Government Responds to Additional Statement of Undisputed Facts

UNITED STATES,
Plaintiff,
v.
ECOVEST CAPITAL, INC., et al.
Defendants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO CLAUD CLARK III'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

The United States respectfully submits, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and N.D.Ga. L.R. 56.1(B)(3), this Response to Claud Clark III's Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts (ECF No. 370).

1. From 2010 through 2018 Mr. Clark, on behalf of EcoVest, performed approximately seventy appraisals of conservation easements to be placed on various properties. Clark Declaration (Exhibit A) at ¶ 5.

RESPONSE: Undisputed that Clark prepared at least 70 appraisals of conservation easements for EcoVest, and that EcoVest's customers used those appraisals to claim tax deductions. The United States notes, however, that for each conservation easement deal, EcoVest obtained two appraisals from Clark — an initial appraisal and a final appraisal. Dep. of Ian Chrystall at 224:5-8, Feb. 23, 2021, ECF No. 371-22 (“Q. So for each of EcoVest's core offerings, conservation resulted, and so there is two versions of that appraisal; right? A. That sounds correct.”)¹

Clark's appraisals were the key document in the organization of the syndicated conservation easement scheme. This is because Clark's value opinion determined the sales price (“offering size”) that customers paid to invest in the conservation easement deals:

Dep. of Adam Lloyd at 151:23-152:5, Mar. 4, 2020, ECF No. 371-29. See also Dep. of Jed Linsider at 44:8-19, Jan. 12, 2021, ECF No. 371-27:

In other words, the amount customers had to pay to invest in the conservation easement deals was a direct function of Clark's valuation opinion. In addition, EcoVest used Clark's appraisal to create the organizing document (or PPM) that informed customers of the key terms, conditions, benefits, and risks of the syndicated conservation easement scheme. Dep. of Chrystall at 223:13-15, ECF No. 371-22 (“Q. Well, there is an initial appraisal, which EcoVest used in creating the PPM; right? A. The draft appraisal, yes.”).

Not only was Clark's appraisal one of the key documents used to organize the scheme, it also was the key document used to sell the scheme to customers. This is because Clark's value opinion convinced customers that investing in the scheme would generate a tax deduction equal to 4.11 times the investment amount:

ECF No. 349-25 at 5 (Manager's Analysis for Myrtle West Resort project). Clark's value opinion determined the amount of tax deductions EcoVest disclosed and furnished in its sales and promotional materials:

Ex. 193 to Frodle Dec., PPM for Cypress Cove Marina at ECOVEST-DOJ_0007784, ECF No. 372-28.

2. In conducting these appraisals, Mr. Clark employed the same methodology upheld by the United States Tax Court in Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818 (T.C. 2009). Clark Declaration (Exhibit A) at ¶ 6.

RESPONSE: Objection and disputed. The United States objects, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) and N.D.Ga. L.R. 56.1(B)(3)(a), to the admissibility of Clark's declaration upon which he relies for this proposed fact. First, Clark does not attempt to explain how he has personal knowledge regarding the “methodology” that the Tax Court may have considered in Kiva Dunes, nor does he attempt to explain how he has personal knowledge regarding the extent to which the Tax Court may have “upheld” a particular methodology in that case. See Wen Liu v. Univ. of Mia. Sch. of Med., 693 Fed. Appx. 793, 798 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[S]ince [plaintiff] does not explain how she has personal knowledge of the requirements placed upon other faculty members, her statements appear to be based 'upon information and belief.' Accordingly, these statements in Liu's affidavit cannot raise a genuine issue of fact.”) (citations omitted)”).² Indeed, Clark utterly fails to identify the purported “methodology” the Tax Court may have considered in Kiva Dunes, much less the extent to which (if any) that the Tax Court may have “upheld” that methodology.

Second, Clark cannot render a legal conclusion that the Tax Court “upheld” any particular methodology or that the appraisals Clark prepared for EcoVest comported with that methodology as a matter of law. See D'Onofrio v. Vacation Pub'ns., Inc., 888 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir. 2018) (“At the summary judgment stage, evidence relied upon need not be presented in admissible form, but it must be capable of being presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence. Neither legal conclusions nor statements made without personal knowledge are capable of being so presented.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). For this reason, the proposed fact also does not comply with N.D.Ga. L.R. 56.1(B)(1), which provides that the Court will not consider any fact “stated as an issue or legal conclusion.”

