Bankruptcy Court Holds Tax Refund Is Property of Bankruptcy Estate

After the Debtor's bankruptcy, the Trustee for the Debtor's estate filed various tax returns that resulted in a substantial tax refund due from the carry-back of Downey Bank's net operating losses. Under the normal course of the tax sharing agreement, the Debtor would file the return and allocate the liability and/or refund relating to its various subsidiaries. In an instance such as this, the Debtor would then transfer to Downey Bank the amount of the refund allocated to it. The question here is whether the Debtor holds Downey Bank's (substantial) share of the refund in trust; thus, entitling Downey Bank to the entirety of the tax refund allocable to it, i.e., the res of the trust, or whether the refund is property of the estate and Downey Bank has a claim for its unpaid share of the refund. Such a claim would share pro rata with the Debtor's other liabilities, including a $200 million claim filed by Wilmington Trust Company as Indenture Trustee under certain Notes issued by the Debtor. Not surprisingly, the Trustee and the Indenture Trustee asserts that the tax refund is property of the estate and the FDIC-R argues to the contrary. As a result of the dispute, the Trustee filed a declaratory judgment action in this Court regarding, among other things, the ownership of the tax refunds.

Pending before the Court are two motions for summary judgment regarding the ownership of the tax refund. The resolution of the motions hinges on the language of the tax sharing agreement and, as mentioned above, whether it creates a debtor-creditor relationship between the parties or whether the tax sharing agreement creates an agency or trust relationship. Based upon the plain, unambiguous language of the tax sharing agreement, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the tax sharing agreement creates a debtor-creditor relationship. Additionally, the Court finds that no resulting trust was created between the parties. As a result, the tax refund is property of the Debtor's estate. Summary judgment will be entered in favor of the Trustee and the Indenture Trustee.²

In DFC's own words:

On November 21, 2008 (the "Receivership Date"), the Director of Thrift Supervision appointed FDIC-R as the receiver of Downey Bank. Upon its appointment, FDIC-R sold substantially all of the former assets of Downey Bank to U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank") under a purchase and assumption agreement dated November 21, 2008.

FDIC-R has filed a "protective" claim against DFC in an unliquidated amount for, among other things, its allocation of the Tax Refund.

B. Procedural Background

In October 2010, the Trustee commenced this adversary proceeding by filing a complaint (the "Complaint") against FDIC-R seeking declaratory judgment regarding ownership of tax refunds under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.⁶ Thereafter, FDIC-R filed an answer and counterclaims, which were subsequently amended (the "Counterclaims").⁷ The Trustee filed its answer and affirmative defenses to FDIC-R's answer.⁸ On January 28, 2011, this Court allowed the Indenture Trustee to intervene as a plaintiff.⁹

The Indenture Trustee and the Trustee filed motions for summary judgment as to the ownership of the Tax Refund and as to their allegations that FDIC-R violated the automatic stay.¹⁰ In addition, they seek summary judgment on FDIC-R's counterclaims seeking ownership of the Tax Refund.¹¹ The motions for summary judgment have been fully briefed¹² and are ripe for the Court's consideration.

C. Factual Background

The TSA states:

Historically, the Debtor and Downey Bank adhered to the process established by the TSA. As required by the TSA, estimated taxes were calculated on a stand-alone basis and reflected the amount that each Affiliated Group member would have owed to the IRS had it filed separately.¹⁶ The Affiliated Group members would then pay their estimated tax payments to DFC.¹⁷ When DFC received estimated tax payments from the Affiliated Group members, it would deposit them into its operating account, commingling them with its existing funds. Thereafter, DFC paid the consolidated taxes electronically to the IRS and other taxing authorities.¹⁸ The Affiliated Group's year-end tax returns were similarly calculated on a stand-alone basis as required by the TSA. Although, the tax liability for each member of the Affiliated Group was calculated on a stand-alone basis, each member's taxable income was reported to the IRS on a consolidated scheduled submitted with the Affiliate Group's consolidated return.

The TSA gives broad authority to the Debtor regarding the preparation, filing, and manner in which the tax returns are prosecuted. The TSA states, in relevant part:

The TSA further provides that if adjustments of the consolidated tax liability occur as a result of the filing of an amended return, claim for a refund or an audit, "the liability of the Affiliated Group members shall be recomputed by [the Debtor] to give effect to such adjustments. In the case of a refund, [the Debtor] shall make payment to each Affiliated Group member for its share of the refund . . . within seven (7) business days after the refund is received by [the Debtor]."²² Besides the payment obligation, there are no further restrictions on the Debtor's use of any such refund (i.e. no requirements that the refund be held in escrow or segregated from other funds).

Refund checks received from the IRS were made payable to DFC.²³ However, prior refund checks, even though made payable to DFC, were deposited directly into one of Downey Bank's accounts (and in turn, Downey Bank distributed the respective portions of the refund to other members of the Affiliated Group).²⁴

Shortly thereafter, the Trustee filed a Form 1139, Corporate Application for Tentative Carryback Refund, for a tentative carryback refund claim (the "Tentative Carryback Refund"). The Tentative Carryback Refund sought to carryback the losses claimed in the 2008 Tax Return and sought a tax refund of approximately $145 million for the tax years ending December 31, 2006 and 2007.

By letter dated October 26, 2009, the IRS refused to process the Trustee's Form 1139 because FDIC-R had filed a Form 56-F with the IRS without informing the Trustee or seeking leave of this Court, as explained infra.

On December 31, 2009, the Trustee filed amended tax returns asserting claims for refunds for the tax years 2003-2007 (the "Amended Tax Returns").²⁵ The Amended Tax Returns claimed refunds, including statutory interest, of $314,335,197.20.

On September 10, 2010, the Trustee supplemented the claims asserted earlier in the Amended Tax Returns to claim a total refund of $373,791,733 (the "Second Amended Tax Returns"), and an entitlement to statutory interest (this amount, or such other amount as may be due to the Debtor, the "Tax Refund"). For the purposes of these motions, the parties concede that the overpayments arise from the carryback of Downey Bank's net operating losses in 2008 to the taxable income reported by the Affiliated Group with respect to the tax years 2003 through 2007.²⁶

FDIC-R filed competing tax returns on behalf of the Debtor and the entire Affiliated Group. Downey Bank (and its subsidiary DSL Service Company) claims that it generated substantially all of the taxable income reported by the Affiliated Group to the IRS between 2003 and 2007. As a result, Downey Bank was the source (through the TSA) of substantially all of the tax payments made to the IRS in the years at issue.²⁷ As such, FDIC-R's competing tax return seeks the same amount of refund sought in the returns filed by the Trustee.

