Trump Seeks En Banc Rehearing in Tax Returns Dispute

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; CHARLES PAUL RETTIG, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service; and JANET L. YELLEN, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury,
Defendants-Appellees,
DONALD J. TRUMP; DONALD J. TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST; DJT HOLDINGS LLC; DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER, LLC; DTTM OPERATIONS LLC;
DTTM OPERATIONS MANAGING MEMBER CORP.; LFB ACQUISITION LLC; LFB ACQUISITION MEMBER CORP.; LAMINGTON FARM CLUB, LLC,
Intervenors for Defendant-Appellants.

ORAL ARGUMENT HELD ON MARCH 24, 2022
DECISION ISSUED ON AUGUST 9, 2022

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT

On Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, No. 1:19-cv-1974-TNM
PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC

Patrick Strawbridge
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
Ten Post Office Square
8th Floor South PMB #706
Boston, MA 02109

William S. Consovoy
Thomas R. McCarthy
Cameron T. Norris
James P. McGlone
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700
Arlington, VA 22209
(703) 243-9423
cam@consovoymccarthy.com

Counsel for Appellants

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

Table of Authorities

Introduction & Rule 35 Statement

Background

Argument

Conclusion

Certificate of Compliance

Certificate of Service

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES*

Cases

Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)

Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542 (10th Cir. 1997)

Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019)

Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)

Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011)

Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 2013)*

In re Federal Bureau of Prisons' Execution Protocol Cases, 980 F.3d 123 (D.C. Cir. 2020)

Jewish War Veterans of the U.S. of Am., Inc. v. Gates, 506 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2007)

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)

Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1968)

Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 39 F.4th 774 (D.C. Cir. 2022)*

Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020)*

Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10 (D.C. Cir. 2021)

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000)

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)

Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961)

Statutes

26 U.S.C. §6103(f)(1)

Rules

Fed. R. App. P. 351

* Authorities Petitioners chiefly rely on are marked with asterisks.

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INTRODUCTION & RULE 35 STATEMENT

Rehearing is justified when “the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance” or “the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court.” Fed. R. App. P. 35. This case meets both standards.

Nobody believes that the Committee on Ways and Means requested six years' worth of tax information about President Trump and his businesses to determine if the IRS's Presidential Audit Program is adequately staffed or funded. The Committee's Chairman and members made clear — both before and after the request — that they wanted the President's tax returns so they could publicly expose them. The Treasury Department and the Office of Legal Counsel rejected the request in 2019 because that improper purpose was obvious from both the record and the blatant mismatch between the stated purpose and the documents requested. Since then, the Supreme Court and this Court have made clear in related litigation that congressional requests for a President's financial information are not “run-of-the-mill legislative effort[s]” but instead raise “weighty separation-of-powers concerns” that require a “'careful analysis'” with “'[s]everal special considerations.'” Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2034 (2020); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 39 F.4th 774, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2035).

Notwithstanding this clear instruction, the panel affirmed the dismissal of Intervenors' complaint at the pleading stage. The district court's decision, which applied a highly deferential standard, predated this Court's recent decision in Mazars. But the panel, purporting to apply Mazars' more robust scrutiny, nonetheless affirmed — meaning that in its view, Intervenors had not even plausibly alleged a violation of this heightened, far-less-deferential standard. In doing so, it made several errors.

First, the panel refused to consider any of the record evidence of the Committee's improper purpose — the very evidence that led Treasury and DOJ to reject the request in 2019. The panel held that it could consider only the purpose the Committee asserted in its request. This reduced the legitimate-legislative-purpose inquiry to a toothless magic-words test. It violated governing precedent authorizing a broader range of sources in evaluating legislative purpose. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 133 & n.33 (1959); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 410 (1961). And it ignored the Supreme Court's admonition that courts should not to “blind” themselves to “what all others can see and understand.” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2034 (cleaned up).

Second, the panel's application of Mazars was far too deferential to the Committee, relying on decisions involving ordinary subpoenas that the Supreme Court itself warned could not govern congressional requests to Presidents. Moreover, it is beyond obvious that the Committee does not need six years of detailed tax returns and audit files to determine if an IRS program is funded or staffed properly. Here, this Court's recent decision in Mazars presents a telling contrast. Despite a much longer Committee record supporting that subpoena's legislative purpose, the Court “substantially narrowed” the subpoena. Mazars, 39 F.4th at 806. That decision is irreconcilable with the panel's cursory analysis here — which one member acknowledged failed to give serious consideration to the institutional burdens that the request posed to the Executive's ongoing relationship with Congress. See Concur.Op.3-4.