The United States further objects, pursuant to N.D.Ga. L.R. 56.1(B)(3)(b), because Clark's self-serving declaration (the only source for this proposed fact) does not support the factual contention that the Tax Court actually considered or upheld any particular methodology in the Kiva Dunes case or that Clark's appraisals for EcoVest employ the same or similar methodology. The declaration contains no information whatsoever from which one could identify the methodology that may have been considered in Kiva Dunes, the methodology that Clark may have used in his appraisals for EcoVest, and whether those two methodologies share any similarities whatsoever.

Finally, the United States disputes this proposed fact because Kiva Dunes explicitly stated that for purposes of claiming a charitable contribution tax deduction, “Fair market value is the price at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having a reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. Sec. 1.170A–1(c)(2), Income Tax Regs.” Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC v. Comm'r, 2009 WL 1748862 at *2 (T.C. 2009). But Clark did not apply the correct definition of fair market value because, as he freely admitted, a “willing buyer” would never pay his massively inflated before-values for the properties he appraised. (United States' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUF”), ECF No. 349-2, at ¶¶ 83, 88.)

3. Mr. Clark employed this methodology in reliance on the Tax Court's Kiva Dunes decision and the Commissioner's acceptance of the decision. Clark Declaration (Exhibit A) at ¶ 7.

RESPONSE: Objection and disputed. The United States objects, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) and N.D.Ga. L.R. 56.1(B)(3)(a), to the admissibility of Clark's declaration upon which he relies for this proposed fact. First, Clark does not attempt to explain how he has personal knowledge regarding the “methodology” that the Tax Court may have considered in Kiva Dunes, nor does he attempt to explain how he has personal knowledge regarding the extent to which the Tax Court may have “upheld” a particular methodology in that case. See Wen Liu, 693 Fed. Appx. at 798 (“[S]ince [plaintiff] does not explain how she has personal knowledge of the requirements placed upon other faculty members, her statements appear to be based upon information and belief. Accordingly, these statements in Liu's affidavit cannot raise a genuine issue of fact.”) (citations omitted)”).³ Indeed, Clark utterly fails to identify the purported “methodology” the Tax Court may have considered in Kiva Dunes, much less the extent to which (if any) that the Tax Court may have “upheld” that methodology.

Second, Clark cannot render a legal conclusion that the Tax Court “upheld” any particular methodology or that the appraisals Clark prepared for EcoVest comported with that methodology as a matter of law. See D'Onofrio, 888 F.3d at 208 (“At the summary judgment stage, evidence relied upon need not be presented in admissible form, but it must be capable of being presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence. Neither legal conclusions nor statements made without personal knowledge are capable of being so presented.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). For this reason, the proposed fact also does not comply with N.D.Ga. L.R. 56.1(B)(1), which provides that the Court will not consider any fact “stated as an issue or legal conclusion.”

The United States further objects, pursuant to N.D.Ga. L.R. 56.1(B)(3)(b), because Clark's self-serving declaration (the only source for this proposed fact) does not support the factual contention that the Tax Court actually considered or upheld any particular methodology in the Kiva Dunes case or that Clark's appraisals for EcoVest employ the same or similar methodology. The declaration contains no information whatsoever from which one could identify the methodology that may have been considered in Kiva Dunes, the methodology that Clark may have used in his appraisals for EcoVest, and whether those two methodologies share any similarities whatsoever.

Finally, the United States disputes this proposed fact because Kiva Dunes explicitly stated that for purposes of claiming a charitable contribution tax deduction, “Fair market value is the price at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having a reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. Sec. 1.170A–1(c)(2), Income Tax Regs.” Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC, 2009 WL 1748862 at *2. But Clark did not apply the correct definition of fair market value because, as he freely admitted, a “willing buyer” would never pay his massively inflated before-values for the properties he appraised. (SUF, ECF No. 349-2, at ¶¶ 83, 88.)

