Despite the ability to access most courts only remotely for much if not all of the year, 2021 still produced a number of important tax procedure decisions. Perhaps judges could produce more opinions because they did not need to travel or to hold lengthy in-person trials. This post shows that not all cases are Graev cases.
Supreme Court matters
The Supreme Court handed down a unanimous opinion in CIC Services. The Court holds that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar a suit challenging an IRS notice that requires a non-taxpayer to provide information even though the failure to provide the information could result in a penalty. Posts can be found here, here, here and here.
The Supreme Court rejected the request for certiorari in Organic Cannabis v. Commissioner seeking a determination that the time period for filing a petition in Tax Court in a deficiency case is a claims processing period rather than a jurisdictional one but granted certiorari in Boechler v. Commissioner regarding the same issue but in the collection due process context. The Boechler case will be argued before the Supreme Court on January 12, 2022.
Circuit Court matters
Coffey v. Commissioner, –F.3d – (8th Cir. 2021) – in a case that fractured the Tax Court about as badly as it can be fractured, the Eighth Circuit, after initially projecting harmony and uniformity in its decision, fractured as well, reversing its initial decision which overturned the Tax Court’s fully reviewed opinion. This action briefly reopened the door on the question of adequate filing of a return for purposes of triggering the statute of limitations, before reinstating the original holding through a new opinion by the panel. That new panel opinion can be found here.
Taxpayers claimed that they were residents of the US Virgin Islands in 2003 and 2004 and filed returns with the Virgin Islands tax authority. That taxing authority has a symbiotic relationship with the IRS and sent to the IRS some of the documents it received. The IRS took the documents it received and concluded that M/M Coffey should have filed a US tax return. Based on that conclusion, it sent the Coffeys a notice of deficiency. The Coffeys argued that the notice of deficiency was sent beyond the statute of limitations on assessment since their filing with the US Virgin Islands tax authority also served as a filing with the IRS, starting the normal assessment statute. The government argued that because the Coffeys did not file a return with the US, no statute of limitations on assessment existed. After only eight years, the Tax Court sided with the Coffeys. A mere three years later, the Eighth Circuit reversed in a unanimous three judge panel.
On February 10, 2021, the Eighth Circuit granted a panel rehearing but denied a rehearing en banc. Disagreements with the outcome of a circuit court usually result in a request for a rehearing en banc rather than a rehearing with the very panel that entered the decision. So, this is a bit of an unusual twist in a case with many twists. After the vacating of the original opinion, the same panel issued a new opinion with some minor differences.
The result of the Eighth Circuit’s decision allows the IRS to come in many years later to challenge residence of individuals claiming Virgin Islands residence. If the Coffeys had succeeded in this case, the procedural issue would have turned into a substantive victory, since the IRS would not have been able to make an assessment against them for the years at issue.
Gregory v. Commissioner, — F.3d – (3rd Cir. 2020) – This case was decided at the very end of 2020 so it is included here as it came out during last year’s end of year review and also because it is a case argued on appeal by the Tax Clinic at Harvard so including it provides another opportunity to showcase the work of the students. The issue before the Third Circuit was whether the taxpayers’ use of Forms 2848 Power of Attorney and 4868 Request for Extension of Time constituted “clear and concise notice” of a change of address to the IRS pursuant to Treasury Regulation §301.6212-2. Although filed as a non-precedential opinion, the outcome is a clear example of how the IRS cannot simply ignore the actual knowledge it has of a taxpayer’s address when issuing a Statutory Notice of Deficiency pursuant to I.R.C. §6212(b)(1), even if that taxpayer failed to follow the IRS’ prescribed procedures for changing their address.
An odd ending to this case occurred when the Third Circuit returned it to the Tax Court. Rather than simply entering an opinion for the taxpayers, the Court issued an order restoring the case to the general docket. That order made no sense because the Gregorys unquestionably filed their Tax Court petition late. This required the filing of a motion to have the court make a determination that the notice of deficiency was invalid, which it eventually did with no opposition from an equally confused government counsel.
