Individual Argues Filing Deadline Extended by COVID-19 Disaster

AIRREYON S. LOWE,
Petitioner
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondent.

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

PETITIONER' S SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT' S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

INTRODUCTION

Ms. Airreyon Lowe ("Petitioner") received a Notice of Deficiency dated December 2, 2019 reflecting that her self-employment income had been adjusted and she was disallowed a portion of her earned income credit for 2017.¹ Ms. Lowe mailed her petition by United States Postal Service mail, on Tuesday, March 3, 2020.² The petition was filed by the Tax Court on March 9, 2020.

On June 16, 2020, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Respondent") filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction on the grounds that the petition was not filed with the Tax Court within the time prescribed by section 6213(a).³ Respondent argues that Petitioner's 90-day period to file a petition with the Tax Court expired on Monday, March 2, 2020. On July 13, 2020, Ms. Lowe timely filed an Objection to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.⁴ In her Objection, Petitioner stated that she was concerned about the outbreak of COVID-19. With young children at home and the increase in COVID-19 cases in the area, Petitioner was hesitant to meet with her tax preparer and to enter the post office to mail her petition to the Tax Court.⁵

In this supplemental objection, Petitioner argues that her deadline to file a petition in the Tax Court was extended by the automatic disaster relief provision of section 7508A, subsection (d). Under subsections (a) and (b), the Secretary of the Treasury (the "Secretary") has authority to postpone the time to perform certain acts, including the filing of a Tax Court petition, in response to a federally declared disaster.⁶ In addition, for federal disasters declared after December 20, 2019, subsection (d) separately affords qualified taxpayers a mandatory 60-day period that is disregarded in the same manner as the period specified in subsection (a). This 60-day period begins on the earliest incident date specified in the disaster declaration.⁷ President Trump declared the State of New Jersey a disaster area "beginning on January 20, 2020".⁸ As explained further below, section 7508A(d) gives Petitioner at least 60 days after January 20 to file her petition, or at least until March 21, 2020. Petitioner met this deadline. Thus, the Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.

Respondent has no objection to the filing of this supplemental objection, but he does not agree with Petitioner's argument regarding section 7508A(d). The Motion to Dismiss does not discuss section 7508A, and Respondent's specific objections to Petitioner's argument are unknown.

I. MANDATORY POSTPONEMENT OF DEADLINES IN RESPONSE TO DISASTERS UNDER SECTION 7508A(D)

In December of 2019 Congress passed and the President signed into law the Taxpayer Certainty and Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2019.⁹ This Act amended section 7508A by adding subsection (d), titled "Mandatory 60-Day Extension."¹⁰ This subsection provides qualified taxpayers with a disregarded time period — the postponement period — that runs concurrent with or in addition to any extensions specified by the Secretary under subsections (a) and (b), discussed below.¹¹ The amendment applies to "federally declared disasters declared after the date of the enactment of this Act."¹² To date, no Treasury regulations or agency guidance have been issued regarding subsection (d).¹³

A. Disaster Area

Subsection (d) references the term "disaster area" twice: in defining who qualifies for the mandatory postponement, and in defining the length of the postponement period. The term "disaster area" is itself defined by reference to section 165(i)(5).¹⁴ Under that provision, a disaster area is an area "determined by the President of the United States to warrant assistance by the Federal Government under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act."¹⁵

B. The Postponement Period

While the title of subsection (d) references a "60-day extension," the period can be longer. The period to be disregarded begins "on the earliest incident date specified in the declaration to which the disaster area . . . relates" and ends on "the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified."¹⁶ Neither section 7508A nor section 165 provide a definition of "incident date" or "declaration".

Additional background and context are helpful before turning to petitioner's postponement period. Part II below gives background on the Stafford Act. Part III discusses the measures taken by the federal government in response to the Covid-19 pandemic that are relevant to this case. Part IV then addresses how the 60-day period is determined for Petitioner.

C. Qualified Taxpayers

The postponement period described in subsection (d) "shall be disregarded" "in the case of any qualified taxpayer."¹⁷ Section 7508A(d)(2) lists six ways that a taxpayer may qualify by having a connection to a disaster area. A "qualified taxpayer" includes individuals whose principal residence is located in a disaster area.¹⁸ It also includes taxpayers whose principal place of business (other than the business of performing services as an employee) is in a disaster area.