Thereafter, on October 29, 2010, the Trustee commenced an action in the United States Court of Federal Claims against the United States seeking, among other things, to liquidate the amount of the Tax Refund.²⁸ The Court of Federal Claims action is currently pending. This Court understands that the matter is settled in principle, although approval from the requisite governmental agencies has not been obtained to date. The litigation in the Court of Federal Claims has been effectively stayed pending the outcome of the settlement process. Although the full amount of the Tax Refund has not been liquidated, for the purposes of this Opinion, there is a Tax Refund.

On November 28, 2008, three days after the Petition Date, and again in October 2009, FDIC-R filed a Form 56-F "Notice Concerning Fiduciary Relationship of Financial Institution" (the "Form 56-F") with the IRS.²⁹ One purpose of the Form 56-F is, FDIC-R states, "to notify the IRS of a fiduciary relationship only if the relationship is with respect to a financing institution (such as a bank or thrift)."³⁰ Furthermore, a Form-56 may "secure [FDIC-R's] position with respect to any refund which may be available to a consolidated group."³¹ FDIC-R filed the Form 56-F in support of its claim for the Tax Refund.³²

Although the Form 56-F represents that FDIC-R was providing notice of its filing to the Debtor, FDIC-R did not notify the Debtor that it had filed the Form 56-F until March 2009.³³ Furthermore, the Trustee asserts that FDIC-R advocated directly to the IRS (without the Trustee's knowledge) that the Chapter 7 Trustee's tax returns should be rejected in favor of the returns to be filed by FDIC-R. In October 2009, James Vordtriede, a senior member of FDIC-R's Division of Resolutions and Receiverships, Tax Unit, wrote to Le Hashimoto, a revenue agent at the IRS, requesting a freeze of the Debtor's IRS accounts:

In early January 2010, the Debtor's filed a motion against FDIC-R for violation of the automatic stay. Thereafter, FDIC-R sent an e-mail to the IRS advocating that "the trustee's claim's can be rejected on technical grounds alone" and therefore, "the freeze of Downey Financial Corporation's group 1120 accounts [should] remain in place pending submissions by the FDIC of its own set of claims allowed under Reg. 301.6402-7(e)(1)."³⁶ Later, FDIC-R attempted to clarify its position and said that it was not taking any formal position or requesting any action.³⁷ However, Mr. Vordtriede stated at the end of this "clarifying" e-mail: "My [previous] e-mail was to outline for you the FDIC's technical grounds for its position and update you."³⁸ As such, FDIC-R in no way withdrew its position regarding the freeze on the accounts.

This Court demanded that all ex parte communications with the IRS be stopped. On September 13, 2010, this Court advised FDIC-R that it "will not allow any sharing of documents with the IRS without further order of the Court or consent of the parties. And that goes -- that's designed to -- hopefully, to the extent a well has been poisoned, to keep it from getting any worse."³⁹ The very same day as this Court's ruling, FDIC-R had additional ex parte communications with the IRS, in which it requested "that the refunds be made payable to the FDIC and forwarded to our attention pursuant to IRC Reg. 103.6402-7."⁴⁰ This Court held a further hearing regarding the violation of this Court's ruling.⁴¹ The Court again ordered that FDIC-R stop communicating with the IRS.⁴² Thereafter, to the Court's knowledge, the parties have abided by the automatic stay as the litigation continued here and in the Court of Federal Claims.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), made applicable to these proceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, provides that summary judgment should be granted if the movant shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,"⁴³ after considering the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits."⁴⁴

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, all factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.⁴⁵ After sufficient proof has been presented to support the motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that genuine issues of material fact still exist and that summary judgment is not appropriate.⁴⁶ A genuine issue of material fact is present when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."⁴⁷

In order to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in a jury trial, the nonmovant must supply sufficient evidence (not mere allegations) for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant.⁴⁸ The same principles apply in a bench trial where the judge is the ultimate trier of fact; the nonmovant must obviate an adequate showing to the judge to find for the nonmovant.⁴⁹ In a situation where there is a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, Rule 56(c) necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and mandates a ruling in favor of the moving party.⁵⁰

B. The Parties' Positions

The Trustee and the Indenture Trustee (collectively, the "Movants") argue that the tax refunds are property of the Debtor's estate because (i) affiliated companies are free to allocate their ultimate tax liability among themselves pursuant to the TSA; (ii) the TSA creates a debtor-creditor relationship and not a trustee-beneficiary relationship; (iii) the TSA does not establish a trust relationship; (iv) the Affiliated Group's course of dealings confirmed the debtor-creditor relationship; and (v) no grounds exist for the imposition of a constructive trust.

FDIC-R responds that the Tax Refund is property of Downey Bank receivership estate because (i) the TSA does not expressly transfer ownership of the Tax Refund to DFC; (ii) the Movant's interpretation of the language of the TSA would render the TSA internally inconsistent, ambiguous and unlawful; (iii) the course of performance among the Affiliated Group members established that the funds were, in fact, property of Downey Bank; and (iv) the Trustee (as successor to DFC) holds the Tax Refund as FDIC-R's agent and in trust for FDIC-R.

C. Property of the Debtor's Estate

On November 25, 2008, when DFC filed a chapter 7 petition, a bankruptcy estate was created to hold "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor [DFC] in property as of the commencement of the case."⁵¹ The Petition Date sets a "date of cleavage" and "establishes the moment at which the parties' respective rights in property must be determined."⁵² The scope of an estate's property interests is broad.⁵³

D. The TSA is Not Ambiguous.

The crux of the dispute is the interpretation of the TSA and the facts surrounding the TSA to the extent that there are ambiguities in the TSA's language. Interpreting the terms of the TSA is essential in establishing who owns the Tax Refund. To begin, the TSA states that this Court should interpret the TSA in accordance with the laws of the State of California.⁵⁶ Furthermore, this matter is appropriate for summary judgment because "the determination whether contract language is ambiguous is a question of law."⁵⁷

The Ninth Circuit case of Bob Richards Chrysler-Plymoth Corp., Inc.⁶⁵ establishes that in the absence of a written agreement expressly stating the rights and obligations of parties filing a consolidated tax return, a tax refund resulting solely from offsetting losses of one member of a consolidated filing group against the income of that same member in a prior or subsequent year should inure to the benefit of that member.⁶⁶ Without a written agreement, the party receiving the refund from the government receives the refund in its capacity as "agent" for the consolidated group.⁶⁷ "The absence of an express or implied agreement that the agent had any right to keep the refund meant the agent was under a duty to return the tax refund to the party that incurred the loss."⁶⁸

FDIC-R urges that the TSA does not change the "ownership rules" set forth in Bob Richards. The Court, however, disagrees. If an express written agreement is in effect then the agreement controls the disposition of the tax refund.⁶⁹ To that extent, the Court will look at the four-corners of the TSA to determine whether the agreement created an agency or debtor-creditor relationship between the Debtor and Downey Bank.