Third, the panel violated precedent in rejecting Intervenors' facial challenge to 26 U.S.C. §6103(f)(1). That statute does not require requests for tax information to have a legitimate legislative purpose, and the fact that some requests might have one cannot save a statute that states an invalid rule on its face — no more than the fact that some people carrying a gun in a school zone crossed state lines could save the statute in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). The panel distinguished Lopez and other binding decisions based on a distinction between statutes that regulate individuals and statutes that regulate the government that finds no support in the caselaw or the principles underlying the limits on Congress's authority.

Review is of utmost importance. Highlighting the “potential for disruption” of the executive branch, the district court acknowledged that “[w]e are in uncharted territory.” JA222, 249. Indeed. The decision here will control future disputes between Congress and the Executive — including those of sitting Presidents — almost all of which arise in this circuit. The Court should grant the petition.

BACKGROUND

The Committee's purpose in requesting President Trump's tax returns has never been a secret; and it has nothing to do with professed concerns about funding or staffing issues at the IRS. Democrats made a national issue out of his tax returns in the 2016 election. And for the two years before he became Chairman, Ranking Member Neal never proclaimed a legislative purpose for seeking President Trump's tax returns. To the contrary, he and other Committee members openly stated that he wanted to disclose the tax returns to enable “the media to sift and sort” them and so the public could see “whether he uses tax shelters, loopholes, or other special-interest provisions to his advantage.” JA153-54 ¶¶37-41.

After Democrats took control of the House in 2019, Chairman Neal did not disavow his stated purpose. While “putting together the case” for obtaining President Trump's tax returns, he knew that Committee members' words could “become the basis of a long and arduous” litigation. He warned his Democratic colleagues not to “step on [their] tongue[s]” to avoid undermining their case. JA162 ¶87-88.

In April 2019, Chairman Neal formally requested the tax returns of President Trump and eight related entities, along with audit information and IRS administrative files, for tax years 2013 to 2018. He claimed he needed these materials to study “the extent to which the IRS audits and enforces the Federal tax laws against a President.” JA169-70 ¶¶123-24. Chairman Neal elsewhere explained that he had strategically “constructed” the best possible “case” after numerous meetings with House counsel to “prepare[ ]” him what to say so that it would “stand[ ] up” in court and “make sure we got the tax returns.” JA170-71 ¶¶127-28, 130. Yet throughout the 116th Congress, Chairman Neal and other Committee members reiterated their purpose of exposing President Trump's tax information to the public. JA174-81 ¶¶143-87.

The Committee's improper purpose was not lost on the executive branch. Treasury rejected the request as having illegitimate purposes, noting that it was “the culmination of a long-running, well-documented effort to expose the President's tax returns for the sake of exposure.” JA188 ¶217. Treasury highlighted the “widespread, contemporaneous acknowledgement by the Committee Chairman and other key Members that the actual objective is to use the IRS as a means to expose the tax returns of a political opponent.” JA188 ¶217. Treasury also noted the “objective” mismatch between the Committee's audit rationale and “the terms of [its] request.” JA188 ¶218.

Justice reached the same conclusion. In a June 2019 memorandum, the Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the request “represents the culmination of a sustained effort over more than two years to seek the public release of President Trump's tax returns.” JA54. OLC noted that, “throughout 2017 and 2018, Chairman Neal and other Members of Congress made clear their intent to acquire and release the President's tax returns. They offered many different justifications for such an action,” but never “oversight of 'the extent to which the IRS audits and enforces the Federal tax laws against a President.'” JA58. OLC found that “[n]o one could reasonably believe that the Committee seeks six years of President Trump's tax returns because of a newly discovered interest in legislating on the presidential-audit process.” JA63-64. OLC thus concluded that the Committee's purpose was not what Chairman Neal wrote in his request. See JA189 ¶¶19-20.

In July 2019, the Committee sued Treasury and other governmental defendants to enforce its request, and Intervenors joined the case as defendants. JA26-27. The case was stayed pending the resolution of Committee on Judiciary of United States House of Representatives v. McGahn, No. 19-5331, and remained stayed after President Biden took office while the new administration considered how to respond to the request. JA34, 37.