D. Mechanism and Effect of the Mandatory Postponement for Qualified Taxpayers

For qualified taxpayers, the postponement period "shall be disregarded in the same manner as a period specified under subsection (a)."¹⁹ Beyond this statement, subsection (d) does not specify which time-sensitive acts are postponed, other than for acts regarding pensions.²⁰ Neither does it provide any more detail regarding how the postponement period is triggered. Therefore, before further discussing the application of subsection (d) it is helpful to review the structure and operation of subsection (a).

1. Under subsection (a) of section 7508A, the Secretary of the Treasury may postpone certain tax-related deadlines, including the time for filing a petition with the Tax Court for redetermination of a deficiency.

Section 7508A(a) gives the Secretary authority to disregard up to one year for purposes of determining the timeliness of a broad range of time-sensitive acts, for taxpayers who the Secretary determines are affected by a federally declared disaster. In contrast to subsection (d), subsection (a) does not specify which taxpayers are to receive relief; this determination is made by the Secretary.²¹ Subsection (a) also does not specify when the postponement period is to start; this also is determined by the Secretary.²²

Section 7508A does provide some specifics when it comes to the acts to be postponed under subsection (a).²³ The postponement period applies to determining

(1) whether any of the acts described in paragraph (1) of section 7508(a) were performed within the time prescribed therefor (determined without regard to extension under any other provision of this subtitle for periods after the date (determined by the Secretary) of such disaster or action),

(2) the amount of any interest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to the tax for periods after such date, and

(3) the amount of any credit or refund.²⁴

The acts²⁵ described in paragraph (1) of section 7508(a)²⁶ include:

(C) Filing a petition with the Tax Court for redetermination of a deficiency . . .; and

(K) Any other act required or permitted under the internal revenue laws specified by the Secretary . . .²⁷

The Secretary has specified acts under subparagraph (K) in section 301.7508A-1(c), Proced. & Admin. Regs. and in Revenue Procedure 2018-58.²⁸

The Secretary's process for providing disaster relief under section 7508A's subsection (a) is described in the applicable regulation:

If a tax-related deadline is postponed under section 7508A and this section, the IRS will publish a revenue ruling, revenue procedure, notice, announcement, news release, or other guidance (see § 601.601(d)(2) of this chapter) describing the acts postponed, the postponement period, and the location of the covered disaster area.²⁹

Before taxpayers can receive any relief under section 7508A(a), the IRS must wait for the president to issue a disaster declaration. Subsection (d), with its grant of an automatic postponement, allows for more immediate support for taxpayers affected by a disaster or emergency.

Revenue Procedure 2018-58 notes, "Unless the notice or other guidance for a particular disaster provides that the relief is limited, the guidance will generally postpone all of the acts listed in the regulations and this revenue procedure."³⁰

2. Under subsection (d) the Secretary has no discretion; the postponement period automatically applies with respect to all acts eligible for discretionary postponement under subsection (a).

As noted above, section 7508A(d) states that its postponement period "shall be disregarded in the same manner as a period specified under subsection (a)."³¹ The acts that are subject to mandatory postponement are not specifically listed, and no procedural mechanism for postponement is detailed in subsection (d). To date, the government has not issued regulations or provided any formal or informal guidance implementing this subsection.

The most logical reading of subsection (d) is that a disaster declaration automatically triggers a postponement period for the time-sensitive acts that may be postponed by a discretionary postponement under (a).³² Under this reading, the phrase "in the same manner" refers to the specific time-sensitive acts which are postponed by the operation of subsection (d). Two issues: (1) what triggers the operation of subsection (d); and (2) which time-sensitive acts receive relief; are discussed together in this part because the phrase, "shall be disregarded in the same manner as a period specified under subsection (a)" could potentially refer to either issue.

At first glance it seems possible that "in the same manner" could refer to the process by which the Secretary grants a postponement under subsection (a). That is, the phrase might refer to the process of publishing guidance granting taxpayers a postponement period and setting out its parameters. However, this would conflict with the plain wording of subsection (d) and it would also conflict with the mandatory and specific nature of the subsection overall. This is not therefore the best reading of the phrase.