4. In performing the appraisals for Ecovest, Mr. Clark was never a shareholder, officer, director, or employee of EcoVest or any associated entity. Clark Declaration (Exhibit A) at ¶ 8.

RESPONSE: Disputed. The United States disputes this proposed fact because Clark had an ownership interest in entities associated with EcoVest. Dep. of Chrystall at 282:9-16, ECF No. 371-22) (identifying Cape Fear as one of EcoVest's offerings); Dep. of Claud Clark at 451:4-453:20, Mar. 10-11, 2021, ECF No. 371-3 (Clark's admission that he invested in Cape Fear); EcoVest's SAF ¶ 42 (through their investment in EcoVest's offerings, investors had ownership interests in the entities that held the property).

In addition, as discussed above in response to Fact No. 1, Clark's appraisal was the key document used to organize and sell the syndicated conservation easement scheme.

Moreover, as EcoVest's “go-to person” for conservation easement deals and one of its “core experts,” Clark was deeply integrated and embedded into EcoVest's operations, the strategic planning and development of the scheme, and its execution. Dep. of Lloyd at 250:3-16, ECF No. 371-29; Ex. 636 (Listing of EcoVest Core Experts). Clark attended and participated in EcoVest's “all-hands meetings” which were a “teaching session” at which Clark discussed “appraisal issues” and “court rulings.” Dep. of Larry Kohler at 144:22-146:21, Apr. 1, 2021, Second Bresnahan Declaration at ¶ 22. EcoVest purposefully included Clark in those “all-hands meetings.” Dep. of Linsider at 256:15-257:1, ECF No. 371-27. Clark attended EcoVest's “diligence meetings.” Id. at 257:9-14.

Clark attended EcoVest's “pipeline meetings” where “[h]e was involved in discussions about project opportunities.” Id. at 245:4-7. Indeed, EcoVest felt that it was important to include Clark “in discussions about the pipeline of these deals.” Id. at 255:3-7. In that role, Clark lent his experience in helping decide which projects should actually become a syndicated conservation easement deal. Id. at 262:12-263:9; see also id. at 260:3-261:5 (“Q. What did he contribute to those conversations? A. His opinion. Q. Can you be more specific? Opinion about what? A. He's an experienced real estate appraiser who understands real estate projects, and it's a great check and balance to know what he's thinking about projects we're proposing.”)

Clark helped put together the PPMs for the conservation easement deals and was part of EcoVest's “working group” that participated in the “the flow of business for these transactions.” Id. at 253:7-22.

EcoVest and Clark collaborated heavily on the appraisals themselves. For example, EcoVest and Clark discussed Clark's appraisal methodology. Id. at 279:20-280:1, ECF No. 371-27 (“Q. Okay. So you and other EcoVest employees discussed his appraisal methodology, is that what you're saying? A. Sure.”); Dep. of Lloyd at 261:24-262:1, ECF No. 371-29 (“Q. Well, have you ever had a discussion with Mr. Clark about his appraisal methodology? Yes.”). EcoVest provided information to Clark to be inserted into his appraisals. Id. at 262:25-263:8 (“Q. Did anyone at EcoVest ever provide information to Mr. Clark to be inserted into the appraisal? A. I believe we provided some information for him to consider inserting in an appraisal at one point, yes.”). EcoVest provided Clark with calculations and assumptions. Dep. of Chrystall at 111:12-112:7, ECF No. 371-22. See also Exs. 1159-1161, 1164, 1170 (discussing Clark's failure to address the MIPA price and how HBU affects valuation of conservation easements), Second Bresnahan Declaration at ¶¶ 17-21.

EcoVest also provided Clark with Excel spreadsheets that contained models used in his appraisals. Dep. of Chrystall at 189:3-14, 194:11-20, ECF No. 371-22. EcoVest helped Clark build those spreadsheets and exchanged information with Clark about those spreadsheets. Id. at 177:17-178:14 (Clark relied on EcoVest to make sure his models “calculated everything correctly”); Dep. of Linsider at 270:13-271:15, ECF No. 371-27 (“Q. I asked about it with Mr. Clark. Did you have the exchange of information back and forth with Mr. Clark about Mr. Clark's Excel business model? A. There is some exchange, yes.”). EcoVest reviewed and checked the Excel spreadsheets Clark used in his appraisals, cleaned up links in those spreadsheets, and reviewed his spreadsheets “for formulas and math.” Id. at 275:22-276:12, 277:1-12.