In July 2021, the Government reversed course. That day, it informed the district court (and Intervenors) that Chairman Neal had updated his request for President Trump's tax returns six weeks earlier and that the Government now intended to comply. Doc. 111. Intervenors immediately answered the Committee's original complaint and filed counterclaims and crossclaims against the Committee and Government. JA39-42.

The Committee and Government moved to dismiss Intervenors' claims. At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, counsel for the Committee and the Government “admit[ted]” that at least some statements outside the face of the request could be considered in determining whether the Committee had a valid legislative purpose. JA236 (citing Doc. 146 at 7, 13, 39). The district court recounted those statements and concluded that “Chairman Neal's statements are relevant” and “undermine the alleged purpose of studying [legislation].” JA236-37. Given the 12(b)(6) posture, Intervenors' allegations of an invalid purpose thus should have survived the motions to dismiss.

The district court, however, dismissed all of Intervenors' claims. The court concluded that the Committee “need only state a valid legislative purpose,” and thus ignored the “impressive” and “[t]roubling” evidence of an invalid purpose. JA238 (emphasis added). Moreover, because the Committee's request “implicates a former President” and “Congress and the current President stand united,” JA250, the district court declined to apply Mazars and instead evaluated the request under the more deferential standard of Nixon v. GSA.

A panel of this Court affirmed. The panel agreed with the district court that it was required to ignore all of Intervenors' allegations establishing an invalid purpose, and instead could only consider the purposes Congress identified in the request itself. Op.10. And although the panel purported to apply Mazars, not Nixon v. GSA, it did so in a highly deferential way — refusing to even narrow the request. The panel also rejected Intervenors' facial challenge to §6103(f). This petition follows.

ARGUMENT

I. The Court should rehear whether Intervenors plausibly alleged that the Committee's request for President Trump's tax returns lacks a legitimate legislative purpose.

On a 12(b)(6) motion, “the plaintiff enjoys the benefit of having all plausible allegations and reasonable inferences from those facts taken in favor of sustaining the complaint.” In re Federal Bureau of Prisons' Execution Protocol Cases, 980 F.3d 123, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Intervenors' allegations were not merely plausible — they tracked a conclusion that both Treasury and OLC reached in 2019 when first presented with the Committee's request. And their pleading contains numerous quotes from the Chairman, other Committee members, and Speaker Pelosi establishing an illegitimate purpose for the request. The panel deemed all of this legally irrelevant, claiming that any material beyond the face of the request was improper evidence of “motives.” Op.13. That approach violates precedent, including Mazars itself. The panel was not merely permitted to consider the Committee members' many contradictory statements; it was required to do so. Left uncorrected, the panel decision reduces Mazars to a magic-words test, where any request or subpoena will automatically be deemed constitutional so long as the Committee is not so foolish as to avow its improper purpose on the face of the request.

To begin, all congressional requests for information must have a legitimate legislative purpose. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031. Congress cannot make demands for information to “expose for the sake of exposure.” Id. at 2032 (quoting Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200. (1957)). The parties concede this point. Cmte.-Br.32-33; Gov't-Br.26.

Intervenors at least plausibly alleged that the Committee's purpose here was exposure, not studying legislation. They described the long campaign to obtain President Trump's tax returns, myriad statements from key decisionmakers confessing nonlegislative purposes, numerous admissions from the Chairman that his stated purpose was pretextual, the shifting explanations for the request, and the conclusions of inside and outside observers — including the United States itself — that “the Committee's stated purpose was pretextual and its actual purpose was simply to provide a means for public disclosure of the President's tax returns.” JA78.

If these allegations aren't enough, then nothing ever could be, absent a chairman foolishly stating an illegal purpose (and only an illegal purpose) in the request itself. The panel was wrong to “blind” itself to “what all others can see and understand.” Mazars, 140 S.Ct. at 2034 (cleaned up). Though the panel reasoned that it could not “delve deeper than this” because “[t]he courts do not probe the motives of individual legislators,” Op.13, there is a long record of courts going beyond the face of a congressional request to determine its purpose. Courts have always “scrutinized [the] record” — not just “the Committee's report,” but “the entire record.” Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 133 & n.33; see also Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (instructing courts to consider “several sources,” including statements of committee members and staff); Wilkinson, 365 U.S. at 410 (consulting “[a] number of . . . sources,” including statements of committee chair and staff). Even this Court in its initial Mazars opinion — a decision reversed for treating Congressional request too deferentially — went beyond the face of the memorandum supporting the request. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Chairman's statements in a letter). Even the Committee expressly agreed at argument below that courts could consider evidence beyond the request, Doc. 146 at 6-7, and OLC likewise acknowledges that “[i]f a committee's asserted purpose truly 'blinks reality,' . . . an executive agency need not credit that objective any more than a court would.” JA120.