E. The TSA Establishes a Debtor-Creditor Relationship Between DFC and Downey Bank.

The bankruptcy court in IndyMac Bancorp examined three key factors when considering whether a particular document or transaction establishes a debtor-creditor relationship or a different relationship (such as trust, mere agency, or bailment relationship).⁷⁰ The three factors are whether (1) the TSA creates fungible payment obligations among the parties; (2) there are no escrow obligations, segregation obligations nor use restrictions under the TSA; and (3) the TSA delegates the tax filer under the agreement with sole discretion regarding tax matters. Each of these factors, which are discussed at length below, favor a finding under the unambiguous terms of the TSA of a debtor-creditor relationship between the Debtor and Downey Bank.

In a similar case to that sub judice, the District Court for the Southern District of California held in Imperial Capital Bancorp, Inc. v. FDIC (In re Imperial Capital Bancorp, Inc.)⁷⁷ that:

Recently, however, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has issued two seemingly contrary opinions.⁸⁰ Notwithstanding that neither is binding precedent upon this Court, the cases are readily distinguishable.

The BankUnited Court also held that there was no language in the tax sharing agreement from which it could reasonably infer that the parties agreed that the holding company "would retain the tax refunds as a company asset and, in lieu of forwarding them to the [b]ank, would be indebted to the [b]ank in the amount of the refunds."⁸³ Nor could the Court find "any words from which the terms of the indebtedness could be inferred."⁸⁴

The BankUnited Court's chief concern appears to have been that the bank paid the tax liability and the bank was liable to the other members of the consolidated group for any tax refunds, while the holding company filed the return and received the actual tax refund. That is not the case here. In this case, Downey Bank (and other members of the Affiliated Group) paid their estimated tax liability to DFC (the holding company), DFC had the sole discretion to prepare and file the tax returns, the Tax Refund was paid by the taxing authorities to DFC, and then DFC would recomputed each member's tax liability, and DFC could retain any refund for seven business days (and in the event of tax overpayments, DFC, in its sole discretion, would determine whether to refund the overpayments to the members of the Affiliate Group or credit the overpayment against the tax liability of the Affiliated Group). Ultimately, DFC paid all taxes, received the Tax Refund and remained liable to the other members of the Affiliated Group for their respective portions.

Although the BankUnited and NetBank cases seem to offer contrary decisions to the cases discussed above, they are factually distinguishable and do not persuade this Court that DFC and Downey Bank had anything other than a debtor-creditor relationship.

The TSA contains no escrow provisions, segregation requirements or restrictions on DFC's use of any tax refund that the government pays to DFC. Nothing in the TSA imposes any duty upon DFC to hold these funds in trust or to treat them as trust funds for the benefit of any other parties. Prior to the payment of any tax refund to the Affiliated Group members, DFC has complete dominion and control over the monies received from the governmental authorities for over a week.⁹⁵ Furthermore, Downey Bank's rights (and those of the other Affiliated Group members) are limited to the expectancy of payment of a sum at future date.⁹⁶

FDIC-R argues that because the TSA does not explicitly discuss ownership of the Tax Refund, that the Court should rely on the following language:

The Court finds that the stand-alone language refers to the amount of tax liability to be paid by the members of the Affiliated Group and does not create a trust or agency relationship or ownership of any refund. Nothing herein affects the amount of FDIC-R's claim against DFC -- this Opinion relates solely to who "owns" the Tax Refund.

Here, the debtor-creditor relationship is created by the lack of segregation provisions or use restrictions.¹⁰³ When DFC receives the tax refund, DFC stands as a future debtor of Downey Bank (after the passage of seven business days) and not as trustee or agent.¹⁰⁴

Section 2.4 of the TSA gives DFC "sole discretion over (1) the manner in which tax returns are prepared and filed, (2) whether any tax refund should be paid or credited against future tax liability, and (3) how to resolve disputes with the taxing authorities."¹⁰⁶ In fact, the TSA provisions in this matter are almost identical to those in IndyMac Bancorp.¹⁰⁷ This Court agrees with IndyMac Bancorp and finds that this language does not subject DFC to the direction or control of any member of the Affiliated Group and does not establish a principal-agent relationship between the members of the Affiliated Group and DFC.¹⁰⁸

FDIC-R argues that the "mere use of certain words" should not over-ride the intention of the parties.¹⁰⁹ However, the preliminary consideration of extrinsic evidence does not trump the TSA's clarity.¹¹⁰ For example, FDIC-R submits (and the Movants do not dispute) that prior tax refund checks were deposited directly into Downey Bank's accounts (rather than first being deposited into DFC's accounts).¹¹¹ This practice, however, only reinforces the debtor-creditor relationship because DFC had to consent and direct the deposit of the check into Downey Bank's account.¹¹²

As set forth herein, it is beyond the "mere words." The Court is persuaded by (i) the absence of a precise provision establishing a trust or agency relationship; (ii) DFC's sole discretion to prepare and file the consolidated tax return, including "the manner in which any item of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit shall be reported;" (iii) DFC's sole discretion to determine whether any overpayments to which Downey Bank may have been entitled to be paid by way of refund or credited against the tax liability of the consolidated group; and (iv) DFC's ability to hold any refund for more than a week. These provisions giving complete discretion to DFC along with the specific words of "payment" and "reimbursement," leads this Court to find that DFC owns any Tax Refund. And, consequently, FDIC-R has a claim against DFC's estate for the amount of its separate-return basis.¹¹³

In conclusion, all three of the Indy Mac Bancorp factors favor, as a matter of law, a finding that under the unambiguous terms of the TSA the relationship of the Debtor and Downey Bank in connection with the Tax Refund is that of a debtor and a creditor, respectively.¹¹⁴

E. Course of Performance

Notwithstanding that the parties have a debtor-credit relationship under the unambiguous terms of the TSA, FDIC-R argues that the Affiliated Group's course of performance indicates that Downey Bank owns the tax refund. In support of its position, FDIC-R submitted (along with other evidence) both a factual declaration and an expert declaration. As such, the Court must first determine whether it should consider these declarations.