Subsection (d) provides for a concrete time period that "shall be disregarded" for certain specified taxpayers, in contrast to subsection (a) where the Secretary has discretion to decide the period of postponement, which taxpayers will qualify for a postponement, and indeed whether to grant any postponement at all. The title of subsection (d) also refers to a "mandatory" postponement of time.³³ The postponement would not be mandatory if it needed to be triggered by a discretionary act of the Secretary.³⁴ The mandatory nature of subsection (d) is striking juxtaposed with the discretionary "may" of subsection (a).

In addition, the "process" interpretation of "in the same manner" would render new subsection (d) largely irrelevant and a nullity in most cases.³⁵ Indeed, it appears to be Respondent's position that subsection (d) does nothing to assist taxpayers affected by the COVID-19 disaster. Respondent might point out that subsection (d) potentially provides for a longer postponement period than the one year available under subsection (a). However, when one considers the ordinary format for Stafford Act disaster declarations (discussed further below), it seems unlikely that Congress enacted subsection (d) to merely provide for a longer postponement period at the Secretary's discretion.

To the extent there is any ambiguity with respect to whether "in the same manner" refers to the time-sensitive acts which Congress intended to postpone, versus a postponement process to be triggered in some way by the Secretary, the legislative history resolves that ambiguity. Legislative history cannot override the plain text of the Code, but it can be instructive when the text is ambiguous.³⁶ The House of Representatives' Committee on Ways and Means issued a Report on the Taxpayer Certainty and Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2019 (the "House report"). Regarding section 7508A(d), the House report gives the following "Reasons for Change":

The Committee believes that the certainty and additional time provided by an automatic extension of filing deadlines for taxpayers affected by Federally declared disasters will ease the burden of tax compliance for taxpayers dealing with the hardship of disaster recovery.³⁷

No certainty would be provided to taxpayers by subsection (d) if the Secretary could decide not to trigger its application. Nor would taxpayer compliance burdens be necessarily eased.

In addition, both a staff report from the Joint Committee on Taxation³⁸ as well as the House report indicate that Congress was aware of the specific acts that that are subject to suspension of time under subsection (a), and further indicate that the Committee expected that those same acts would be postponed by new subsection (d). The acts described in paragraph (1) of section 7508(a) are listed in both reports.³⁹ Shortly after this list appears, both reports contain a similar description of subsection (d). In the House report, the "Explanation of Provision" section begins:

The provision provides to qualified taxpayers in the case of a Federally declared disaster a mandatory 60-day period that is disregarded in determining whether the acts listed above were performed in the time prescribed; the amount of interest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to tax; and the amount of credit or refund. The 60-day period begins on the earliest incident date specified in the declaration of the relevant disaster and ends on the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified.⁴⁰

This confirms that subsection (d)'s reference to subsection (a) was intended to incorporate by reference the acts to be extended by subsection (d)'s postponement period.

The legislative history also provides support for the proposition that the operation of subsection (d) is automatic and nondiscretionary. On December 17, 2019, as the Taxpayer Certainty and Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2019 was incorporated by amendment into the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Representative Rice addressed the House of Representatives to clarify the intent of section 205:

This provision provides disaster related tax relief to those who are victims of a natural disaster.

Specifically, this provision allows for people to receive a 60 day extension to file their taxes if there is a federally declared disaster. I want to clarify that this extension is not limited to the current Internal Revenue Service (IRS) policy . . . but may be triggered by any federal assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, and Related Authorities as of August 2016. . . . Additionally, this provision does not prevent the IRS from extending this tax relief beyond 60 days.⁴¹

The discretionary relief process under subsection (a) failed to provide certainty to victims of disaster. Before relief under subsection (a) can be provided by the IRS through publication of a guidance document, a federal disaster declaration must be issued.⁴² As detailed below, this can occur days, weeks, or potentially even months from the date of a natural disaster. In the midst of a flood or a hurricane, taxpayers and their advisors could not be certain about whether relief would be provided or what acts would qualify. Subsection (d) therefore was necessary to provide reassurance via the mandatory postponement of a definitive list of time-sensitive acts.