EcoVest also paid for and provided documents to Clark for use in his appraisals such as marketing studies, engineering reports, and conceptual development plans. Id. at 265:8-19; Dep. of Lloyd at 264:8-25, ECF No. 371-29 (“Q. Are you aware of him actually using that information in his appraisals? A. Yes.”).

Importantly, EcoVest provided feedback to Clark regarding his appraisals:

Dep. of Linsider at 284:22-285:9, ECF No. 371-27. See also Dep. of Lloyd at 261:17-20, ECF No. 371-29 (“Q. You're identifying that EcoVest employees provided feedback to Mr. Clark about his appraisal prior to it being finalized? A. Yes.”)

In light of his deep involvement in the planning and execution of the scheme, and the crucial role his appraisals played in the sale of the scheme, it is no surprise that Clark claimed ownership of EcoVest's programs as his own (EcoVest's Response to the United States' Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 365-1 (“EcoVest's Response to SUF”)⁴ at ¶ 53 (“our programs do good things”), that he requested permission from EcoVest to work with other clients (id. at ¶ 54), that he personally profited over $1.1 million from preparing appraisals for EcoVest (id. at ¶ 56), and, in a moment of candid reflection, readily understood that his appraisals were the vehicle used to “monetize easements” in the scheme (id. at ¶ 57).

5. Mr. Clark never participated in the preparation of any document establishing the entities which acquired or donated the conservation easements at issue in this case and never participated in the management of such entities. Clark Declaration (Exhibit A) at ¶ 9.

RESPONSE: Disputed. The United States disputes this proposed fact because Clark had an ownership interest in entities associated with EcoVest. Dep. of Chrystall at 282:9-16, ECF No. 371-22) (identifying Cape Fear as one of EcoVest's offerings); Dep. of Clark at 451:4-453:20, ECF No. 371-3 (Clark's admission that he invested in Cape Fear); EcoVest's SAF at ¶ 42 (through their investment in EcoVest's offerings, investors had ownership interests in the entities that held the property).

In addition, as discussed above in response to Fact No. 1, Clark's appraisal was the key document used to organize and sell the syndicated conservation easement scheme.

Moreover, as EcoVest's “go-to person” for conservation easement deals and one of its “core experts,” Clark was deeply integrated and embedded into EcoVest's operations, the strategic planning and development of the scheme, and its execution. Dep. of Lloyd at 250:3-16, ECF No. 371-29; Ex. 636 (Listing of EcoVest Core Experts). Clark attended and participated in EcoVest's “all-hands meetings” which were a “teaching session” at which Clark discussed “appraisal issues” and “court rulings.” Dep. of Kohler at 144:22-146:21, Second Bresnahan Declaration at ¶ 22. EcoVest purposefully included Clark in those “all-hands meetings.” Dep. of Linsider at 256:15-257:1, ECF No. 371-27. Clark attended EcoVest's “diligence meetings.” Id. at 257:9-14.

Clark attended EcoVest's “pipeline meetings” where “[h]e was involved in discussions about project opportunities.” Id. at 245:4-7. Indeed, EcoVest felt that it was important to include Clark “in discussions about the pipeline of these deals.” Id. at 255:3-7. In that role, Clark lent his experience in helping decide which projects should actually become a syndicated conservation easement deal. Id. at 262:12-263:9; see also id. at 260:8-16 (“Q. What did he contribute to those conversations? A. His opinion. Q. Can you be more specific? Opinion about what? A. He's an experienced real estate appraiser who understands real estate projects, and it's a great check and balance to know what he's thinking about projects we're proposing.”)

Clark helped put together the PPMs for the conservation easement deals and was part of EcoVest's “working group” that participated in the “the flow of business for these transactions.” Id. at 253:7-22.