California law allows the admission of parol evidence only if it is (1) "relevant" to prove (2) "a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible."¹¹⁵ "California recognizes the objective theory of contracts, under which it is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation. The parties' undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract interpretation."¹¹⁶

The Castleberry Declaration, submitted as an expert declaration, will similarly not be considered. In California, the "interpretation of contractual language is a legal matter for the court . . . expert opinion on contract interpretation is usually inadmissible." ¹²² As interpretation of the TSA is a legal matter and the Court has found that the TSA is unambiguous, the Court will not consider the testimony of Mr. Castleberry.¹²³

Second, FDIC-R asserts that the books and records of Downey Bank and DFC reflect that the parties recorded transactions relating to payment of taxes in a manner inconsistent with the debtor-creditor relationship because their books and records were maintained exactly as one would expect if Downey Bank filed its tax returns on a separate return basis.

Third, FDIC-R asserts that in filings with the SEC and the OTS parties understood that Downey Bank owned any refunds arising from overpayment of taxes.¹²⁵ Each of these arguments fail.

(i) The refund checks were made payable to DFC.¹²⁷ It would be impossible for Downey Bank to deposit the refund checks without the consent and direction of DFC.¹²⁸

(ii) DFC deposited the entire tax refund for the consolidated group into Downey Bank's account and Downey Bank, in turn, sent checks to other members of the Affiliated Group for their individual refund amount. If the money "belonged" to the other members of the Affiliated Group, why would DFC deposit it into Downey Bank's account?¹²⁹ If DFC considered the refund "owned" by Downey Bank -- it would have had to consider each member's refund "owned" by that member and DFC would be breaching its duties to the other members by depositing the check into Downey Bank's account. The IRS only issued one check and the refunds had to be given to each member of the Affiliated Group -- the only way to accomplish this task is to deposit the check into one of the member's accounts and then send each member their portion of the refund. DFC directing Downey Bank to do this ministerial task cannot create some sort of agency or trust relationship.

(iii) This deposit process only enforces the Court's finding that DFC was to have the entire tax refund and then had a contractual duty to deliver each member their allocated portion. Again, nothing herein affects FDIC-R's claim against DFC. Indeed, per the terms of the TSA (as discussed above) and the course of performance, it appears to the Court that the FDIC-R does have a claim against the Debtor's estate based on DFC's contractual relationship with Downey Bank.

(iv) The consolidated tax return regulations "are basically procedural in purpose and were adopted solely for the convenience and protection of the federal government."¹³⁰ "Federal law does not govern the allocation of the [Affiliated] Group's tax refunds; hence, a parent and its subsidiaries are free to provide for the allocation of tax refunds by contract."¹³¹ As such, the tax return regulations do not alter the relationship the parties created in the TSA.

The Wasserman Declaration states that DFC did not treat the payment to the U.S. Treasury as its own expense.¹³²

F. Trust Relationship

FDIC-R's final argument is that the TSA did not transfer ownership of any tax refunds from Downey Bank to DFC. Rather, a trust relationship was created where the Debtor held any tax refunds in trust for Downey Bank. FDIC-R's argument fails as an initial matter because, as discussed above, and for the sake of clarity below, the TSA does not contain any trust language.

Nonetheless, FDIC-R argues that Bob Richards and the resulting progeny of cases make clear that DFC would have received such funds as an agent of Downey Bank and, as such, would hold the Tax Refund in trust for the benefit of FDIC-R, as successor to Downey Bank. FDIC-R claims that the TSA limited DFC's actions by the provisions about separate filing, and requiring consideration in good faith any treatment proposed by the Affiliate Group member, and requiring that DFC had to make refund payments to the Affiliated Group members within seven business days. All of these TSA provisions highlighted by FDIC-R are discussed above. But, to reiterate, this Court agrees with IndyMac Bancorp and finds that this language does not subject DFC to the direction or control of any member of the Affiliated Group and does not establish a principal-agent relationship between the members of the Affiliated Group and DFC.¹³⁶ Furthermore, as discussed above, Bob Richards and its progeny of cases only applies when there is no express agreement between the parties, which is not the case here.¹³⁷

FDCI-R continues that, even if this Court finds that Bob Richards and its progeny do not apply,¹³⁸ a trust relationship exists under state law. In order to establish a trust, the burden is on FDIC-R to identify some factual disagreement¹³⁹ to "(1) demonstrate that the trust relationship and its legal source exist, and (2) identify and trace the trust funds if they are commingled."¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, this Court must look California state law to determine whether FDIC-R has established a trust relationship.¹⁴¹

However, there is nothing in the TSA that indicates that DFC and Downey Bank intended to create a trust.¹⁴⁹ Here, DFC had duties to file consolidated tax returns (prepared in their "sole discretion"). Furthermore, DFC remained responsible to contest, compromise, and settle any adjustments or deficiencies as a result of any tax authority audit. DFC also decided if estimated tax overpayments were to be returned or reflected in reduced quarterly installments of taxes due. The TSA gave DFC sole authority to manipulate the funds and the tax returns, and DFC had the discretion to use any tax refunds for seven business days.

FDIC-R cites to this Court's decision in In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc.,¹⁵⁰ where the Court was faced with an unsecured creditors' committee who sought a declaration under Delaware law (which is not controlling here) that no trust relationship existed between a diocese and individual parishes who had delivered funds to the diocese to invest pursuant to the diocese's pooled investment program. The funds were deposited into the diocese's operating account and comingled with the diocese's own funds before being placed into the investment pool where they were again commingled. The Court found that a resulting trust was established by the actions and intent of the parties. However, as the funds were comingled with the diocese's general funds and then again in the investment account, the funds were not traceable. As such the parishes could not identify their specific property placed in trust, even though the diocese meticulously recorded the investors' shares of the funds in the investment account.

Importantly, unlike here, in the Catholic Diocese case there was no written agreement governing the parties' rights to the funds at issue. This Court found that the relationship between the parties was "akin to that between an investor and a broker,"¹⁵¹ which is not the relationship among the Affiliated Group members. Furthermore, the whole purpose of the TSA was to consolidate and commingle funds by creating one tax return and one tax payment to and from the taxing authorities, thereby reducing the consolidated group's overall tax liability.¹⁵²

Furthermore, the tax refund checks here were made payable to DFC.¹⁵³ Although FDIC-R asserts that the tax returns were deposited directly into Downey Bank's accounts which would indicate "ownership" of the refunds, such deposit could only occur with the consent and direction of DFC;¹⁵⁴ as such, the "economic reality" is that DFC had complete dominion and control over the tax payments and tax refunds and was empowered to satisfy its contractual payment obligation by authorizing Downey Bank to deposit the check.