In Patrick’s Payroll Services, Inc., v. Commissioner, No. 20-1772 (6th Cir. 2021), the Sixth Circuit upheld the decision of the Tax Court denying the taxpayer the opportunity to litigate the merits of the underlying tax because of a prior opportunity to discuss settlement with Appeals. Guest blogger Chaim Gordon wrote about this case after the Tax Court’s decision and while the case was pending before the Sixth Circuit. Chaim pointed out some of the novel arguments the taxpayer was making. Unfortunately for the taxpayer, the Sixth Circuit was not buying what they were selling.
The 11th Circuit upheld the decision of the Tax Court in Sleeth v. Commissioner, — F.3d — 2021 WL 1049815 (11th Cir. 2021), holding that Ms. Sleeth was not an innocent spouse. The Sleeth case continues the run of unsuccessful taxpayer appeals of innocent spouse cases following the major structural changes to the law in 1998. The Tax Court found three positive factors and only one negative factor applying the tests of Rev. Proc. 2013-34. Yet, despite the multitude of factors favoring relief in each case, the Tax Court found that the negative knowledge factor required denial of relief. This case follows the decision in the Jacobsen case from 2020 in which the Tax Court denied relief to someone with four positive factors for relief and only knowledge as a negative factor. The pattern developing in these cases suggests that the Tax Court views the knowledge factor as a super factor, despite changes in IRS guidance no longer describing it as such. Only economic hardship seems capable of overcoming a negative determination on knowledge. In this post, Carl Smith discussed the Seventh Circuit’s decision in the Jacobsen case. Both cases were argued on appeal by the Tax Clinic at Harvard. The clinic also filed an amicus brief in the case of Jones v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2019-139, set to be argued soon before the 9th Circuit.
Lindsay v. U.S. is the latest case to apply the principle that United States v. Boyle essentially stands for the position that taxpayers have a nondelegable duty to be aware of tax deadlines. An agent’s incompetence or willful misconduct will not excuse the taxpayer from delinquency penalties. Lindsay was incarcerated and executed a POA to Bertelson, an attorney, to manage his affairs, including filing his tax returns. The attorney assured Lindsay he was doing so for the years 2012-15; instead he failed to file the returns and for good measure embezzled hundreds of thousands of dollars. The actions resulted in Lindsay receiving $705,414.61 in actual damages and $1 million in punitive damages. Lindsay eventually filed his tax returns and paid over $425,000 in delinquency penalties. He filed a claim for refund; IRS rejected and he filed a suit in district court. The district court, contrary to the magistrate’s recommendation, granted the government’s motion to dismiss, citing Boyle as precluding a claim for relief. Following a timely appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In so doing, it applied Boyle to Lindsay’s somewhat sympathetic circumstances.
In Ramey v Commissioner, 156 T.C. No. 1 (2021), the Tax Court determined in a precedential opinion that when the IRS issues a notice of decision rather than a notice of determination and the taxpayer has filed the collection due process (CDP) request late, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. The taxpayer, a lawyer, represented himself and pegged his arguments to last known address rather than jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the decision expands the Court’s narrow view of jurisdiction to another setting without addressing the Supreme Court precedent on jurisdiction and its impact on the timing of the filing of documents.
Galloway v Commissioner, TC Memo 2021-24: This case holds that a taxpayer cannot use the CDP process to rehash a previously rejected offer in compromise (OIC). Mr. Galloway actually submitted two OICs that the IRS rejected. As an aside, from the description of the OICs in the Court’s opinion, the rejections seemed appropriate strictly from an asset perspective, since he did not want to include the value of a car he owned but allowed his daughter to use.
The case of Mason v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 2021-64 shows at least one benefit of submitting an offer in compromise (OIC) through a request for a collection due process (CDP) hearing. As part of his lessons from the Tax Court series, Bryan Camp has written an excellent post both on the case and the history of offers.