EcoVest and Clark collaborated heavily on the appraisals themselves. For example, EcoVest and Clark discussed Clark's appraisal methodology. Id. at 279:20-280:1 (“Q. Okay. So you and other EcoVest employees discussed his appraisal methodology, is that what you're saying? A. Sure.”); Dep. of Lloyd at 261:24-262:1, Mar. 4, 2020, ECF No. 371-29 (“Q. Well, have you ever had a discussion with Mr. Clark about his appraisal methodology? A. Yes.”). EcoVest provided information to Clark to be inserted into his appraisals. Id. at 262:25-263:8 (“Q. Did anyone at EcoVest ever provide information to Mr. Clark to be inserted into the appraisal? A. I believe we provided some information for him to consider inserting in an appraisal at one point, yes.”). EcoVest provided Clark with calculations and assumptions. Dep. of Chrystall at 111:12-112:7, ECF No. 371-22. See also Exs. 1159-1161, 1164, 1170 (discussing Clark's failure to address the MIPA price and how HBU affects valuation of conservation easements), Second Bresnahan Declaration at ¶¶ 17-21.

EcoVest also provided Clark with Excel spreadsheets that contained models used in his appraisals. Dep. of Chrystall at 189:3-14, 194:11-20, ECF No. 371-22. EcoVest helped Clark build those spreadsheets and exchanged information with Clark about those spreadsheets. Id. at 177:17-178:14 (Clark relied on EcoVest to make sure his models “calculated everything correctly”); Dep. of Linsider at 270:13-271:15, ECF No. 371-27 (“Q. I asked about it with Mr. Clark. Did you have the exchange of information back and forth with Mr. Clark about Mr. Clark's Excel business model? A. There is some exchange, yes.”). EcoVest reviewed and checked the Excel spreadsheets Clark used in his appraisals, cleaned up links in those spreadsheets, and reviewed his spreadsheets “for formulas and math.” Id. at 275:22-276:12, 277:112.

EcoVest also paid for and provided documents to Clark for use in his appraisals such as marketing studies, engineering reports, and conceptual development plans. Id. at 265:8-19; Dep. of Lloyd at 264:8-25, ECF No. 371-29 (“Q. Are you aware of him actually using that information in his appraisals? A. Yes.”).

Importantly, EcoVest provided feedback to Clark regarding his appraisals:

Dep. of Linsider at 284:22-285:4, ECF No. 371-27. See also Dep. of Lloyd at 261:17-20, ECF No. 371-29 (“Q. You're identifying that EcoVest employees provided feedback to Mr. Clark about his appraisal prior to it being finalized? A. Yes.”)

In light of his deep involvement in the planning and execution of the scheme, and the crucial role his appraisals played in the sale of the scheme, it is no surprise that Clark claimed ownership of EcoVest's programs as his own (EcoVest's Response to SUF, ECF No. 365-1 at ¶ 53 (“our programs do good things”), that he requested permission from EcoVest to work with other clients (id. at ¶ 54), that he personally profited over $1.1 million from preparing appraisals for EcoVest (id. at ¶ 56), and, in a moment of candid reflection, readily understood that his appraisals were the vehicle used to “monetize easements” in the scheme (id. at ¶ 57).

6. According to the Appraisal of Real Estate, 14th Edition, the subdivision development method, which is a subset of the discounted cash flow analysis, may be used to estimate raw land value. Appraisal of Real Estate 14th Edition (Exhibit B) at 548.

RESPONSE: Undisputed that the Appraisal of Real Estate, 14th Edition, states that “discounted cash flow analysis may be applied in subdivision analysis to estimate raw land value.” However, the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice warns that the DCF method “is vulnerable to misuse” and “is best applied in developing value opinions in the context of one or more other approaches.” (Ex. 34 to Frodle Dec., USPAP 2014–15, at U-71 lines 2252 and 2269-70, ECF No. 365-41.) See also id. at U-72 lines 2310-2312 (“Because of the compounding effects in the projection of income and expenses, even slight input errors can be magnified and can produce unreasonable results”).

Moreover, Clark did not actually apply the subdivision development method because in each of his appraisals he stated that the development had already been constructed (SUF at ¶¶ 77-78, ECF No. 349-2), and because, as he freely admitted, a “willing buyer” would never pay his massively inflated before-values for the properties he appraised (id. at ¶¶ 83, 88).