Before turning to the mechanics of determining the postponement period under subsection (d), it is helpful to understand the background of disaster declarations under the Stafford Act.

II. FEDERAL DISASTER DECLARATIONS UNDER THE STAFFORD ACT

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the "Stafford Act") authorizes the President to issue both "emergency" and "major disaster" declarations allowing the federal government to provide assistance to state and local governments when they are overwhelmed.⁴³ Some Stafford Act programs also provide assistance to individuals.⁴⁴ An "emergency" is defined as a situation in which the President determines that "federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts . . . to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe."⁴⁵ A "major disaster" means "any natural catastrophe" that the President determines "causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance."⁴⁶ The federal assistance is coordinated and provided through the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA").⁴⁷

A. Declarations under the Stafford Act

As noted above, the Stafford Act provides for both emergency declarations and disaster declarations. These declarations are independent of each other, and each type of declaration triggers distinct assistance programs.⁴⁸ Emergency assistance programs available under Title V of the Stafford Act are triggered by an emergency declaration.⁴⁹ Disaster assistance programs available under Title VI of the Stafford Act are triggered by a major disaster declaration.⁵⁰

B. Incident Periods under the Stafford Act

The term "incident date" is not used in the Stafford Act and does not appear to be commonly used in Stafford Act declarations or in FEMA guidance. The Stafford Act uses the term "date of disaster" to indicate when federal disaster assistance may begin and when expenses may be reimbursed.⁵¹ Thisis reflected in the official disaster declarations published in the Federal Register. For example, the COVID-19 disaster declaration for New Jersey states:

I have determined that the emergency conditions in the State of New Jersey resulting from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic beginning on January 20, 2020, and continuing, are of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act . . .⁵²

FEMA's regulations use the term "incident period" which is defined as "the time interval during which the disaster-causing incident occurs."⁵³ The regulation continues,

No Federal assistance under the [Stafford] Act shall be approved unless the damage or hardship to be alleviated resulted from the disaster-causing incident which took place during the incident period or was in anticipation of that incident. The incident period will be established by FEMA in the FEMA-State Agreement and published in the Federal Register.⁵⁴

For the New Jersey COVID-19 disaster, FEMA's website states: "Incident Period: January 20, 2020 and continuing."⁵⁵ The only date published in the federal register concerning this disaster is the date contained in the declaration excerpted above.⁵⁶ The President's declaration stating that the disaster was "beginning on January 20, 2020, and continuing" therefore served to establish the incident period.

This example appears typical of Stafford Act disaster declarations. It is common for Stafford Act disaster and emergency declarations to contain open-ended incident periods, whether they involve biological disasters such as COVID-19 or natural disasters such as hurricanes, wildfires, earthquakes, etc.⁵⁷ The declaration often specifies a beginning date and then provides that the period is "continuing."⁵⁸ However, end dates for incident periods may be established months later in an amendment to the declaration.⁵⁹

Disaster relief is not available indefinitely, even if no end date has been specified. For example, unemployment assistance under section 410 of the Stafford Act can extend up to 26 weeks "after the major disaster is declared."⁶⁰ Temporary housing may not ordinarily be provided "after the end of the 18-month period beginning on the date of the declaration of the major disaster by the President."⁶¹ States are required to submit their mitigation plans for review periodically if they want to continue receiving non-emergency hazard mitigation assistance.⁶²

III. THE COVID-19 DISASTER DECLARATIONS AND TREASURY RESPONSE

On March 13, 2020, President Trump issued a letter in which he determined pursuant to section 501(b) of the Stafford Act that the COVID-19 pandemic was a national emergency.⁶³ This Letter operates as an Emergency Declaration allowing for emergency assistance under Title V of the Stafford Act.⁶⁴ The letter encourages state governors and tribal leaders to request major disaster declarations under section 401(a) of the Stafford Act. It also instructs the Secretary "to provide relief from tax deadlines to Americans who have been adversely affected by the COVID-19 emergency, as appropriate, pursuant to section 7508A(a)."⁶⁵ The letter does not specify an incident date or a beginning date for the national emergency.⁶⁶