As a resulting trust would be an equitable remedy, even if FDIC-R could claim that the Debtor is being unjustly enriched -- "[e]nrichment alone will not suffice to invoke the remedial powers of a court of equity. The inquiry is whether, as between the two parties to the transaction, the enrichment be unjust."¹⁵⁵ There is nothing "unjust" about enforcing the parties' contractual obligations set forth in the TSA. Furthermore, as set forth in IndyMac Bancorp:

As a result, FDIC-R has not unequivocally established, i.e., it could not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact,¹⁶⁰ that a resulting trust was formed between and among the Affiliated Group members.

G. Violations of the Automatic Stay.

Finally, as noted above, the Movants also seek for summary judgment regarding their allegations that FDIC-R willfully violated the automatic stay in section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which the FDIC-R refutes. As this Court understands that a settlement in principle has been reached in the Court of Federal Claims action (although approval from the requisite governmental agencies has not been obtained to date) and the Movants have not asserted that the (prospective) Tax Refund was somehow diminished by FDIC-R's (alleged) actions, the Court finds that while the violation of the stay arguments are very strong, they are, effectively, moot. As such, for the purposes of clarity of the record, the Court will deny, without prejudice, the motions for summary judgment regarding FDIC-R's (alleged) violations of the automatic stay.

As such, summary judgment will be granted as to Count I of the Complaint, and denied, without prejudice, as to Court II of the Complaint. Furthermore, summary judgment will be entered in movant's favor on FDIC-R's First and Tenth Counterclaims. An order will be issued.

DATED: October 8, 2013

² As discussed below, the movants also seek summary judgment on FDIC-R's (alleged) violation of the automatic stay. The Court will deny the motions, without prejudice, regarding whether FDIC-R violated the automatic stay.

³ Declaration of Peter Feldman in Support of the FDIC-R's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motions for Partial Summary Judgment of the Trustee and Wilmington Trust Company ("Feldman Declaration") Exh. 4 (Risks Relating to the Notes section of Prospectus Supplement to Downey Financial Corp. $200,000,000 6¹/₂% Senior Notes Due 2014, at S-13).

⁴ D.I. 973. Thereafter, the Court entered an order substituting Mr. Giuliano as plaintiff in this adversary action. Adv. Pro. No. 10-53731 D.I. 133 (Docket items in the adversary action are referred to herein as "Adv. D.I. #").

⁵ 12 U.S.C. § 1811, et seq.

⁶ Adv. D.I. 1.

⁷ Adv. D.I. 29.

⁸ Adv. D.I. 35.

⁹ Adv. D.I. 42.

¹⁰ More specifically, the movants seek summary judgment on Count I of the Complaint for declaratory judgment under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code relating to ownership of the tax refunds and Count II of the Complaint for violation of the automatic stay. See Adv. D.I. 1, 79 and 81.

¹¹ More specifically, the movants seeks summary judgment on FDIC-R's First Counterclaim, which also seeks declaratory judgment under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code relating to the ownership of the tax refunds, and its Tenth Counterclaim, which seeks a declaration that the Trustee is not entitled to and is barred from seeking any or all of the tax refunds. Id.

¹² In addition to the motions and supporting memoranda, FDIC-R's opposition thereto, and movants' reply briefs (Adv. D.I. 79, 80, 81, 82, 92, 94, and 95); the parties have filed ten (10) additional sets of supplemental briefing (Adv. D.I. 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 128, 130 and 131).

¹³ Declaration of William H. Gussman, Jr. in Support of Plaintiff Wilmington Trust Company's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (there "Gussman Declaration"); Exhibit 1 (Termination and Amendment Number 1 to Tax Sharing Agreement among Downey Financial Corp. and Affiliates, dated February 29, 2000). Adv. D.I. 80. The TSA makes reference to an earlier tax sharing agreement, dated December 1, 1998.

¹⁴ The Debtor is referred to as "Financial" in the TSA.

¹⁵ TSA, § 2.1(a).

¹⁶ TSA, § 2.1(d) ("In no instance shall the allocation of tax liability to any member of the Affiliated Group pursuant to this [Tax Sharing] Agreement be less favorable than the tax liability which would result from such member filing a separate tax return.").

¹⁷ TSA, § 2.1(e).

¹⁸Id.

¹⁹ TSA, § 2.4(a).

²⁰ TSA, § 2.1(e).

²¹Id.

²² TSA, § 2.1(h).

²³See Gussman Declaration, Exh. 10.

²⁴See Declaration of Stephan H. Wasserman, CPA/ABV, CFF ("Wasserman Declaration"), Exh. D.

²⁵ On November 6, 2009, the Worker, Homeownership and Business Assistance Act was signed into law permitting the Trustee to carryback losses for up to five years, instead of the former two year carryback rule. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6511 & 172(b)(1)(H) (as amended by § 13 of the Workers, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (Pub. L. No. 111-92, 123 Stat. 29840) (the "2009 Act")).

²⁶ The Trustee has already received approximately $17 million in tax refunds related to overpayments of taxes paid in 2007, which are being held in the Trustee's escrow account pursuant to Stipulations approved by this Court. See D.I. 67 and 347. The remainder of the Tax Refund is being sought in litigation pending before the United States Court of Federal Claims, discussed infra.

²⁷ Payment of Taxes by Downey Bank:

                Amount of taxes funded by

²⁸ Fed. Cl. Case No. 10-734T.

²⁹ Gussman Declaration, Exh. 11.

³⁰Id., Exh. 12, p.2 "Purpose of Form."

³¹Id.

³²Id., Exh. 13.

³³Id., Exh. 14.

³⁴Id., Exh. 13.

³⁵Id., Exh. 15 (Vordtriede Dep. at 146:9-10; 146:17-147:0; 147:14-148:7).

³⁶Id., Exh. 16.

³⁷Id., Exh. 17.

³⁸Id.

³⁹ D.I. 468 (Transcript of Sept. 13, 2010 Hearing at p. 36).

⁴⁰ Gussman Declaration, Exh. 19.

⁴¹ D.I. 608 (Transcript of Nov. 17, 2010 Hearing at p. 6); D.I. 552 (Transcript of Dec. 1, 2010 Hearing at p. 11).

⁴² D.I. 552 (Transcript of Dec. 1, 2010 Hearing at p. 11).

⁴³ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

⁴⁴Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

⁴⁵Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-588 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).

⁴⁶Id. at 587.

⁴⁷Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

⁴⁸Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996).

⁴⁹In re Broadstripe, LLC, 444 B.R. 51, 76-77 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (citing Leonard v. General Motors Corp. (In re Headquarters Dodge), 13 F.3d 674, 679 (3d Cir. 1993).

⁵⁰Id. at 77-78 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 317-18).