Friendship Creative Printers v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2021-19: This case holds that the taxpayer could raise the merits of delinquency penalties by the backhanded method of challenging the application of payments. Taxpayer failed to pay employment taxes over an extended period of time and failed to file the necessary returns but at some point made payments on the earliest periods. In the CDP hearing, taxpayer argued satisfaction of the earliest periods and eventually provided an analysis showing payments equal to the tax paid.
The Court treated this as a challenge to the merits of the delinquency penalties imposed. Unfortunately, the taxpayer did not designate its payments, which meant that the payments it made were not applied in the manner it expected and argued in the CDP hearing. Taxpayer also looked at the transcripts without appreciating the impact of accruals not reflected in the assessed portion of the transcript but accruing nonetheless.
Reynolds v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2021-10: This case holds that the IRS can collect on restitution based assessments even when the taxpayer has an agreement with the Department of Justice to make payments on the restitution award. Taxpayer’s prosecution resulted in a significant restitution order. He agreed to pay DOJ $100 a month or 10% of his income. At the time of the CDP case he was not working and did not appear to have many prospects for future employment. Citing Carpenter v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 202 (2019), the Tax Court said that the IRS did have the right to pursue collection from him. Obviously that right, at least with respect to levy, is tempered by the requirement in IRC 6343 not to levy when it would place someone in financial hardship, but no blanket prohibition existed to stop the IRS from collecting and therefore to stop it from making a CDP determination in support of lien or levy. The case is a good one to read for anyone dealing with a restitution based assessment to show the interplay between DOJ and IRS in the collection of this type of assessment, as well as to show the limitations of restitution based assessments compared to “regular” assessments.
BM Construction v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2021-13: This case involves, inter alia, a business owned by a single individual and the mailing of the CDP notice to the business owner rather than the business. The Tax Court finds that sending the CDP notice to the individual rather than the business does not create a problem here, since the sole owner of the business would receive the notice were it addressed to the business rather than to him personally.
Shitrit v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2021-63, points out the limitations on raising issues other than the revocation of the passport when coming into the Tax Court under the jurisdiction of the passport provision. Petitioner here tries to persuade the Tax Court to order the issuance of a refund but gets rebuffed due to the Court’s view of the scope of its jurisdiction in this type of case.
The case of Garcia v. Commissioner, 157 T.C. No. 1 (2021) provides clarity and guidance on the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in passport cases as the Court issues a precedential opinion to make clear some of the things that can and cannot happen in a contest regarding the certification of passport revocation. I did not find the decision surprising. The Court’s passport jurisdiction is quite limited. Petitioners will generally be disappointed in the scope of relief available through this new type of Tax Court jurisdiction.
In Mendu v. United States, No. 1:17-cv-00738 (Ct. Fd. Claims April 7, 2021) the Court of Federal Claims held that FBAR penalties are not taxes for purposes of applying the Flora rule. In arguing for the imposition of the Flora rule, the taxpayer, in a twist of sides, sought to have the court require that the individual against whom the penalties were imposed fully pay the penalties before being allowed to challenge the penalties in court. The FBAR penalties are not imposed under title 26 of the United States Code, which most of us shorthand into the Internal Revenue Code, but rather are imposed under Title 31 as part of the Bank Secrecy Act.
The case of In re Bowman, No. 20-11512 (E.D. La. 2021) denies debtor’s motion for summary judgment that Ms. Bowman deserves innocent spouse relief. On its own, the court reviews the issue of its jurisdiction to hear an innocent spouse issue as part of her chapter 13 bankruptcy case and decides that it has jurisdiction to make such a decision. The parties did not raise the jurisdiction issue, which is not surprising from the perspective of the plaintiff, but may signal a shift in the government’s position since it had previously opposed the jurisdiction of courts other than the Tax Court to hear innocent spouse cases.