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Hiramanek Case Raises Issue of Collateral Estoppel When Spouse Intervenes as well as the Refusal of Tax Court to Accept Attempted Concession by IRS on Issue of Duress

Posted on May 17, 2016

Today, we welcome back guest blogger Patrick Thomas.  Patrick has just finished his Christine Brunswick Fellowship through which the ABA Tax Section sponsored his work for two years at the Low Income Taxpayer Clinic (LITC) located within the Neighborhood Christian Legal Clinic in Indianapolis, Indiana.  He will open the new LITC at Notre Dame Law School this fall as its first director.  He writes on an recent decision by Judge Halpern involving an interesting innocent spouse case with a couple of unusual procedural issues.  Keith

On May 10, Judge Halpern issued a memorandum opinion in Hiramanek v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2016-92, denying innocent spouse relief in a standalone petition under section 6015(e). This case presents an interesting application of the collateral estoppel doctrine, along with a good example of circumstances under which a purported joint tax return is signed under duress. Mr. Hiramanek, the Petitioner (and a certified public accountant), was denied the opportunity to argue that a joint return was filed because of his prior intervention in his ex-wife’s case before the Tax Court, where the Court found that because the purported joint return was signed by Mr. Hiramanek’s wife under duress, she could not be held liable for the deficiency on that return. Because Mr. Hiramanek had effectively litigated this issue previously before the Court, he could not raise it again in his own proceeding under section 6015(e).

For tax year 2006, the IRS received what purported to be a joint tax return from the Hiramaneks. In March 2010 the IRS sent them a Notice of Deficiency, which determined a $27,222 deficiency, along with a $5,444 section 6662(a) penalty. Mrs. Hiramanek (“Ms. Kapadia” in the Court’s opinion) timely filed a petition, which both requested innocent spouse relief and disputed the deficiency in full. Mr. Hiramanek formally intervened in that case under Rule 325(b).

Prior to trial, Ms. Kapadia and the Service stipulated that she signed the purported joint return under duress and that therefore no deficiency existed with respect to her. The Court, however, did not accept the stipulation and proceeded to hold a trial on the duress issue. In his testimony at trial, Mr. Hiramanek disputed the allegations of duress, but otherwise did not introduce other relevant evidence.  Ms. Kapadia testified and introduced other evidence of a long history of abuse, along with the specific abuse that forced her signature on the tax return.

The Court found that Ms. Kapadia signed the return under duress and, accordingly, she was not liable for the deficiency. Specifically, the Court held Mr. Hiramanek’s contrary testimony not credible, while finding credible Ms. Kapadia’s testimony and evidence showing a history of abuse. (The Court also found that she qualified for relief under IRC § 66(c), which provides an exception from community property rules where spouses separately file). The Court’s ultimate findings as to the circumstances of duress are quite harrowing. According to the Court:

Throughout their marriage [Mr. Hiramanek] physical and verbally abused petitioner. During 2007 the abuse included threats against petitioner’s life, physical assaults, and verbal abuse. Petitioner documented several instances of abuse in a handwritten diary from December 13, 2005, to April 4, 2007.

In 2007 [Mr. Hiramanek] prepared a 2006 joint Federal income tax return . . . for himself and petitioner. On the evening of April 3, 2007, [Mr. Hiramanek] presented petitioner with a copy of the joint return for her signature. Petitioner refused to sign the return without first reviewing it. [Mr. Hiramanek] initially refused but, upon petitioner’s instance [sic], allowed her a quick glance at the return. Petitioner noticed that [Mr. Hiramanek] had claimed a casualty loss deduction of $35,000 for a break-in to their rental car while they were vacationing in Hawaii. [Mr. Hiramanek] had overstated the amount of the casualty loss deduction, and as a result, petitioner refused to sign the return.

Petitioner’s refusal to sign the return angered [Mr. Hiramanek]. He grabbed petitioner’s left arm and twisted it several times, resulting in bruising. He then struck petitioner on the back of the head with an open hand and pulled her hair with both hands. Finally, [Mr. Hiramanek] pushed petitioner on the jaw. Petitioner still refused to sign the return. Later that night, [Mr. Hiramanek] cornered petitioner in the bathroom and shoved her against the wall. He ordered her to the kitchen table and threatened her with physical harm and threatened that she would never see her children again if she did not sign the return. Petitioner, fearing for her safety, placed a scribble in the signature line of the return.