7. According to the Appraisal of Real Estate, under the discounted cash flow analysis

an appraiser begins by developing detailed spreadsheets. These spreadsheets show itemized incomes, expenses, and cash flows year by year, or sometimes month by month, over the presumed period of ownership or another projection period that the market suggests. The cash flows, including the net resale price, are then discounted at an appropriate rate (or rates) to derive an indication of present value.

Appraisal of Real Estate 14th Edition (Exhibit B) at 529–30.

RESPONSE: Undisputed that this proposed fact accurately quotes from the Appraisal of Real Estate, 14th Edition. However, the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice warns that the DCF method “is vulnerable to misuse” and “is best applied in developing value opinions in the context of one or more other approaches.” (Ex. 34 to Frodle Dec., USPAP 2014–15, at U-71 lines 2252 and 2269-70, ECF No. 365-41.) See also id. at U-72 lines 2310-2312 (“Because of the compounding effects in the projection of income and expenses, even slight input errors can be magnified and can produce unreasonable results”).

Moreover, Clark did not actually apply the subdivision development method because in each of his appraisals he stated that the development had already been constructed (SUF at ¶¶ 77-78, ECF No. 349-2), and because, as he freely admitted, a “willing buyer” would never pay his massively inflated before-values for the properties he appraised (id. at ¶¶ 83, 88).

8. According to the Appraisal of Real Estate, for a proposed development on vacant land, this approach considers “the income and expenses associated with the projections for the hypothetical project over [a] permitting, construction, and absorption period.” Appraisal of Real Estate 14th Edition (Exhibit B) at 549.

RESPONSE: Undisputed that, for the most part, this proposed fact accurately quotes from the Appraisal of Real Estate, 14th Edition. However, the proposed fact omits the 2½-year time period referenced in the source document:

Clark, on the other hand, frequently allowed little to no time for permitting and construction in his valuations of EcoVest properties. (E.g., Ex. 117 at ECOVEST-DOJ_0121681 to Frodle Dec., Final Appraisal of Hickory Preserve, ECF No. 373-22 (projecting 140 units to sell in the first year); Ex. 122 at ECOVEST-DOJ_0001720 to Frodle Dec., Final Appraisal of Azalea Bay Resort, ECF No. 373-27) (projecting 200 units to sell in the first year); Ex. 137 at ECOVEST-DOJ_0060483 to Frodle Dec., Final Appraisal of Lakeshore Resort, ECF No. 373-42) (projecting 60 units to sell in the first year).)

The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice warns that the DCF method “is vulnerable to misuse” and “is best applied in developing value opinions in the context of one or more other approaches.” (Ex. 34 to Frodle Dec., USPAP 2014–15, at U-71 lines 2252 and 2269-70, ECF No. 365-41.) See also id. at U-72 lines 2310-2312 (“Because of the compounding effects in the projection of income and expenses, even slight input errors can be magnified and can produce unreasonable results”).

Moreover, Clark did not actually apply the subdivision development method because in each of his appraisals he stated that the development had already been constructed (SUF at ¶¶ 77-78, ECF No. 349-2), and because, as he freely admitted, a “willing buyer” would never pay his massively inflated before-values for the properties he appraised (id. at ¶¶ 83, 88).

Dated: March 31, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID A. HUBBERT
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

ERIN R. HINES
Florida Bar No. 44175
GREGORY VAN HOEY
Maryland Bar
RICHARD G. ROSE
District of Columbia Bar No. 493454
HARRIS J. PHILLIPS
Massachusetts Bar No. 675603

JAMES F. BRESNAHAN II
Virginia Bar No. 80164
ERIC M. ABERG
District of Columbia Bar No. 1044111
LAUREN A. DARWIT
Illinois Bar No. 6323788
Trial Attorneys, Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 7238, Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
Telephone: (202) 514-2901

Local Counsel:
KURT ERSKINE
United States Attorney
NEELI BEN-DAVID
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Georgia Bar No. 049788
Office of the United States Attorney
Northern District of Georgia
600 U.S. Courthouse
75 Ted Turner Drive, SW, Suite 600
Atlanta, GA 30303
Telephone: (404) 581-6303