⁵¹ 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).

⁵²In re IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., 2:08-BK-21752-BB, 2012 WL 1037481, *12 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) report and recommendation adopted sub nom. In re IndyMac Bancorp Inc., CV 12-02967-RGK, 2012 WL 1951474 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2012) (citations omitted). Hereinafter, the IndyMac Bancorp bankruptcy court report and recommendations (which were accepted by the District Court) will be referred to herein as "IndyMac Bancorp." When the Court refers to the district court's opinion, it will be indicated as the "IndyMac Bancorp District Court Opinion."

⁵³Id. (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 (1983) and In re Central Ark Broad. Co., 68 F.3d 213, 214 (8^th Cir. 1995)).

⁵⁴Id.

⁵⁵Matter of Yonikus, 996 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

⁵⁶ TSA, § 3.3.

⁵⁷United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1135 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

⁵⁸Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1134 (citing United States v. Clark, 218 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000)).

⁵⁹Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

⁶⁰Giove v. Dep't of Transp., 230 F.3d 1333, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

⁶¹McAbee Const. Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

⁶²Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

⁶³Giove, 230 F.3d at 1341. Thus, if the "provisions are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and the court may not resort to extrinsic evidence to interpret them." McAbee Const. Inc., 97 F.3d at 1435 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

⁶⁴In re Vineyard Nat. Bancorp, 2:10-BK-21661RN, 2013 WL 1867987, *7 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 3, 2013).

⁶⁵Western Dealer Mgmt., Inc. v. England (In re Bob Richards Chrysler-Plmouth Corp., Inc.), 473 F.2d 262 (9^th Cir. 1973) (hereinafter "Bob Richards").

⁶⁶Id. at 265.

⁶⁷Id.

⁶⁸Vineyard Nat. Bancorp, 2:10-BK-21661RN, 2013 WL 1867987 at *7 (interpreting Bob Richards Chrysler-Plymouth Corp., 473 F.2d at 265).

⁶⁹Id. (citations omitted). See, e.g., Bob Richards, 473 F.2d at 265 ("Since there is no express or implied agreement that the agent had any right to keep the refund, we agree with the referee and the district court that WDM was acting as a trustee of a specific trust and was under a duty to return the tax refund to the estate of the bankrupt." (emphasis added)); Capital Bancshares, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 957 F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1992) holding that "the refund is the property of the Bank in the absence of a contrary agreement." (emphasis added)); Matter of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 896 F.2d 54, 58 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that "the parties specified by explicit contractual language that the Treasury Bond coupon interest and the GNMA principal and interest payments would be the property of AMC." (emphasis added)); Vineyard Nat. Bancorp, 2:10-BK-21661RN, 2013 WL 1867987 at *7 (finding that "if an express written agreement is in effect, such an agreement controls the disposition of the tax refund." (emphasis added)); F.D.I.C. v. AmFin Fin. Corp., 490 B.R. 548, 551 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (holding that "the Court finds no merit in the FDIC's contentions that the tax sharing agreements do not fully address the rights and obligations of the entities. Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt and rely upon the Bob Richards rule to create an agency or trust as an operation of law."); Team Financial, Inc. v. FDIC (In re Team Financials, Inc.), 09-10925, 2010 WL 1730681, *8 (Bankr. D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2010) ("The parties to the TAA [tax allocation agreement] in this case made a 'differing agreement,' taking this case out of the Bob Richards general rule.").

⁷⁰IndyMac Bancorp, at *13. See also F.D.I.C. v. AmFin Fin. Corp., 490 B.R. 548, 554 (N.D. Ohio 2013) ("The Court adopts the IndyMac analysis in its entirety.").

⁷¹Id. (citations omitted).

⁷² TSA, § 2.1(e) (emphasis added).

⁷³ TSA, § 2.1(h) (emphasis added).

⁷⁴ TSA, § 2.4(a) (emphasis added).

⁷⁵ TSA, § 2.4(a). Compare IndyMac Bancorp, at * 14.

⁷⁶ TSA, § 2.1(e).

⁷⁷ 492 B.R. 25 (S.D. Cal. 2013).

⁷⁸Id. at 30 (citations to the tax allocation agreement omitted).

⁷⁹IndyMac Bancorp at *14. See also In re Imperial Capital Bancorp, Inc., 492 B.R. 25, 30 (S.D. Cal. 2013); In re Team Financials, Inc., 09-10925, 2010 WL 1730681, *10 (Bankr. D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2010); In re First Cent. Fin. Corp., 269 B.R. 481, 497 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) subsequently aff'd, 377 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2004).

⁸⁰Zucker v. FDIC (In re BankUnited Fin. Corp.), 12-11392, 2013 WL 4106387 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2013) (hereinafter, "BankUnited.") and FDIC v. Zucker (In re NetBank, Inc.), No. 12-13965, 2013 WL 4804325 (11th Cir. Sept. 10, 2013) (hereinafter, "NetBank").

⁸¹Id. at *2-4.

⁸²Id.

⁸³Id. at *5.

⁸⁴Id.

⁸⁵Id.

⁸⁶Id.

⁸⁷NetBank, No. 12-13965, 2013 WL 4804325.

⁸⁸Id. at *5.

⁸⁹Id. at *3.

⁹⁰ Interagency Policy Statement on Income Tax Allocation in a Holding Company Structure, 63 Fed.Reg. 64757, 64759 (Nov. 23, 1998).

⁹¹See NetBank at *3 and 5.

⁹²IndyMac Bancorp, at *15 (citations omitted).

⁹³In re Black & Geddes, Inc., 35 B.R. 830, 836 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). See In re Coupon Clearing Serv., Inc., 113 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Black & Geddes, Inc., 25 B.R. at 836); Lonely Maiden Prods., LLC v. GoldenTree Asset Mgmt., LP, 201 Cal. App. 4th 368, 380 (2011) (quoting In re Black & Geddes, Inc., 25 B.R. at 836).

⁹⁴IndyMac Bancorp, at *15.

⁹⁵ TSA, § 2.1(h) (proscribing seven business days for DFC to pay the Affiliated Group member's refund). The FDIC-R relies on In BSD Bancorp, Inc v. FDIC, No. 93-12207-A11 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1995) (Feldman Declaration, Exh. 57), however, the BSD Bancorp opinion does not set forth terms of tax sharing agreement; so it is impossible to compare that tax sharing agreement to the one sub judice. Regardless, the BSD Bancorp court concluded that the parent was required to give subsidiary its share of the refund in cash and immediately; as discussed, here, no such requirement exists (Debtor controls the amount it determines to pay its subsidiary for 7 business days, if at all. See TSA, § 2.h.).