Governors responded to the President's invitation, and the President began issuing COVID-19 disaster declarations with respect to the states. On March 25, 2020, the President issued DR-4488-NJ, in which the State of New Jersey is declared a major disaster area"beginning on January 20, 2020 and continuing."⁶⁷ Each federal disaster declaration specifies this same incident period for the COVID-19 major disaster.⁶⁸

The Secretary of the Treasury also promptly responded to the President's direction. The Internal Revenue Service ("the IRS") issued multiple Notices providing relief under section 7508A(a).⁶⁹ These Notices cite the President's Emergency Declaration of March 13.⁷⁰ In this series of Notices, the IRS gradually expanded the relief available to taxpayers under section 7508A(a). On April 9, 2020, the IRS issued Notice 2020-23, which expanded the relief under section 7508A(a) previously granted by Notices 2020-17, 2020-18, and 2020-20.⁷¹ 1Notice 2020-23 provides for a postponement period under section 7508A(a) of April 1 to July 15, 2020.⁷² Among other relief, the Notice postpones deadlines for filing petitions in the Tax Court that would have been due between April 1 and July 15, 2020.⁷³ In a subsequent statement, the IRS clarified that a taxpayer with a deadline to file a petition with the Tax Court would receive the benefits of both Notice 2020-23 and Guralnik v. Commissioner.⁷⁴ In that case, the Tax Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(3)(A) offers a postponement of time to file a petition when the Tax Court clerk's office is closed due to an emergency until the clerk's office reopens. Due to the COVID-19 emergency, the Tax Court clerk's office closed on March 19, 2020.⁷⁵ Therefore, a taxpayer with a deadline to file a petition beginning on March 19, 2020 would receive a postponement to file the petition until July 15, 2020. While this postponement is helpful, it fails to provide relief to taxpayers like Petitioner whose deadlines expired prior to March 19. Notice 2020-23 does not explain the government's decision to begin the discretionary section 7805A(a) postponement period on April 1.

IV. SECTION 7508A AFFORDS PETITIONER A 60-DAY EXTENSION TO FILE HER TAX COURT PETITION

A. Petitioner is a Qualified Taxpayer

Petitioner is a "qualified taxpayer" as defined in section 7508A(d)(2) because her principal place of residence is Trenton, New Jersey, a federally-declared disaster area. Trenton is also Petitioner's principal place of business, as she operates a hair-braiding business out of her home.⁷⁶ Thus, Petitioner is a qualified taxpayer under section 7508A(d)(2).

B. Petitioner's Postponement Period

As a qualified taxpayer, Petitioner is afforded a mandatory postponement period beginning "on the earliest incident date specified in the [Stafford Act] declaration to which the disaster area . . . relates" and ending on "the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified."⁷⁷ As discussed above, the Stafford Act provides for both emergency declarations and major disaster declarations. Both types of Stafford declarations were issued by the President in March of 2020 covering the State of New Jersey. The national emergency declaration issued on March 13 under the Stafford Act does not specify an incident date; the major disaster declaration for the State of New Jersey issued on March 25 specifies an incident period of "January 20 and continuing."⁷⁸

Under section 7508A(d), a Stafford Act "declaration" activates the automatic, mandatory postponement of the time-sensitive acts listed in subsection (a). While section 7508A(d) and section 165(i)(5) repeatedly refer to a "disaster" rather than an "emergency," the statutory definition of "disaster area" could potentially encompass an emergency declaration under the Stafford Act.⁷⁹ However, there is no conflict created with subsection (d) by the mere fact that two declarations exist. Certainly there is no indication that Congress intended a specific major disaster declaration such as DR-4488-NJ to have no effect, merely by virtue of a prior declaration that lacked an incident date or period. The Court need not decide how subsection (d) would apply if there were two declarations with different incident periods, because in this case the only declaration applicable to New Jersey that includes a specific date is the March 25 disaster declaration.

"Incident date" is not a defined term in the Stafford Act or in regulations under the Stafford Act. The regulations and FEMA guidance refer instead to an "incident period."⁸⁰ While there is a difference between the nomenclature of section 7508A(d)(1)(A), which refers to an "incident date," and the nomenclature used by FEMA, which refers to the relevant "incident period",⁸¹ that difference does not create an inconsistency. First, the structure of section 7508A(d)(1)(A) and of the FEMA declarations are parallel. Both articulate a beginning date of a defined period of time. Section 7508A(d)(1)(A) contemplates a period "beginning on the earliest incident date specified in the declaration to which the disaster area referred to . . . relates" and the FEMA disaster declarations contemplate a period beginning on a specified incident date. Read together, the term "incident date" as used in section 7508A(d) thus references the date specified by a federal disaster declaration as the first date of an "incident period." There is no reason to infer that the specified first date of an "incident period" is not an "incident date." Second, if the term incident date, as used in section 7508A(d)(1)(A), did not refer to a date specified in a disaster declaration as the first day of an incident period, then section 7508A(d) would be meaningless because there would be no "earliest incident date" to commence the extension period.

A second potential difference between Stafford Act declarations and section 7508A(d) is subsection (d)'s reference to "the latest incident date" specified in the declaration. As noted above, Stafford Act disaster declarations may not specify more than one date for a disaster; rather, the initial declaration often provides that an incident period is "continuing".⁸² However, this also is not a meaningful difference and does not present a textual conflict. Subsection (d) does not require that the earliest and latest specified dates be different dates. Nor is there any reason to infer such a requirement. If section 7508A(d) were read to require the specification of an end date, as well as a beginning date, the result would be indefinite extensions of numerous deadlines. Such an interpretation would be an unreasonable in light of FEMA's practice of declaring open-ended incident periods. It would also be inconsistent with the purposes of section 7508A(d), which, as set forth in the legislative history, is to provide certainty to taxpayers experiencing disasters by providing a minimum mandatory extension period of relief while waiting for the Secretary to determine whether to exercise his discretion to provide postponement under subsection (a), and if so, the period of postponement and the acts eligible to be postponed.

The earliest specified incident date for New Jersey's COVID-19 declaration is January 20, 2020. Because January 20, 2020 is the only incident date specified in the declaration, it is also "the latest incident date so specified." As a qualified taxpayer under DR-4488-NJ, Petitioner is entitled to a 60-day postponement period from January 20, 2020 to March 21, 2020.

C. Petitioner's Time to Petition the Court for Redetermination is Subject to the Postponement Period

As discussed above, subsection (d) of section 7508A does not identify the time-sensitive acts to which it applies; rather, it incorporates the acts referenced by section 7508A(a). The filing of a petition for redetermination of a deficiency is one of the acts listed in section 7508(a)(1), referenced by section 7508A(a)(1). Therefore, section 7508(d) provides Petitioner with an automatic 60-day postponement to file her petition with the Tax Court.

This interpretation of section 7508A(d) is consistent with the statutory text and also with Congressional intent as outlined in the House Report, Joint Committee Report, and the Floor Statement of Representative Rice. Subsection (d) does what its title suggests: it provides a "mandatory 60-day extension" to taxpayers affected by major disasters. Petitioner's case demonstrates the value of subsection (d) as a floor to provide some certainty to taxpayers in the initial two months of a disaster. The Secretary, perhaps appropriately, took a measured approach and incrementally expanded discretionary disaster relief in the spring of 2020 through a series of guidance documents. Ultimately, the Secretary chose not to provide relief under the discretionary provision of subsection (a) for time-sensitive acts due before April 1, 2020. Under subsection (d) the Secretary has no discretion; the extension period must be recognized with respect to all acts eligible for discretionary postponement. The mandatory postponement period of subsection (d) fills the gap in time between the date of a disaster incident meriting federal assistance and the start of discretionary tax relief.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court deny Respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Date: Nov. 19, 2020

By: CHRISTINE S. SPEIDEL
Villanova Federal Tax Clinic
299 N. Spring Mill Road
Villanova, PA 19085
(610) 519-4123
christine.speidel@law.villanova.edu
Tax Court Bar No. SC0808

LL.M. student Anna Gooch and law student Monika Chawla assisted in the drafting of this Supplemental Objection.