The next day . . . [Mr. Hiramanek] presented petitioner with a new version of the return in which he had removed the $35,000 casualty loss. Fearing for her safety, petitioner signed the return without review.

Hiramanek v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-280, at 3-4 (Hiramanek I). Ms. Kapadia also filed a police report about this sequence of events, which she introduced at trial.

While the first Tax Court litigation was pending, Mr. Hiramanek filed his own request for innocent spouse relief with the Service, which was denied. He then petitioned the Tax Court for redetermination of his innocent spouse request, which eventually evolved into Hiramanek II. (Mr. Hiramanek appealed the first case all the way to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari in late 2015. This resulted in a multi-year stay of the Hiramanek II proceedings. The Service filed a motion to lift the stay and for judgment on the pleadings on November 2, 2015.)

The Service argued that not only was no joint return filed, but Mr. Hiramanek was prohibited from arguing the existence of a joint return (a necessary predicate to innocent spouse relief) because of his involvement in the final determination in Hiramanek I. The Service specifically argued that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel gave Mr. Hiramanek only one bite at the apple on this issue—a bite he had already taken.

The Court largely agreed with the Service. It grounded its decision in the collateral estoppel doctrine, rather than res judicata; the Court recognized that IRC § 6015(g)(2) provides an exception to the res judicata doctrine, at least for innocent spouse petitions that are filed subsequent to the final determination of a tax deficiency.  As such, res judicata could not bar Mr. Hiramanek’s argument.

Mr. Hiramanek’s primary argument against the application of collateral estoppel was that the Court in Hiramanek I did not have jurisdiction to determine anything outside of the innocent spouse context once Ms. Kapadia formally withdrew her request for innocent spouse relief with the Service. However, because Ms. Kapadia filed her petition within the 90 day period after issuance of the Notice of Deficiency and included a “catch-all” request to invalidate the deficiency, the Court determined that they did have jurisdiction over any matter affecting the deficiency. Whether Ms. Kapadia signed the return under duress was centrally relevant to the existence of a deficiency; thus, the Court reasoned, they had jurisdiction to address that question.

Because Mr. Hiramanek actively participated in the resolution of the duress issue; that issue was identical to the dispositive issue in Hiramanek II; the Court had jurisdiction and rendered a final judgment; Mr. Hiramanek was a party to the prior litigation; and no operative facts had changed in the interim, Mr. Hiramanek was estopped from arguing that a joint return was filed. Therefore, because Mr. Hiramanek’s standalone petition necessitated a joint return and deficiency from which to seek relief—a requirement that could necessarily not be proven, given the collateral estoppel—the Court granted the Service’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

This seems a fairly straightforward application of the collateral estoppel doctrine. However, there is a lesson to be learned for practitioners. Mr. Hiramanek was only prevented from relitigating the duress issue because he actively participated, as an intervenor, in the Hiramanek I litigation. Had he not formally intervened, collateral estoppel would provide no bar. Of course, the factual determinations would be highly probative evidence against his claim, so representatives of nonmoving spouses still would be well-advised to intervene in appropriate cases.

A more interesting situation could arise if the Court had accepted a settlement between Ms. Kapadia and the Service. In Dinger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-145, the Court concluded that a settlement, without a factual stipulation supporting the settlement, did not raise a collateral estoppel bar to subsequent litigation of the substantive facts actually underlying the settlement. Here, it appears the Service and Ms. Kapadia did have a factual stipulation that would have supported the settlement. But again, because Mr. Hiramanek would not have participated in that settlement, collateral estoppel would not apply. And, a stipulation alone would have less probative value than evidence introduced at trial, and would provide less finality to the petitioner seeking relief, as well as the Service.

Thus, in particularly compelling cases with substantial available evidence of abuse, like Ms. Kapadia’s, it may be prudent for an individual seeking innocent spouse relief, or the relief sought by Ms. Kapadia, to take this issue to trial and to accede to intervention by the nonmoving spouse. Even if the IRS Chief Counsel desires to grant innocent spouse relief, it may be in their interests to try the issue as well, given that it will save them from additional litigation down the line. Of course, this does not prevent tactics like Mr. Hiramanek’s that could extend the litigation, but given Hiramanek II, it appears that the Service could easily succeed with a motion for judgment on the pleadings in subsequent litigation brought by the nonmoving spouse.

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