⁹⁶See IndyMac Bancorp, at *16.

⁹⁷ TSA, § 2.1(d).

⁹⁸Id.

⁹⁹ TSA, § 2.1(e). The TSA also refers to a "separate-return basis" when discussing unused losses. TSA, § 2.1(g).

¹⁰⁰ TSA, § 2.1(h).

¹⁰¹ TSA, §§ 2.2 and 2.3.

¹⁰²IndyMac Bancorp, at *14 (emphasis supplied).

¹⁰³Id. at *16 (finding that "a debtor-creditor relationship is created because lack of segregation provisions or use restrictions undermines the direction and control necessary to establish an agent or trustee relationship."(citations omitted)).

¹⁰⁴See id.

¹⁰⁵Id. at * 16 (citations omitted).

¹⁰⁶ TSA, § 2.4(a).

¹⁰⁷IndyMac Bancorp, at * 16.

¹⁰⁸Id.

¹⁰⁹Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 38, 442 P.2d 641 (1968) ("A court must ascertain and give effect to this intention by determining what the parties meant by the words they used. Accordingly, the exclusion of relevant, extrinsic, evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument could be justified only if it were feasible to determine the meaning the parties gave to the words from the instrument alone.").

¹¹⁰Zenger-Miller, Inc. v. Training Team, GmbH, 757 F. Supp. 1062, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 1991).

¹¹¹ Feldman Declaration, Exh. 15, Buck Tr. 152:4-153:12. See also Feldman Declaration, Exh. 23.

¹¹²See, e.g. Unlimited Adjusting Grp., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 672, 676-77 n. 6 (2009) ("When a payee receives a check, the payee becomes its holder. The payee may negotiate the check by indorsing it and transferring it to another person, who then becomes its holder." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Pac. Indem. Co. v. Sec. First Nat. Bank, 56 Cal. Rptr. 142, 150 (1967) ("Where a depositor issues a check instructing the drawee bank to make a payment from his funds on deposit to a specified person, his account may not be charged for this amount unless this person actually endorses and negotiates this check.").

¹¹³See generally TSA, § 2.4(a).

¹¹⁴IndyMac Bancorp at *2.

¹¹⁵U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc., 281 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¹¹⁶Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 505, 514 (2003) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). See also Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 836 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (holding that "[c]ontract interpretation is governed by the objective intent of the parties as embodied in the words of the contract. . . . However, evidence of the "subjective, uncommunicated intent of one of the parties" cannot be used to contradict the express terms of the contract.").

¹¹⁷Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 645-46 (citations, footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).

¹¹⁸ Royer Declaration, ¶ 8.

¹¹⁹Heston v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 160 Cal. App. 3d 402, 413, 206 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Ct. App. 1984) ("A dispute over the terms of the Agreement clearly had arisen at the time the January 25 letter was sent, even if no dispute between Heston and Farmers had yet occurred. Farmers cannot impose its own interpretation six years after the signing of the Agreement, after it had become apparent that paragraph H presented a problem . . .").

¹²⁰ TSA, § 3.1.

¹²¹ TSA, § 2.1(a).

¹²²In re Tobacco Cases I, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 320 (2010) (citations and internal quotations omitted); Oceanside 84, Ltd. v. Fid. Fed. Bank, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 487, 494 (1997)("The interpretation of a written instrument, even though it involves what might properly be called questions of fact, is essentially a judicial function to be exercised according to the generally accepted canons of interpretation so that the purposes of the instrument may be given effect. . . . It is therefore solely a judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

¹²³ Similarly, the IndyMac Bancorp court similarly rejected the use of a similar Castleberry Declaration. IndyMac Bancorp, at *10 ("[T]he TSA is not ambiguous, and thus parol evidence such as the Castleberry Declaration is not relevant to its interpretation. Moreover, opinion or "expert" testimony about legal issues is not admissible evidence. Because the interpretation of a contract such as the TSA is a legal issue for the Court, Mr. Castleberry's testimony would be inadmissible as evidence even if the Court believed the TSA is ambiguous (which the Court does not)." (citations omitted)).

¹²⁴ Section § 1.1502-77(a) states in part:

¹²⁵ FDIC-R, relying wholly on the Royer Declaration, asserts that the TSA was not supposed to transfer ownership of the tax return (based on the statement in the Royer Declaration that the TSA was not supposed to transfer ownership of the tax return). As stated above, the Court considers the Royer Declaration extrinsic evidence and, as a result, this argument by FDIC-R will not be considered herein.

¹²⁶ FDIC-R also asserts that the fact that DFC issued the consolidated tax payment to the IRS is immaterial. See Cohen v. Un-Ltd. Holdings, Inc. (In re Nelco, Ltd.), 264 B.R. 790, 810 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999). However, the tax allocation agreement in In re Nelco, Ltd. did not "not address the allocation of tax refunds among the consolidated group." Id. at 809. As a result the Nelco court, following the Bob Richards progeny of cases, without a written agreement "a member of a consolidated group can participate in a tax refund only to the extent of tax payments made by that member." Id. at 810. Here, the parties are governed by the TSA; as such the holding in Nelco is not applicable.

¹²⁷ FDIC-R argues that the receipt by DFC from the U.S. Treasury of the refund check is not relevant, because all the members assumed the Downey Bank owned the refunds. The Court disagrees, the fact that the consolidated return check is made payable to DFC is, in fact, relevant considering the facts of this case. The refund checks made payable to DFC could not be negotiated without the direction and consent of DFC. If the parties did not want DFC to have that control then the TSA would have been drafted accordingly.

¹²⁸See, e.g., supra at n. 112.

¹²⁹ On at least one occasion, Downey Bank remitted a portion of the refund to DFC. See Wasserman Declaration at ¶ 24 and Exh. D. If the Court were to accept Downey Bank's argument, then DFC would have given "ownership" of its own refund to Downey Bank -- this would not make logical sense. Logically, DFC was delegating a ministerial task of depositing the refund check and then distributing the allocated refund to the other members of the Affiliated Group.

¹³⁰BankUnited, 12-11392, 2013 WL 4106387 at *1 n. 2 (citations and internal quotation mark omitted); In re First Cent. Fin. Corp., 269 B.R. 481, 489 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2001) ("[U]nder applicable I.R.S. regulations, a parent company acts as agent for the consolidated group in filing consolidated tax returns [but] this agency is purely procedural in nature, and does not affect the entitlement as among the members of the Group to any refund paid by the I.R.S.").

¹³¹BankUnited, 12-11392, 2013 WL 4106387 at *1.