The panel disagreed, declaring that any consideration of the record beyond the request itself would require inquiring into legislators' “motives.” Slip Op. 13. Not so. Longstanding precedent delineates an important distinction between motive and purpose. E.g., Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200. Motive is “why an individual Member sponsored or supported an [action],” while purpose is “what that [action] was designed to accomplish.” Jewish War Veterans of the U.S. of Am., Inc. v. Gates, 506 F. Supp. 2d 30, 60 (D.D.C. 2007). The distinction is “admittedly . . . fine,” but it “finds support in the case law and hence must be respected.” Id.; e.g., Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575-76 (2019) (courts must “scrutinize[ ]” the branch's “reasons” by examining “the record” and “viewing the evidence as a whole”). To gauge purpose, courts “must focus . . . on objectively discernible conduct or communication that is temporally connected to the challenged activity.” Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 560 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Mazars, 940 F.3d at 767-71 (Rao, J., dissenting).

The panel's refusal to consider any evidence beyond Committee's own carefully constructed statement is especially inappropriate in separation-of-powers cases like this one. The panel conceded that this case should be treated as a dispute between Congress and the Executive. See Op.14. In such cases, deferential presumptions have no place. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704-05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Supreme Court in Mazars chided the lower courts for “applying precedents that do not involve the President's papers” — including the very cases that the panel used here to ignore the extensive record undermining the Committee's asserted purpose. Compare, e.g., Mazars, 140 S.Ct. at 2034 (distinguishing Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)), with Op.10 (relying on Eastland). This Court should rehear this case and correct this error.

II. The Court should rehear whether the Committee's request for a former President's information survives Mazars' heightened scrutiny.

Unlike the district court, JA251, the panel (correctly) assumed it was bound by Mazars. Op.14. Mazars requires “a careful analysis” under which courts must acknowledge when a congressional request does “not represent a run-of-the-mill legislative effort but rather a clash between rival branches of government over records of intense political interest for all involved.” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2034-35. But despite the generous 12(b)(6) standard and the requirement of heightened scrutiny, the panel held that Intervenors didn't plausibly allege any violation of Mazars. This substantially dilutes the Mazars test and warrants rehearing.

First, Mazars required the panel to “carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his papers” and to reject requests “when other sources could provide Congress the information it needs.” Id. at 2035–36. Here, the question is whether the Committee needs six years of President Trump's detailed tax information to determine whether the IRS's Presidential Audit Program “is adequately resourced and sufficiently guarded from external pressures.” Op.19. But one does not determine if an executive-branch program is adequately funded by flyspecking six years of individual returns and audits. A good-faith request for legislative purposes would seek information from the IRS directly about budgeting, staffing, and the like. Nor would the returns themselves reveal any evidence of “external pressures” — a sincere request would seek testimony from IRS personnel on these matters. Although the Committee claimed that prior talks with the IRS were unsuccessful, it did not renew those efforts under the Biden administration before issuing its amended request in 2021. Nor has the Committee ever considered seeking other Presidents' returns — even though they were all subject to the same program and such a request would implicate lesser privacy interests (for those who already publicly released their returns). The panel asserted that only the returns of Presidents and Vice Presidents are relevant. Op.19. But Intervenors alleged that audits of Presidents are no different than any other audit, and that the pressure on IRS agents is comparable in audits of other powerful officials — such as the IRS Commissioner, for example. JA202 ¶279. The panel's silence on these points does not reflect heightened scrutiny.

Second, Mazars requires this Court to “insist on a [request] no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress's legislative objective.” 140 S.Ct. at 2036. On this point, the panel upheld a sweeping request for six years of data because “[t]he Chairman has stated that the value of requesting six years of information is the ability to compare one year with another.” Op.21. This again is far too deferential to the Committee. Tellingly, the panel cites only non–separation-of-powers cases, despite the Supreme Court's warning not to. See Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2032. The panel also refused to consider whether the Committee should have reduced the burden by guaranteeing confidentiality — even though Mazars itself recognized that solution in earlier interbranch clashes. Id. at 2030.

