial number of lower-income unemployed workers would be excluded from eligibility for the health tax credit.
8 Sandra Clark, "Do Proposals to Increase Funding for National Emergency Grants Provide an Effective Way to Meet the Health Insurance and Other Needs of Laid-off Workers?," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised November 27, 2001.
END OF FOOTNOTES
- AuthorsGreenstein, Robert
- Institutional AuthorsCenter on Budget and Policy Priorities
- Subject Area/Tax Topics
- Index TermsAMTbudget, federalCOBRAcorporate taxhealth care and insuranceincome tax, individualslegislation, taxtax reliefcapital gains
- Jurisdictions
- LanguageEnglish
- Tax Analysts Document NumberDoc 2001-31259 (10 original pages)
- Tax Analysts Electronic Citation2001 TNT 245-32