¹³² Wasserman Declaration § 20(B)(iv).

¹³³Id. at ¶ 20(B)(iii).

¹³⁴Id. at ¶ 20(B)(iv), n. 11.

¹³⁵ Interagency Policy Statement 63 FR 64757-01 (Nov. 23, 1998) ("Regardless of the method used to settle intercorporate income tax obligations, when depository institution members prepare regulatory reports, they must provide for current and deferred income taxes in amounts that would be reflected as if the institution had filed on a separate entity basis.").

¹³⁶IndyMac Bancorp, 2:08-BK-21752-BB, 2012 WL 1037481 at * 16.

¹³⁷See, supra, n. 69.

¹³⁸ FDIC-R also points to several other cases that also are not applicable here: (i) In Cohen v. Un-Ltd. Holdings, Inc. (In re Nelco, Ltd.), 264 B.R. 790, 805 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999), the court found the tax allocation agreement ambiguous and, as a result, looked to the economic realities and intention of the parties. Here, the TSA is not ambiguous. (ii) In BSD Bancorp, Inc v. FDIC, No. 93-12207-A11 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1995) (Feldman Declaration, Exh. 57), the tax allocation agreement contained language that allowed the holding company, in unusual circumstances, to "borrow" the refund from the subsidiary (and specified the any loan would be subject to regulations governing loans to affiliates), and absent those "unusual" circumstances the holding company had to pay the refund to the Bank immediately. This is distinguishable from the present case where no such language exists. (iii) In Lubin v. F.D.I.C., 10-CV-00874, 825751, *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2011), was based upon precise language in the tax sharing agreement that created agency, specifically stating that funds were "obtained as agent" for the group members. No such language exists in the case sub judice.

¹³⁹Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 (1992) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)) ("In order to continue, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to identify "some factual disagreement sufficient to deflect brevis disposition.").

¹⁴⁰City of Farrell v. Sharon Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

¹⁴¹Id.

¹⁴²Weststeyn Dairy 2 v. Eades Commodities Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (footnote omitted) (citing Abrams v. Crocker-Citizens Nat. Bank, 41 Cal.App.3d 55, 59, 114 Cal.Rptr. 913 (1974)).

¹⁴³Id. at 1075-76 (emphasis added) (quoting Abrams, 41 Cal.App.3d at 59 (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 12, cmt. g)).

¹⁴⁴Id. at 1083-84 ("One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he or she has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¹⁴⁵In re Foam Sys. Co., 92 B.R. 406, 409 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) aff'd, 893 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1990) and aff'd sub nom. Ins. Co. of the W. v. Simon, 893 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1990) ("If the only parties to be considered were Insurance Co. and the debtor, then the equities might favor the imposition of a resulting trust. However, in light of the Bankruptcy Code's strong policy of ratable distribution among all creditors, the bankruptcy court properly declined to exclude the funds in the account from the debtor's estate by imposing a resulting trust." (citations omitted)); In re Lewis W. Shurtleff, Inc., 778 F.2d 1416, 1420 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the bankruptcy code has a "strong policy in favor of ratable distribution among all creditors" (citations omitted)).

¹⁴⁶Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Schroeder, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 864 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¹⁴⁷ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

¹⁴⁸Weststeyn Dairy 2, 280 F. Supp. 2 at 1086. Aikin v. Neilson (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), 08-52709-MM, 2009 WL 2849122, *5 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 20, 2009) vacated and remanded, C 09-4311 RMW, 2012 WL 1110023 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2012) ("When evidence establishes that both parties to a transaction intended that the holder of the property was to hold it in trust for another, the court may use a resulting trust to accomplish that goal. The resulting trust enforces a relationship that was always intended to be that of trustee and beneficiary.")

¹⁴⁹ In NetBank, the Eleventh Circuit held that is does "not believe that the absence of language requiring a trust or escrow has much persuasive value. That factor is offset entirely by the similar absence of any language indicative of a debtor-creditor relationship-e.g., provisions for interest and collateral." NetBank at *6 (footnote omitted). See also BankUnited Fin. Corp., 12-11392, 2013 WL 4106387 at *5. However, absent language creating an express trust, the FDIC-R has the burden to show the parties unequivocally intended to establish a resulting trust -- and even if this Court were to adopt the Eleventh Circuit's finding, if the absence of trust language is a "wash" due to the absence of debtor-creditor language -- the FDIC-R cannot meet its burden of showing unequivocal intent. See Weststeyn Dairy 2, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (holding that a "resulting trust is inapplicable because the evidence does not show the parties unequivocally intended to establish a trust").

¹⁵⁰In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, 432 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).

¹⁵¹Id. at 148.

¹⁵²See TSA, § 2.1(a).

¹⁵³ Furthermore, any reliance on BSD Bancorp, Inc v. FDIC, No. 93-12207-A11 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1995) (Feldman Declaration, Exh. 57), would be unfounded because therein the parent received the tax refund it placed them in a segregated account. Id. at p. 12. Furthermore, in BDS Bancorp the tax allocation agreement provided various circumstances where the parents could "borrow" refunds which could not be fully funded when due. When the parent deposited the refund into the segregate account the requirement that the refunds could "not be fully funded" was not met; as such, the parent had no right to borrow the refund under the tax allocation agreement, and therefore held the fund in trust for the subsidiary bank. Id. In the case sub judice, there is no such ability to "borrow" language in the TSA nor was the refund deposited into a segregated account.

¹⁵⁴See, supra n. 112.

¹⁵⁵McGrath v. Hilding, 41 N.Y.2d 625, 629, 363 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1977) (citing Restatement (First) of Restitution § 1 (1937), Comments a and c).

¹⁵⁶IndyMac Bancorp, at *28 (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).

¹⁵⁷In re N. Am. Coin & Currency, Ltd., 767 F.2d 1573, 1575 amended, 774 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1985) (while balancing the request to impose a constructive trust) (citations omitted). See In re Visiting Home Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The purpose of the bankruptcy law is to establish a uniform system to place the property of the bankrupt, wherever it is, under the control of the court for equal distribution among creditors.").

¹⁵⁸IndyMac Bancorp, at *29 (holding that "a resulting trust is an equitable remedy subject to the same strict limitations imposed on constructive trusts in bankruptcy." (citations and footnote omitted)).

¹⁵⁹Id.

¹⁶⁰United States v. Jamas Day Care Ctr. Corp., 152 Fed.Appx. 171, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Olson v. GE Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 950 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 1993)) (In order to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in a jury trial, the nonmovant must supply sufficient evidence (not mere allegations) for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant.)). See also Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822. (". . . 'genuine' means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party [and] 'material' means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law").