MAGISTRATE JUDGE RECOMMENDS CONFIRMATION OF SALE OF FORECLOSED PROPERTY.

[2] The first issue is whether confirmation of the present sale is necessary at all. The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2001 govern foreclosures of taxpayers' property. United States v. Stonehill, 83 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 1996). The relevant portions of that statute provide:

[3] In the circumstance of a private sale, the statute makes clear that the sale must be confirmed. There is no similar requirement in the instance of a public sale, however. The only condition imposed by the statute on a public sale is that it "shall be upon such terms and conditions as the court directs."

[4] In this case, on February 13, 2002, the district judge entered an Amended Order of Foreclosure and Decree of Sale (the "Order of Sale"). That order establishes a number of terms and conditions, two of which are relevant here. First, the Order of Sale sets a minimum sale price, as follows:

[5] In addition, the Order of Sale provides for confirmation of the sale, even though the sale is to be public and not private:

[6] There is no dispute that the conditions of the statute have been satisfied. The property was sold at public sale, conducted at the courthouse of El Paso County, Colorado, which is the county in which the property is located. Motion, Exh. A at ¶ 1. Nor is there any dispute that the conditions imposed by the court in the Order of Sale were complied with. Id. at ¶¶ 1-3. The price bid at the public sale was $113,000.00.

[7] Mr. Clinger, the sole objector to confirmation of the sale, opposes confirmation on the following ground:

[8] The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, on several occasions, has held that inadequacy of price alone is not sufficient grounds to refuse confirmation or to set aside a sale. For example, in Smith v. Juhan, 311 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1962), the circuit court stated:

[9] No credible evidence has been presented of an inadequate price being paid for this property, and certainly no evidence that shocks my conscience.

[10] The sale at issue here was the Marshal's third attempt to sell the property. Motion, at p.1 n.1. At the first public sale, on March 2, 1999, a William Simpson bid $150,000 for the property. United States' Supplemental Memorandum In Support of Motion to Confirm Sale (the "US Supp"), at p.4. Mr. Simpson did not tender the full purchase price within the time required, however, and the sale was not consummated. Id. A second sale occurred on March 9, 2001, at which the Town of Monument, Colorado, was the high bidder at $190,000.00. Id. at p.5. Again, the purchaser failed to tender the full purchase price within the time required. Id. Each of these purchase prices, although higher than the $113,000.00 bid here, are within the same general range and support its reasonableness.

[11] Moreover, I note that in the Order of Sale, the district judge set a minimum bid of $110,000.00. The United States argues that the minimum bid defines what was a reasonable price for this property. The minimum bid apparently was suggested by the United States, US Supp at pp.3-4, "after consulting with a Revenue Officer with approximately 25 years of experience, who had consulted with at least one local real estate office concerning the value of the property." Id. at p.7. The Revenue Officer estimated the value of the property at $150,000.00. Id. In addition to that, the El Paso County Assessor determined the value of the property in 1999 to be $157,406.00. Id. All of these facts further support the reasonableness of the price obtained here.

[12] Mr. Clinger relies on various materials in urging that the price is unconscionable. The first are materials purporting to show the value of a neighboring parcel of real property at $550,000.00. Opposition, at Exhs. C-D. No analysis of comparability is provided by any reliable source, however, and this evidence is completely unpersuasive.

[13] Mr. Clinger also points to a "Market Analysis" dated July 18, 2002, in which Craig Cuddy, who identifies himself as a real estate associate but not an appraiser, purports to value the property by comparison to three other properties. Supplemental to Defendant Clinger's Response to USA's Motion to Confirm Sale ("Clinger's First Supp."), at Exh.E Because Mr. Cuddy is not an appraiser, I place no reliance whatsoever on his valuation.

[14] Nor has Mr. Clinger made any claim or showing of an additional circumstance indicating unfairness, such as chilled bidding. See Smith, 311 F.2d at 672 (requiring a showing of inadequate price "coupled with slight additional circumstances indicating unfairness" to deny confirmation of or to set aside a judicial sale).

[15] Based upon these facts, I find that the price obtained at the public sale of the property is not grossly inadequate and does not shock my conscience. In addition, I find that there has been no showing of any additional circumstances indicating unfairness in the sale process. I find, further, that all of the conditions of sale imposed by law and by the Order of Sale have been satisfied. Accordingly,

[16] I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion be GRANTED and that the sale to Kalima Masse be CONFIRMED.

[17] I FURTHER RECOMMEND that the Order Confirming Sale and Directing Disbursement of Proceeds, attached as an appendix to the US Supp, be entered as an order of the court.

[18] FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties have 10 days after service of this recommendation to serve and file specific, written objections. A party's failure to serve and file specific, written objections waives de novo review of the recommendation by the district judge, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Makin v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996). A party's objections to this recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).

[19] Dated September 13, 2002.