Third, “courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a [request] advances a valid legislative purpose.” Id. at 2036. But the panel refused to consider any of Intervenors' allegations (and supporting evidence) of improper purpose. The whole point of Mazars is to impose extra scrutiny of Congress's asserted purpose. Nor does the panel's reference to a handful of statements by President Trump about the audit process satisfy Mazars — especially since the Committee claims to be researching the sufficiency and funding of the audit process generally, not President Trump's concerns.

Fourth, the panel failed to “careful[ly] assess the burdens imposed on the President.” Id. at 2036. The institutional dynamics matter; congressional requests “stem from a rival political branch that has an ongoing relationship with the President and incentives to use subpoenas for institutional advantage.” Id. Those incentives do not disappear when a former President is targeted, as this Court recognizes. Mazars, 39 F.4th at 787 (quoting Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

The request here is designed to inflict maximum pain on the former President; it seeks reams of sensitive financial information protected by federal law, interferes with ongoing audits, and will disclose everything to the public. The panel dismissed this concern as an ordinary consequence of “the nature of the investigative and legislative processes.” Op.24. That reasoning treats this request like “a run-of-the-mill legislative effort,” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2034, instead of one that arose when the President was in office and serves as a warning to all future Presidents. Intervenors have at least plausibly alleged that the burden of these requests threatens the relationship between Congress and the President.

“[A] more searching inquiry into the burdens imposed by the Committee's request is warranted given the core constitutional principle at issue.” Concur.Op.5. In closely analogous circumstances, this Court substantially narrowed a sweeping subpoena for similar records issued by the same House. See Mazars, 39 F.4th at 799-806. It should grant rehearing to apply the same scrutiny here.

III. The Court should rehear Intervenors' facial challenge to 26 U.S.C. §6103(f)(1).

Section 6103(f) does not require congressional requests for tax return information to have a legitimate legislative purpose — a bedrock constitutional requirement. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031. Though there are where Congress issues §6103(f)(1) requests that happen to have a legitimate legislative purpose, that coincidence has nothing to do with the statute. Section 6103(f)(1) is unconstitutional because, in every application, it states an invalid rule of law.

Typically, a facial challenge fails if a reviewing court can imagine at least one application that would be constitutional. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). But there is an important exception — one that contests whether the statute states a valid rule in the first place. In these “'valid rule facial challenges,'” the alleged “constitutional violation inheres in the terms of the statute.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 698 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus, in Lopez, the challenged firearms statute was declared unconstitutional even though some defendants no doubt carried their weapons in interstate commerce. 514 U.S. at 551; accord United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000).

This Court has recognized this distinction. In Gordon v. Holder, the plaintiff argued that the PACT Act violated due process because it required sellers to collect taxes for other jurisdictions, without first requiring that the seller have “minimum contacts” with that jurisdiction. 721 F.3d 638, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Citing Salerno, the Government argued “that any facial challenge to the PACT Act must fail” because at least some sellers had minimum contacts with the jurisdiction. Id. at 654. This Court disagreed; a facial challenge is proper when statutes “omit constitutionally-required jurisdictional elements,” even though in some individual cases the missing element might be satisfied. Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613). Because the key limitation is missing from the text, “any legitimate application is pure happenstance” and cannot defeat a facial challenge. Id.

The panel distinguished Lopez, Morrison, and Gordon on one ground: those cases involved “statu[t]es criminalizing private conduct,” whereas §6103(f)(1) “does not penalize private conduct, it regulates how the government interacts with itself.” Op.27. Respectfully, that distinction is no distinction at all. The cases Intervenors rely on are federalism decisions concerning the limits on Congress's Article I authority, not applications of criminal law. Morrison, for example, invalidated a civil remedy. 529 U.S. at 601-02. None of those cases draw the distinction the panel relied on. And §6103(f)(1) clearly affects individual interests, allowing for otherwise highly confidential information belonging to individuals to be turned over to Congress. Rehearing is justified to resolve the panel's departure from Lopez, Morrison, and Gordon.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant panel rehearing or rehearing en banc.

Dated: August 18, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

Patrick Strawbridge
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
Ten Post Office Square
8th Floor South PMB #706
Boston, MA 02109

Thomas R. McCarthy
Cameron T. Norris
James P. McGlone
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste. 700
Arlington, VA 22209
(703) 243-9423
cam@consovoymccarthy.com

Counsel for Donald J. Trump, The Trump Organization, Inc., Trump Organization LLC, The Trump Corporation, DJT Holdings LLC, Trump Old Post Office LLC, and The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust