Tax Court Says Deficiency Filing Deadline Is Jurisdictional

HALLMARK RESEARCH COLLECTIVE,
Petitioner
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent

United States Tax Court

Filed November 29, 2022

Christopher Reed Haunschild and James Brooks Mann, for petitioner.

Yervant P. Hagopian, Whitney N. Moore Warren, and Michael K. Park, for respondent.

OPINION

GUSTAFSON, Judge: Before the Court is “Petitioner's Motion to Vacate Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction”, in which Hallmark Research Collective (“Hallmark”) cites the Supreme Court's recent decision in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493 (2022), and asks us to vacate our order of dismissal because it wrongly treats the 90-day¹ deadline of section 6213(a)² as jurisdictional. The issue for decision is whether section 6213(a) limits the Tax Court's jurisdiction to deficiency petitions filed on or before that deadline. We hold that the timely filing of a deficiency petition is a jurisdictional requirement, and we will accordingly deny Hallmark's motion to vacate.

Background

Hallmark Research Collective

Hallmark is evidently a corporation with its principal place of business in California.³ Hallmark filed its 2015 return untimely, and it did not file its 2016 return. Pursuant to section 6020(b), the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) prepared for 2016 a substitute for return.

Pursuant to section 6212, the IRS sent a statutory notice of deficiency (“NOD”) to Hallmark's last known address, by certified mail, on June 3, 2021. The NOD determined deficiencies, additions to tax, and penalties against Hallmark for the years 2015 and 2016 and further advised Hallmark of the following:

If you disagree with the Notice of Deficiency

If you want to contest our final determination, you have 90 days from the date of this letter (150 days if addressed to you outside of the United States) to file a petition with the United States Tax Court.

How to file your petition

You can get a petition form and the rules for filing from the Tax Court's website at www.ustaxcourt.gov, by contacting the Office of the Clerk at the address below, or by calling 202-521-0700. Send your completed petition form, a copy of this letter, and copies of all statements and schedules you received with this letter to the address below.

United States Tax Court
400 Second Street, NW
Washington, DC 20217

. . . .

Time limits on filing a petition

The court can't consider your case if you file the petition late.

• A petition is considered timely filed if the Tax Court receives it within:

  • 90 days from the date this letter was mailed to you, or

  • 150 days from the date this letter was mailed to you if this letter is addressed to you outside of the United States.

• A petition is also generally considered timely if the United States Postal Service postmark date is within the 90 or 150-day period and the envelope containing the petition is properly addressed with the correct postage. The postmark rule doesn't apply if mailed from a foreign country.

  . . . .

• The time you have to file a petition with the Tax Court is set by law and can't be extended or suspended, even for reasonable cause. We can't change the allowable time for filing a petition with the Tax Court.

  . . . .

If we don't hear from you

If you . . . don't file a timely petition with the Tax Court, we'll assess and bill you for the deficiency (and applicable penalties and interest) after 90 days from the date of this letter (150 days if this letter is addressed to you outside the United States).

The NOD included on its front page the caption:

Last day to file petition with US tax court:

SEP 01 2021

Hallmark's petition

Using the “e-filing” procedure provided on the Tax Court's website, Hallmark electronically filed its petition for redetermination of the deficiencies at 9:36 p.m. on September 2, 2021 — one day late. In its petition Hallmark stated: “My CPA . . . contracted COVID/DELTA over the last 40 days and kindly requests additional time to respond.” For purposes of this Opinion, we assume that Hallmark was not to blame for the late filing and that equitable considerations, if taken into account, might excuse the untimeliness.

Order to Show Cause and the parties' responses

On November 17, 2021, we issued an Order to Show Cause (Doc. 6), wherein we

Hallmark filed its response, in which it requested that we defer ruling until the Supreme Court issued its decision in Boechler (in which the Court had granted a petition for a writ of certiorari). Hallmark argued that the deadline to file a deficiency petition in section 6213(a) “is functionally the same as the deadline[ ] in [section] 6330(d)(1) (at issue in Boechler . . . )”. Hallmark further argued that its “circumstances are compelling and an objective review would clearly result in equitable tolling of the filing deadline for the single day required.”

In his response the Commissioner asserted that “there is no cause as to why the Court should not, on its own motion, dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the petition was not timely filed.”

Order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction

We did not defer ruling. On April 1, 2022, we entered an Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 18), in which we followed longstanding precedent, held that the 90-day deadline of section 6213(a) for deficiency cases is jurisdictional, and dismissed Hallmark's deficiency petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner

On April 21, 2022, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Boechler, holding that “[s]ection 6330(d)(1)'s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection due process determination is an ordinary, nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling.” Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1501.

Hallmark's motion to vacate our order of dismissal

On May 2, 2022, Hallmark timely filed its motion to vacate (Doc. 21) and its memorandum of law in support thereof (Doc. 22). The motion principally argues that

the [Supreme] Court's reasoning in Boechler compels the conclusion that the 90-day filing deadline in section 6213(a) for deficiency cases is not jurisdictional, and thus is subject to equitable tolling. This Court should . . . apply[ ] the Boechler analysis to the filing deadline set forth in section 6213([a]), vacat[e] the Order, and request[ ] submissions from Petitioner and Respondent concerning the potential application of equitable tolling to the facts surrounding Petitioner's submission.

The Commissioner filed his response (Doc. 29) on June 22, 2022, and Hallmark filed its reply (Doc. 31) on July 15, 2022.

Discussion

As we and other courts have often held: “It is well settled that in order to maintain an action in this Court there must be [1] a valid notice of deficiency [issued by the Commissioner] and [2] a timely filed petition”. Abeles v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019, 1025 (1988).⁴ Hallmark argues that two jurisdictional prerequisites⁵ for a deficiency case are at least one too many. Hallmark contends we should not follow prior precedents holding the 90-day deadline to be jurisdictional, because “Boechler undercut the theory and reasoning underlying” those precedents, so that “[t]he cases are now clearly irreconcilable”, and that “efficient and harmonious judicial administration here would seem to require this Court to review the Supreme Court's Boechler opinion and issue a new precedent on the section 6213(a) filing deadline.” We now undertake such a review, and we conclude that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Boechler does not apply to the 90-day deadline of section 6213(a).

I. The Supreme Court has articulated a “clear statement” standard for discerning jurisdictional rules.

A. “Jurisdictional” rules are different from “claim-processing” rules.

Where a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction depends on a timely filing, “a litigant's failure to comply with the bar deprives a court of all authority to hear a case”. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 408–09 (2015). Courts must enforce the deadline sua sponte; the deadline cannot be tolled or waived; and there is no room for equitable exceptions to be made on account of the specific facts of a case. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Late-filed cases in such instances must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id.

Claim-processing rules, on the other hand, are those that “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times”, Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011), “but do not deprive a court of authority to hear a case”, Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. “Filing deadlines . . . are quintessential claim-processing rules”, Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435, and “ordinarily are not jurisdictional”, Sebelius v. Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 154 (2013). This is true “even when the time limit is important . . . and even when it is framed in mandatory terms”. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. Deadlines that are claim-processing rules are subject to the rebuttable presumption that they may be equitably tolled upon the particular facts of a case. Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990). But see id. at 96 (“Because the time limits imposed by Congress in a suit against the Government involve a waiver of sovereign immunity, it is evident that no more favorable tolling doctrine may be employed against the Government than is employed in suits between private litigants . . . . But the principles of equitable tolling described above do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect”). A litigant's failure to meet the deadline risks dismissal for failure to state a claim, see Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511–13, but the statute of limitations defense must be raised in the answer (or amended answer); otherwise, the issue is waived, and the case may proceed, see Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 459 (2004).

Perceiving a problem with “drive-by jurisdictional rulings”, see Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)), the Supreme Court has endeavored to “bring some discipline” to the use of the jurisdictional label, see Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435. The Court has instructed that “[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label 'jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455.

B. For a deadline to be considered jurisdictional, an analysis employing the principles of statutory construction must show that the rule “clearly states” it is jurisdictional.

“Only Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 452 (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 1). “Because Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2007). “Congress is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label to . . . a claim-processing rule”, Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435, and “it is no less 'jurisdictional' when Congress prohibits federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate 'class of cases' after a certain period has elapsed”, Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213.

However, Congress must “clearly state[ ]” that a filing deadline is jurisdictional; and absent such a clear statement, “courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16. “Congress must do something special, beyond setting an exception-free deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and so prohibit a court from tolling it.” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. Congress “need not use magic words”, Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436, and a statutory deadline may be jurisdictional even without the word “jurisdiction”, see, e.g., Bowles, 551 U.S. at 208–10 (holding 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) and (c) to be jurisdictional); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1997) (holding section 6511 to be jurisdictional); but the “traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences”, Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410.

“To determine whether Congress has made the necessary clear statement, we examine the 'text, context, and relevant historical treatment' of the provision at issue.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 246 (2016) (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010)). Statutes that meet this standard share several qualities: They speak of a court's power “in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction” of the court. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1982). They “define a federal court's jurisdiction . . ., address its authority to hear untimely suits, [and] cabin its usual equitable powers.” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 411. Their context, such as placement within their statutory regime, history of reenactments, or a long-standing judicial interpretation, reflects that Congress imbued a deadline with “jurisdictional consequences”. See, e.g., Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 410; Henderson, 562 U.S. at 439; Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209–13; Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394.

With these principles in mind, we now examine the 90-day deadline that Congress provided in section 6213(a).

II. Section 6213(a) clearly states that its 90-day deadline for filing a deficiency case is jurisdictional.

A. The Tax Court is the exclusive forum for deficiency cases.

1. Deficiency procedures defer assessment of income tax.

The Constitution confers on Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1913, authorizes Congress to impose a federal income tax without apportionment among the States. Congress promptly enacted the Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. Under our income tax system, taxpayers are required to file annual returns reporting their income and claiming entitlement to certain deductions and credits enumerated in the Code. §§ 6001, 6012. The IRS is authorized to examine those returns, § 7602, and to determine that additional tax may be owed, § 6212. Any additional tax determined to be owed that is greater than the amount shown by the taxpayer on his return is referred to as the “deficiency”. § 6211.

Before the IRS may forcibly collect the deficiency, it must first “assess” that deficiency⁶ by recording the liability on the Treasury's tax rolls, see § 6203, and then the IRS may make notice and demand, see § 6303, and collect by lien or levy, see §§ 6321, 6331. To protect the rights of taxpayers, Congress has established deficiency proceedings as a remedy for challenging the IRS's determination before the tax is collected. This pre-payment remedy is not required by the Constitution. Rather, the minimum requirements of constitutional due process are satisfied by the taxpayer's right to sue for a refund of overpaid tax after paying it. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595–99 (1931). But Congress created an additional remedy, in the predecessor to section 6213(a), by which a taxpayer may seek de novo pre-payment review of a determination by the IRS that he is liable for a deficiency in tax. Congress created the Tax Court's predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals, specifically to give taxpayers this opportunity. Deficiency jurisdiction is the principal purpose for this Court's existence.

Under the deficiency procedures that Congress established, specific steps must be taken before the IRS may assess a deficiency. See generally §§ 6211–6216. First, the IRS must notify the taxpayer that a deficiency has been determined against him for a particular year. § 6212. Second, the taxpayer has an opportunity to challenge the IRS's deficiency determination. In 1919 Congress authorized the Commissioner to establish rules and procedures for taxpayers to make an administrative appeal of a deficiency determination, see Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 228, 40 Stat. 1057, 1075; and in 1921 Congress established the administrative deficiency appeal procedures by statute, see Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 227, 266.

2. Pre-assessment judicial review of IRS deficiency determinations is assigned to the Tax Court.

Congress was soon unsatisfied with a lone administrative remedy for pre-payment review of deficiency determinations, and in the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336, it established the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) as an independent executive agency to be the unique forum for hearing and resolving deficiency disputes. In 1942 Congress renamed the BTA the Tax Court of the United States (“TCUS”), but Congress left the TCUS as an independent agency within the executive branch. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957. Then in 1969 Congress “established, under article I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax Court.” Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 (codified as amended at § 7441).⁷ Congress intentionally designed the Tax Court, like its predecessors the BTA and the TCUS, to be the exclusive forum for pre-payment review of deficiencies. The effect of a “decision of the Tax Court which has become final” is that the redetermined deficiency “shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice and demand”. § 6215(a).

B. Section 6213(a) is the jurisdictional grant to the Tax Court for deficiency cases.

The Tax Court may exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly provided by statute. Breman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66 (1976).

1. A general description of the Tax Court's jurisdiction appears in section 7442.

Congress has described the jurisdiction of the Tax Court in section 7442, which provides:

Sec. 7442. Jurisdiction.

The Tax Court and its divisions shall have such jurisdiction as is conferred on them by this title, by chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, by title II and title III of the Revenue Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 10-87), or by laws enacted subsequent to February 26, 1926.

A careful reading of section 7442 shows that it does not itself confer jurisdiction but states the truism that the Tax Court “shall have such jurisdiction” as is “conferred” by other provisions elsewhere in the Code and other revenue laws. In the absence of any other such provisions, section 7442 by itself would not vest the Tax Court with any jurisdiction; and in the absence of section 7442, the Tax Court would nonetheless possess the jurisdiction that had been “conferred on [it] by this title”.

This general jurisdictional description in section 7442 has its origin in an equivalent provision enacted in 1926. Section 1000 of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 105, added section 904 to the Revenue Act of 1924; and section 904 provided: “The Board and its divisions shall have such jurisdiction as is conferred on them by Title II [income tax] and Title III [estate tax] of the Revenue Act of 1926 or by subsequent laws.” When the BTA was first established, the Revenue Act of 1924 made no mention of the BTA's “jurisdiction”. Rather, section 900(e), 43 Stat. at 337, provided that “[t]he Board and its divisions shall hear and determine appeals filed under sections 274, 279, 308, and 312”, and section 274(a), 43 Stat. at 297 (the predecessor statute of section 6213(a)), provided that “[w]ithin 60 days after such notice [of deficiency] is mailed the taxpayer may file an appeal with the Board of Tax Appeals”. Two years later the general provision addressing “jurisdiction” was enacted as section 904 (now section 7442) and thus clarified what had already been true: Congress gave the BTA jurisdiction over deficiency cases not by announcing that the Board of Tax Appeals shall have “jurisdiction” over deficiency cases but simply by providing in section 274(a) that “the taxpayer may file” a deficiency case “with the Board of Tax Appeals” and providing in section 900(e) that “the Board . . . shall hear” those deficiency cases.

The current general description in section 7442 thus confirms for the Tax Court (as former section 904 confirmed for the BTA) that the Court does have “jurisdiction” as is elsewhere conferred by “this title” (Title 26 of the United States Code).

2. The particular grant of the Tax Court's deficiency jurisdiction appears in section 6213(a).

The particular provision in Title 26 that does confer jurisdiction over deficiency cases is section 6213(a).⁸ We print it here in its entirety (with bracketed numbering of the sentences inserted):

Sec. 6213. Restrictions applicable to deficiencies; petition to Tax Court

(a) Time for filing petition and restriction on assessment. — [1] Within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. [2] Except as otherwise provided in section 6851, 6852, or 6861 no assessment of a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A, or B, chapter 41, 42, 43, or 44 and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90-day or 150-day period, as the case may be, nor, if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. [3] Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a), the making of such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court, including the Tax Court, and a refund may be ordered by such court of any amount collected within the period during which the Secretary is prohibited from collecting by levy or through a proceeding in court under the provisions of this subsection. [4] The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or order any refund under this subsection unless a timely petition for a redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then only in respect of the deficiency that is the subject of such petition. [5] Any petition filed with the Tax Court on or before the last date specified for filing such petition by the Secretary in the notice of deficiency shall be treated as timely filed. [Emphasis added.]

Section 6213 is not a court-promulgated rule;⁹ rather, it is Congress's mandate of the Tax Court's deficiency authority and of its place within the federal tax system,¹⁰ and we must follow its directive. Breman, 66 T.C. at 66. Therefore, we “attempt to ascertain Congress' intent regarding the particular type of review at issue in this case”, Henderson, 562 U.S. at 437–38; and to do so we first examine the text of section 6213(a).

C. The placement and context of the 90-day deadline in section 6213(a) show it is jurisdictional.

1. Section 6213(a) states two prerequisites for a deficiency case.

Section 6213(a) authorizes the taxpayer to postpone the IRS's assessment of a deficiency it has determined by filing a deficiency petition in the Tax Court within the 90-day period, and it thereby gives the Tax Court jurisdiction to adjudicate that petition. By the first sentence of section 6213(a), Congress created a class of cases — deficiency cases — and specified the time period within which to file them. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 212–13 (“Because Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.”). No court has ever questioned whether the Tax Court has deficiency jurisdiction, and no court has ever held that the basis for that jurisdiction is any statute other than section 6213(a).

As we stated above, the prerequisites for a Tax Court deficiency case are (1) a valid notice of deficiency issued by the Commissioner and (2) a petition timely filed by the taxpayer. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Each of these prerequisites has a clear basis in the statutory text, and as we will show, both are jurisdictional.

a. The IRS must issue a valid notice of deficiency.

Under section 6213(a), a deficiency petition may be filed only “after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed”. According to section 6212, such a notice (1) must determine a deficiency, (2) must be sent by certified or registered mail, and (3) must be sent to the taxpayer's last-known address.

The notice of deficiency is known as the “ticket” to Tax Court. A defect in its fulfillment of those requirements of section 6212 may cause a misfire in the deficiency procedure and may deprive us of authority to hear a deficiency case. See, e.g., Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'g 81 T.C. 855 (1983). The requirements of section 6212 that define an NOD are essential to the Tax Court's authority over a deficiency case because they are incorporated by reference into section 6213(a).

In this case there is no dispute about the first of the two prerequisites of section 6213(a) — the validity of the NOD that the IRS issued to Hallmark. However, we pause to note that the unanimously acknowledged jurisdictional necessity of the issuance of the NOD arises from section 6213(a) — the same statute that (we hold here) makes jurisdiction also depend on a timely petition. If a taxpayer files a petition in the Tax Court attempting to dispute the existence of a deficiency before the IRS has issued an NOD, then the petition will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has so held. See Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 165 n.4 (1976) (“A deficiency notice is of import primarily because it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a taxpayer's suit in the Tax Court for redetermination of his tax liability.” (Emphasis added.)).¹¹ Or, as the Tax Court put it: “It is elemental that the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction where the Commissioner has not determined a deficiency and a statutory notice of deficiency has not been sent to the taxpayer-petitioner.” Johnston v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 792, 793–94 (1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1970). But this “elemental” proposition is based on the jurisdictional character of the first sentence of section 6213(a). The requirement of a valid NOD and the 90-day deadline are inseparably linked in that sentence. If, as Hallmark contends, the 90-day deadline were not jurisdictional, then we do not see how the requirement of a valid NOD could (as the Supreme Court has held) be jurisdictional. Rather, both prerequisites would then have to be treated as mere claim-processing rules, which might be waived and which, if invoked, would result in dismissal not for lack of jurisdiction but for failure to state a claim — i.e., a merits determination. But that is a thought experiment. No court has ever denied (and Hallmark does not dispute) that the Tax Court's jurisdiction over a deficiency case depends on the issuance of the NOD.

b. The taxpayer must file a timely petition.

Section 6213(a) creates a window of opportunity for the taxpayer: “Within 90 days . . . the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.” Under the plain meaning of this provision, the grant to the taxpayer of the right to file a deficiency petition is constrained by the time in which to do so, and only a petition meeting that deadline can be said (in the words of Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455) to “fall[ ] within . . . [the Tax C]ourt's adjudicatory authority”.

2. The 90-day deadline is embedded in the jurisdictional grant in sentence 1.

The 90-day deadline is imposed in the jurisdictional statute, section 6213(a). Admittedly, a requirement “does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions”. Auburn, 568 U.S. at 155. On the other hand, “Congress's separation of a filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant often indicates that the deadline is not jurisdictional”, Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 403; whereas the 90-day deadline at issue here is not just “in a section of” the jurisdictional statute but is in the same sentence as, and is embedded in, the jurisdictional grant: “Within 90 days . . . the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.” We therefore construe the placement of the deadline in the jurisdictional statute as some indication that the 90-day deadline may be jurisdictional, and we continue our analysis.

3. The injunction provision in sentence 4 of section 6213(a) suggests that “jurisdiction” depends on timeliness.

Section 6213(a) must be construed as a whole,¹² and sentence 4 clarifies that deficiency “jurisdiction” (conferred in sentence 1) depends on a petition's timeliness, and implies the jurisdictional character of the deadline provided in sentence 1. Cf. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393–94 (“The provision granting district courts jurisdiction under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–5(e) and (f), [unlike section 6213(a),] does not limit jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a timely filing with the EEOC. It contains no reference to the timely-filing requirement. The provision specifying the time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts” (footnote omitted)). The only mention of “jurisdiction” in subsection (a) itself is that fourth sentence, which makes provision as to when the Tax Court has “jurisdiction to enjoin . . . or order any refund”. This statement indirectly indicates that deficiency jurisdiction depends on a timely petition by precluding injunction or refund “unless a timely petition for a redetermination of the deficiency has been filed and then only in respect of the deficiency that is the subject of such petition”. That is, the statute says there may be supplemental injunction or refund “jurisdiction” where a deficiency petition is before the Court, but only if the petition was “timely”. Section 6213(a) therefore speaks to both the petition's timeliness and the Tax Court's injunctive power. Cf Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 411 (“[Title 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)] does not define a federal court's jurisdiction over tort claims generally, address its authority to hear untimely suits, or in any way cabin its usual equitable powers”).

If timeliness were a jurisdictional prerequisite for the supplemental injunction or refund but not for the predicate deficiency case, then an oddity might result: Where a deficiency case was filed untimely, the Court might nonetheless have deficiency jurisdiction via equitable tolling, but by the statute it could not have jurisdiction over any related injunction or refund claim. The traditional tools of statutory construction encourage us to view the statutory text as a whole and to prefer to avoid this anomaly by recognizing “timely petition” to be a jurisdictional prerequisite for both the injunction power and the underlying deficiency case.

It must be borne in mind, however, that this observation is analogous to one that did not carry the day in Boechler, where the Commissioner had argued that “[i]t would be strange . . . to make the deadline a jurisdictional requirement for a particular remedy (an injunction) [i.e., enjoining a lien or levy], but not for the underlying merits proceeding itself [there, a collection due process hearing under section 6330(d)(1); here, a deficiency case under section 6213(a)].” Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1499. The Supreme Court held, however, that this potential anomaly “might strengthen the Commissioner's argument that his interpretation is superior” but held that an interpretation that a timely filing requirement is jurisdictional “must be not only better, but also clear”. Id. Consequently, at this point in the analysis we posit simply that the explicit “jurisdiction” provision in the fourth sentence of section 6213(a) that invokes the time limit of the first sentence “strengthen[s]” (but does not clinch) the argument that the 90-day deadline of the first sentence is jurisdictional.

4. Congress's amendments adjusting the deadline show that the deadline is fixed.

From time to time, Congress has marginally extended the deadline of section 6213(a) to accommodate a variety of potentially sympathetic situations. In 1926 Congress provided that if the deadline (then the 60th day) fell on a Sunday (as it had in Appeal of Satovsky, 1 B.T.A. 22, 24 (1924)), then that Sunday would not count as the 60th day, because Sunday was not a business day and papers could not be filed.¹³ In 1934 Congress extended the deadline to 90 days and excluded any holiday as the 90th day.¹⁴ In 1942 Congress extended the deadline to 150 days for persons abroad.¹⁵ In 1945 Congress excluded Saturday as the 90th day.¹⁶ And most recently, in 1998, in order to help prevent taxpayers from miscalculating the 90-day deadline, Congress passed a provision (not codified in 26 U.S.C.) mandating that the Commissioner include on the notice of deficiency a statement of the last date to file a petition and then made a corresponding amendment to section 6213(a) making that stated date a safe harbor.¹⁷ Each of these modifications to the deadline for filing a deficiency petition was made to address a scenario that the Tax Court could have addressed with equitable tolling if it had such power. But Congress recognized that the Tax Court does not have the power to extend the jurisdictional deadline imposed by section 6213. Thus, Congress, in the course of its amendments, has treated the deadline of section 6213(a) (and its predecessor statutes) as a jurisdictional deadline that the Tax Court cannot alter or toll.

D. Section 7459(d) confirms the jurisdictional nature of the 90-day deadline of section 6213(a).

1. Section 7459(d) provides a general rule that dismissal of a deficiency case sustains the IRS's deficiency determination.

The Code indicates that when the Tax Court dismisses an untimely petition, it does so “for lack of jurisdiction”. Section 7459(d) provides as follows:

(d) Effect of decision dismissing petition. — If a petition for a redetermination of a deficiency has been filed by the taxpayer, a decision of the Tax Court dismissing the proceeding shall be considered as its decision that the deficiency is the amount determined by the Secretary. An order specifying such amount shall be entered in the records of the Tax Court unless the Tax Court cannot determine such amount from the record in the proceeding, or unless the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.]

This statute thus addresses situations where (1) there has been a “deficiency . . . determined by the Secretary”; (2) there has been a “petition . . . filed by the taxpayer” in the Tax Court; and (3) the “amount” of the deficiency is “determine[able] . . . from the record”. When those conditions are met and a deficiency petition is dismissed, the statute provides that some such cases are thereby resolved on their merits and some are not. The general rule of section 7459(d) is that dismissal of a deficiency petition is the functional equivalent of a merits decision sustaining the determination of the deficiency; consequently, the deficiency “shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice and demand”. See § 6215(a). This general rule precludes a taxpayer from using a deficiency case to bar indefinitely the assessment of tax. When he files his petition, he does halt the assessment process until the Tax Court enters its decision; but he cannot then contrive to have his case dismissed (whether by agreement, or for failure to prosecute, or for any other reason), thereby forestalling assessment by keeping the Tax Court from entering decision. Rather, under section 7459(d), dismissal will generally be tantamount to the taxpayer's losing on the merits, and an adverse decision will be entered.

2. Section 7459(d) provides an exception, even though the IRS determined a deficiency and the taxpayer filed a petition, when a dismissal is “for lack of jurisdiction”.

Section 7459(d) makes specific an exception for circumstances where “the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction”. We stress the truism that this exception can apply only if the general rule of section 7459(d) would otherwise apply — that is, only where the IRS has determined a deficiency and where the taxpayer has filed a petition. The general rule of section 7459(d) could not apply (and decision would not be entered) if there is no “deficiency . . . determined by the Secretary”, or if there is no “petition . . . filed by the taxpayer”. The exception in section 7459(d) therefore makes provision for a dismissal without adverse decision in the circumstance where there has been a notice of deficiency issued by the IRS and there has been a taxpayer-filed petition but there is nonetheless a “lack of jurisdiction”. This prompts the question of what sort of “jurisdictional” defect might be possible where there was a deficiency determination and a filed petition.

The easy answer to the question is that jurisdiction might be lacking (and the Court should dismiss without entering decision) either when the notice of deficiency is defective under section 6212 or when the petition is untimely. The jurisprudence of the Tax Court (and its predecessors) has long held that either of those two defects in compliance with section 6213(a) calls for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without a decision as to the amount of the deficiency.

One who insists that section 6213(a) does not state “jurisdictional” prerequisites must conclude that neither invalidity of the notice nor untimeliness of the petition could cause “lack of jurisdiction” over a deficiency case, and he must then explain what “jurisdictional” circumstances Congress meant to except when it provided in section 7459(d) that there can be “lack of jurisdiction” even where there has been a deficiency determination and the filing of a petition. This non-jurisdictional reading of section 6213(a) and its prerequisites is untenable for two reasons that we now discuss.

3. Non-jurisdictional dismissals of cases with untimely petitions would produce incongruous results.

When a deficiency case is dismissed because it is untimely under the first sentence of section 6213(a) or its predecessor statutes, the unvarying practice of the Tax Court and its predecessors for almost 100 years has been to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and therefore (consistent with section 7459(d) and its predecessor statutes) not to enter decision as to an amount of a deficiency. This dismissal leaves the IRS free to assess the deficiency (because no timely petition was filed to halt assessment pursuant to the second sentence of section 6213(a) and its predecessor statutes); but because there has been no adjudication of the liability that could give rise to res judicata, this dismissal also leaves the taxpayer free to pay the tax and then pursue his refund remedies.

If the jurisprudence had been wrong, if the 90-day deadline were a claim-processing rule, and if the dismissal of an untimely petition were not jurisdictional but rather “for failure to state a claim”,¹⁸ then section 7459(d) would call for a different treatment. It would call for dismissal of the untimely petition with an order “that the deficiency is the amount determined” in the NOD. This surprising outcome counsels against the non-jurisdictional construction of section 6213(a) not because it provokes sympathy for a taxpayer¹⁹ for whom this would be an unfavorable result but because it puts section 6213(a) and section 7459(d) at odds with each other and with the manifest purpose of the statutory regime.

Rightly construed, the two statutes work harmoniously in tandem. Section 6213(a) gives the taxpayer the unilateral power, merely by filing a timely petition, to halt the deficiency assessment process until the Tax Court enters decision; and section 7459(d) assures that the taxpayer cannot then avoid the conclusion of that deficiency process by contriving a dismissal of his case before the Tax Court does so. Section 7459(d) prevents that abuse by requiring that the Tax Court will enter decision in every case in which it has been given the power to do so — but not in cases (such as those with untimely petitions) as to which Congress expressly withheld that power from the Tax Court. A non-jurisdictional reading of section 6213(a) might allow equitable tolling, but it would, in conjunction with the operation of section 7459(d), require the Tax Court to exercise power over untimely cases by entering decisions sustaining the deficiencies determined in the NOD. But whatever “90 days” means in section 6213(a) (i.e., whether a literal 90 days, or a 90 days plus equitable tolling where applicable), it certainly means that the Tax Court cannot redetermine the deficiency where the petition was not filed “[w]ithin 90 days”; yet Hallmark's non-jurisdictional construction of section 6213(a) would have us do just that.

It is no answer to this anomaly to point out (as Hallmark does) that “if this unfortunate res judicata result were to happen, it would be a matter for Congress to consider altering by legislation”. It is certainly correct that courts must not choose an interpretation because it brings about a desired outcome, and it is true that defects in a statute are for Congress to fix, not the courts. But choosing desired outcomes is not the same thing as following the principles of statutory construction that counsel against choosing an interpretation that creates a conflict in the legislative regime (and that therefore would require Congress to then address the conflict by corrective legislation). See USA Gymnastics v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 27 F.4th 499, 516 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he harmonious-reading canon [instructs that] '[t]he provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible'” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 180 (2012))).

This consequence of Hallmark's position — requiring the Tax Court to enter decision where Congress plainly withheld power to do so — demonstrates the error of that position and the distortions that would result from adopting it.

4. Applying section 7459(d) only to dismissals other than those called for by section 6213(a) would contradict the actual history and intent of section 7459(d).

Since Hallmark argues that untimely petitions are not dismissed “for lack of jurisdiction” for purposes of section 7459(d), Hallmark must posit the petitions that are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Hallmark points to five situations (which it states concisely and on which we comment in footnotes) in which “a petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because [1] the notice of deficiency was invalid because not sent to the taxpayer's last known address[,][²⁰] [2] the petition is barred by the automatic stay in bankruptcy,[²¹] [3] a corporation lacks capacity to file the petition at the time[,][²²] [4] the filing fee has not been paid[,][²³] and [5] the taxes have been paid[²⁴] before the notice of deficiency was issued.” Hallmark's list does not account for section 7459(d) nor explain the actual history of its adoption. To make Hallmark's point (that the “lack of jurisdiction” exception in section 7459(d) addresses defects other than those in section 6213(a)), it is thus necessary to show that Congress added the exception not to address circumstances of invalid NODs or untimely petitions (as in section 6213(a)) but instead to address other jurisdictional circumstances Hallmark has identified. Such a showing cannot be made.

Hallmark is correct that the “lack of jurisdiction” provision now in section 7459(d) was added by section 601 of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. at 871, and that “[t]he legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1928 contains no discussion of the reason for the addition”. We have found no congressional report explaining the addition, but it is not difficult to reconstruct the relevant history. In 1924 the BTA began resolving cases, and it construed its deficiency statute — “Within 60 days after such notice [of deficiency] is mailed the taxpayer may file an appeal with the Board of Tax Appeals”, section 274(a) — to require dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, of an untimely petition:

[I]nasmuch as the Revenue Act of 1924 contains no indication that Congress had any intention of permitting any extension of the 60 days within which to file an appeal, this Board is without power to grant an extension of the time. The language of the Act is inflexible and upon it depends the jurisdiction of the Board.

Satovsky, 1 B.T.A. at 24. The point here is not that the BTA's opinion was correct (we believe it was) but simply that this was the announced view of the BTA. That view was announced repeatedly over the ensuing years in opinions, see infra Appendix, and also in orders of dismissal:

Starting with the first volume, the United States Board of Tax Appeals Reports included at the back an appendix listing “Appeals Dismissed or Otherwise Disposed of”, in which the first category was cases dismissed for “Want of Jurisdiction”. Four jurisdictional subcategories were listed: “(A) Appeals Not Based Upon Statutory Determination by Commissioner”, “(B) Appeals Not Filed Within Statutory Period”, “(C) Appeals Involving Taxes Paid”, and “(D) Appeals Involving Taxes Not Within Jurisdiction”.²⁵ That is, from the very beginning, the BTA dismissed for lack of “jurisdiction” cases that lacked a valid NOD (its subcategories (A) and (C)) or lacked a timely petition (its subcategory (B)). Beginning with 4 B.T.A., an additional jurisdictional subcategory was added: “Appeals Dismissed under Section 282(a), Revenue Act of 1926” (a bankruptcy provision). That was the BTA's situation in 1926 when Congress added to the Revenue Act of 1924 the first predecessor of section 7459(d) as then-section 906(c), see Revenue Act of 1926, § 1000, 44 Stat. at 107, which provided:

(c) If a petition for a redetermination of a deficiency has been filed by the taxpayer, a decision of the Board dismissing the proceeding shall, for the purposes of this title and of the Revenue Act of 1926, be considered as its decision that the deficiency is the amount determined by the Commissioner. An order specifying such amount shall be entered in the records of the Board unless the Board can not determine such amount from the pleadings.

This provision required merits determinations for dismissals (and did not include the exception “or unless the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction”). As we would apply section 7459(d) today, the BTA applied section 906(c) after its initial enactment, as illustrated in Appeal of Pennock, 4 B.T.A. 1271, 1271 (1926), where no jurisdictional defect was alleged: “In view of the lack of evidence to support the petitioner's allegations, we must dismiss the appeal under the provisions of section 906(c) of the Revenue Act of 1924, as amended by section 1000 of the Revenue Act of 1926.” Presumably, the “decision” document in Pennock sustained the amount set out in the notice of deficiency.

However, a wrinkle arising from section 906(c) had appeared in Appeal of United Paper Co., 4 B.T.A. 257 (1926), in which the taxpayer had filed before 1926 an untimely petition that had not yet been dismissed at the time section 906(c) was enacted. The taxpayer cited section 906(c) to argue that, even if its not-yet-dismissed petition was untimely and must now be dismissed, “the Board must, under section 906(c) . . ., enter an order specifying the deficiency to be the amount determined by the Commissioner.” Id. at 258. United Paper was therefore an occasion for the BTA to remark on the form that dismissals take, and on the distinction that ought to be made between dismissals where an amount of deficiency should or should not be stated:

The petition not having been filed within the time prescribed by subdivision (a) of section 274 of the Revenue Act of 1924, it seems clear that there has been no appeal, taken under that section. At the time the petition was filed the Board had no jurisdiction to hear and determine any issue, and without such jurisdiction the filing of the petition can not constitute an appeal to the Board. An act has been performed which has no validity or significance.

. . . .

. . . Necessarily the Board has the power to determine whether jurisdiction exists and, if not, to make an appropriate record of its determination. This has customarily taken the form of an order. While in form a dismissal, the order is in effect a determination that no appeal has been taken, and there can be no jurisdiction even to dismiss the appeal in the sense in which dismissal is used in the statute [i.e., in section 906(c), now section 7459(d)]. In those cases where the Board determines that it has no jurisdiction of the appeal, it does not provide in its order that the deficiency is the amount determined by the Commissioner.

United Paper, 4 B.T.A. at 258 (emphasis added). That is, notwithstanding section 906(c), the BTA continued to follow its practice as to untimely petitions — dismissing them for lack of jurisdiction and without a statement of a deficiency amount — though that practice was not explicitly warranted in section 906(c) as originally enacted.

In conformity with the BTA's practice described in United Paper, Congress amended the statute in 1928 by adding to section 906(c) (now section 7459(d)) the now-familiar phrase:

(c) If a petition for a redetermination of a deficiency has been filed by the taxpayer, a decision of the Board dismissing the proceeding shall be considered as its decision that the deficiency is the amount determined by the Commissioner. An order specifying such amount shall be entered in the records of the Board unless the Board can not determine such amount from the record in the proceeding, or unless the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction.

Revenue Act of 1928, § 601, 45 Stat. at 871–72 (emphasis added). To construe the phrase “for lack of jurisdiction”, we need to know: What “jurisdiction[al]” circumstances did Congress address in making this amendment in 1928? The obvious answer is that Congress addressed the very circumstance that the BTA had described in United Paper — i.e., “the Board determines that it has no jurisdiction” because “[t]he petition [was] not . . . filed within the time prescribed”. We find no BTA opinion discussing the issue of sustaining a deficiency in a jurisdictional dismissal in connection with any jurisdictional issue other than the untimeliness of a petition (as in United Paper). With reasonable confidence we also impute to Congress the knowledge that, as the BTA had reported since 1924, it was dismissing for “want of jurisdiction” where there was no valid NOD. We see no reason to suppose that Congress ignored the actual activity of the BTA, left unsolved the timeliness-related conundrum described in United Paper, and instead amended the statute to address as-yet-unrealized difficulties in future cases that might involve lack of corporate capacity. We do see, in the BTA's appendices, dismissals for lack of jurisdiction because of pending bankruptcies and because taxes not assigned to the BTA were petitioned, and those dismissals, too, would fall within the “lack of jurisdiction” exception of section 906(c). That these, too, involve “lack of jurisdiction” does not at all undermine the obvious congressional intent to address, as cases involving “lack of jurisdiction”, those that were being dismissed because they lacked the prerequisites of section 274(c) (now section 6213(a)), i.e., a valid NOD and — as in United Paper — a timely petition.

Section 906(c) was reenacted in 1939, 1954, and 1986. Congress took this repeated action against the backdrop of caselaw uniformly interpreting the deadline to file a deficiency petition to be jurisdictional, as we now show.

E. The historical treatment of section 6213 by Congress and the circuit courts of appeals further indicates that the deadline for filing a deficiency case is jurisdictional.

According to the Supreme Court, “[w]hen 'a long line of this Court's decisions left undisturbed by Congress,' . . . has treated a similar requirement as 'jurisdictional,' we will presume that Congress intended to follow that course.” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 82 (2009)). This statement describes the traditional tool of statutory construction known as the “prior-construction canon.”²⁶ If a statute is reenacted using words or phrases that have already received authoritative construction by the highest court in a jurisdiction, or have been uniformly construed by inferior courts or the responsible agency, then the later version of that statute preserving the wording is presumed to carry forward that interpretation, and they are to be understood according to that construction. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (citing an “unwavering line of administrative and judicial interpretation” that included no Supreme Court opinions, and holding, “[w]hen administrative and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as well”); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948) (“In adopting the language used in the earlier act, Congress 'must be considered to have adopted also the construction given by this Court to such language, and made it part of the enactment'” (quoting Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 153 (1924))).

Over nearly a hundred years of reenactments and amendments of section 6213(a), Congress has left substantially unchanged the wording of its jurisdictional grant, and Congress's additions to section 6213(a) have clarified that its deadline is jurisdictional. The deadline to file a deficiency case has been uniformly construed as jurisdictional not only by the Tax Court and its predecessors but also by the circuit courts of appeals. The appendix attached to this Opinion includes a chronological listing of each enactment, reenactment, and amendment, relevant legislative history, and citations of caselaw, in order to demonstrate the volume of uniform, uncontradicted authority. We begin at the origin of deficiency litigation in the BTA.

1. The Revenue Act of 1924

The predecessor to section 6213 is section 274 of the Revenue Act of 1924, § 274, 43 Stat. at 297, which provided:

Sec. 274. (a) If, in the case of any taxpayer, the Commissioner determines that there is a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this title [i.e., Title II. — Income Tax], the taxpayer, except as provided in subdivision (d) [regarding jeopardy assessment and collection], shall be notified of such deficiency by registered mail, but such deficiency shall be assessed only as hereinafter provided. Within 60 days after such notice is mailed the taxpayer may file an appeal with the Board of Tax Appeals established by section 900.

. . . .

(c) If the taxpayer does not file an appeal with the Board within the time prescribed in subdivision (a) of this section [i.e., 60 days], the deficiency of which the taxpayer has been notified shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the collector.

(Emphasis added.) Thereafter the inaugural BTA decisions interpreted this provision as requiring a taxpayer to timely file a petition in order to confer upon the BTA jurisdiction over that case. See Satovsky, 1 B.T.A. at 24 (“[W]e are of the opinion that, inasmuch as the Revenue Act of 1924 contains no indication that Congress had any intention of permitting any extension of the 60 days within which to file an appeal, this Board is without power to grant an extension of the time. The language of the Act is inflexible and upon it depends the jurisdiction of the Board” (emphasis added)); see also Appeal of Hatch & Bailey Co., 1 B.T.A. 25, 26 (1924); Appeal of William Frantze & Co., 1 B.T.A. 26 (1924); Appeal of Hurst, Anthony & Watkins, 1 B.T.A. 26, 27 (1924); Appeal of Strutwear Knitting Co., 1 B.T.A. 41, 41 (1924); Appeal of B.B. Davis & Co., 1 B.T.A. 587, 587 (1925); Appeal of Matteson Co., 1 B.T.A. 905, 905–06 (1925); Appeal of Eastman Gardiner Naval Stores Co., 4 B.T.A. 242, 245 (1926).

2. The Revenue Act of 1926

Against the backdrop of that caselaw, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1926, § 274(c), 44 Stat. at 55–56, which amended section 274 by adding “(not counting Sunday as the sixtieth day)”, thereby giving taxpayers marginal protection at the deadline by exempting Sunday from being the final day. This amendment shows Congress's intention that the expiration of the deadline to file a deficiency petition continue to be significant, because it left unchanged subsection (c), providing that “[i]f the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Board within the time prescribed in subdivision (a) of this section [i.e., 60 days], the deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, shall be assessed”.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was the first circuit court of appeals to decide whether the deadline to file a deficiency case is jurisdictional. In Lewis-Hall Iron Works v. Blair, 23 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592, the D.C. Circuit held:

[T]he Board's decision dismissing the petition was correct, for the requirement that such petitions shall be filed within 60 days after the mailing of notice of the deficiency, is statutory and jurisdictional and is not merely procedural. Revenue Act of 1926, Sec. 274(a). The Board, therefore, was without jurisdiction to hear the petition.

See also Chambers v. Lucas, 41 F.2d 299, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1930).

3. The Revenue Act of 1934

By 1934, the BTA was 10 years old, and at that time (as thereafter) the jurisprudence was unanimous that the deficiency case deadline is jurisdictional. Section 274 was renumbered section 272 in the Revenue Act of 1934, § 272, 48 Stat. 680, 741, wherein Congress extended the filing deadline in subsection (a) from 60 days to “[w]ithin 90 days after such notice is mailed (not counting Sunday or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the ninetieth day)”. Congress therefore sought to give taxpayers more time within which to file a deficiency petition, and it provided an additional marginal extension of the deadline by exempting Sundays and federal holidays from being the final day. But despite the enhanced protections granted to taxpayers in subsection (a), Congress did not amend subsection (c), which still provided that “[i]f the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Board within the time prescribed in subsection (a) of this section, the deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, shall be assessed”.

Thereafter, the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits joined the D.C. Circuit and the BTA in holding the timely filing of a deficiency petition to be a jurisdictional requirement. See Poyner v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir. 1936); Cont'l Petroleum Co. v. United States, 87 F.2d 91, 94 (10th Cir. 1936); Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1937).

4. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939

Congress's enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 272, 53 Stat. 1, 82, was a milestone for the U.S. tax system. The 1939 Code retained the text of section 272 verbatim. And thereafter the Tenth and D.C. Circuits followed their precedents and continued to interpret the deficiency case deadline to be a jurisdictional requirement. See Ryan v. Alexander, 118 F.2d 744, 750 (10th Cir. 1941); Stebbins' Estate v. Helvering, 121 F.2d 892, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1941), aff'g 40 B.T.A. 613 (1939).

5. The Revenue Act of 1942

In the Revenue Act of 1942, §§ 168, 504, 56 Stat. 798, 876, 957, Congress renamed the BTA as the Tax Court of the United States and again modified the deficiency case deadline — but otherwise left section 272 unchanged. The Act added the following to section 272: “If the notice is addressed to a person outside the States of the Union and the District of Columbia, the period specified in this paragraph shall be one hundred and fifty days in lieu of ninety days.” Congress thus granted to a specific class of taxpayers — i.e., those outside of the country — additional time to file a deficiency petition to ensure those taxpayers had adequate time in which to do so. Congress did not amend subsection (c), which continued to provide that a deficiency would be assessed “[i]f the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Board within the time prescribed”.

Thereafter, the Third and Sixth Circuits joined the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits (as well as the BTA) in holding that the timely filing of a petition is a jurisdictional requirement. See Commissioner v. Rosenheim, 132 F.2d at 679–80; Worthington v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 131, 131–32 (6th Cir. 1954) (per curiam).

6. The 1945 International Organizations Immunities Act

In 1945, after more than 20 years of deficiency litigation, Congress amended section 272(a)(1) to include Saturday in the days exempt from being “the ninetieth day”. International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945, § 203, 59 Stat. at 673. Once again, Congress marginally extended the taxpayers' deadline but otherwise left subsections (a) and (c) unchanged.

Thereafter, the Second Circuit joined the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits (as well as the BTA) in holding that the timely filing of a deficiency petition is a jurisdictional requirement. See Mindell v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1952). And the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits followed their precedents in continuing to construe the deficiency case deadline as jurisdictional. See Di Prospero v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 76, 77 (9th Cir. 1949), Cent. Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 902, 903 (6th Cir. 1952), Drouin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1953) (per curiam).

7. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954

The enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 6213, 68A Stat. 3, 771, was another major development in U.S. tax law. Congress renumbered section 272 as section 6213, with revisions not material to our subject (which numbering persists today). Section 6213 provided:

Sec. 6213. Restrictions Applicable to Deficiencies; Petition to Tax Court.

(a) Time for filing petition and restriction on assessment. — Within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the States of the Union and the District of Columbia, after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. . . .

. . . .

(c) Failure to file petition. — If the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court within the time prescribed in subsection (a), the deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Secretary or his delegate.

That is, Congress substantially retained the statutory text — “Within 90 days . . . after the notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed . . ., the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court” — that for three decades had been construed as jurisdictional. Thereafter the Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits followed and affirmed their precedents interpreting the deadline for filing a deficiency petition to be a requirement to confer jurisdiction on the Tax Court. See Underwriters, Inc. v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 953, 954 (3d Cir. 1954) (per curiam); Galvin v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 166, 166 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); Rich v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1957) (Johnsen, J., concurring in part); Teel v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 749, 751 (10th Cir. 1957), aff'g 27 T.C. 375 (1956); DeWelles v. United States, 378 F.2d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1967).

8. The Tax Reform Act of 1969

When Congress established the Tax Court as an Article I court in 1969, it did not amend section 6213. Thereafter, the Tax Court promulgated Rule 13 of its Rules of Practice and Procedure — “Jurisdiction” — providing that “[i]n all cases, the jurisdiction of the Court also depends on the timely filing of a petition. See Code Sections 6213, 7502.” Rule 13(b), 60 T.C. 1057, 1072. This rule followed the uniform body of precedent since 1924.

Thereafter, the Eighth and Eleventh²⁷ Circuits joined the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, as well as the BTA and the Tax Court, in holding the timely filing of a deficiency petition to be a jurisdictional requirement. See Andrews v. Commissioner, 563 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1977); Pugsley v. Commissioner, 749 F.2d 691, 692 (11th Cir. 1985). And the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits followed their precedents to the same effect. See DiViaio v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 231, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Shipley v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 212, 213 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1976-383; Johnson v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'g T.C. Memo. 1977-382; Tadros v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1985).

9. The Tax Reform Act of 1986

When Congress passed significant amendments to the Code resulting in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, it reenacted section 6213 as it had appeared in the 1954 Code, without amendment. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits continued to hold that the timely filing of a deficiency case is a jurisdictional requirement. See Mulder v. Commissioner, 855 F.2d 208, 210–11 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'g T.C. Memo. 1987-363; Hoffenberg v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 665, 666 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1989-676; Patmon & Young Prof. Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 F.3d 216, 217 (6th Cir. 1995), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1993-143; Correia v. Commissioner, 58 F.3d 468, 469 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

10. The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998

The most recent amendment to section 6213(a) was in 1998, when Congress directed that “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary's delegate shall include on each notice of deficiency under section 6212 . . . the date determined by such Secretary (or delegate) as the last day on which the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court”, and amended section 6213(a) “by adding at the end the following new sentence: 'Any petition filed with the Tax Court on or before the last date specified for filing such petition by the Secretary in the notice of deficiency shall be treated as timely filed.'” Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, § 3463, 112 Stat. at 767. This amendment of section 6213(a) is particularly telling of Congress's intention that the Tax Court not have jurisdiction over late-filed deficiency petitions. Congress left unchanged the text that had been construed as jurisdictional, ensured by its amendment that the taxpayer would be made aware of the date of expiration of the deadline for filing a deficiency case, and clarified that a petition filed on that stated date would be timely.

The legislative history²⁸ of this amendment gives useful information about Congress's awareness and understanding of the state of the law on the issue of the 90-day rule as jurisdictional. The conference report gave the following explanation:

Present Law

Taxpayers must file a petition with the Tax Court within 90 days after the deficiency notice is mailed (150 days if the person is outside the United States) (sec. 6213). If the petition is not filed within that time period, the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the petition.

H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 289 (emphasis added); H.R. Rep. No. 105-364, pt. 1, at 71 (emphasis added). By this amendment to section 6213(a), Congress communicated to taxpayers that the last day to file a deficiency petition is indeed the last day, thereby indicating — against the backdrop of explicitly observed “Present Law” — that the deadline is imbued with jurisdictional significance and is exempt from equitable exceptions.

Since then, the Seventh Circuit (applying the Supreme Court's clear-statement rule) has joined the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, as well as the BTA and the Tax Court, in holding the timely filing of a deficiency petition to be a jurisdictional requirement. See Tilden v. Commissioner, 846 F.3d 882, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2017), rev'g and remanding T.C. Memo. 2015-188. And the Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits continued to so hold. See Rochelle v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), aff'g 116 T.C. 356 (2001); Edwards v. Commissioner, 791 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Elings v. Commissioner, 324 F.3d at 1112; see also Organic Cannabis Found., LLC v. Commissioner, 962 F.3d 1082, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying the clear statement rule to section 6213(a) and concluding that its deadline is jurisdictional).

11. Summary

This history of reenactments of and amendments to section 6213(a) demonstrates that Congress's intention is to provide an adequate but strict timeframe within which a taxpayer may file a deficiency petition in the Tax Court. Congress has given taxpayers certain liberalizing adjustments to the last day of the deadline but has also made clear the deadline's finality. Furthermore, section 6213(c), providing that “[i]f the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court within the time prescribed in subsection (a), the deficiency . . . shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and demand”, has remained constant.²⁹ This historical treatment of section 6213 reflects an intention of Congress, remarkably persistent over the past century, that, in balancing the rights of the taxpayer and the interests of the Government, the deficiency assessment regime give the taxpayer an adequate time within which to file a deficiency petition, but that (1) a taxpayer's failure to do so within the prescribed time will foreclose the opportunity to litigate his deficiency before the Tax Court, (2) the deficiency not timely petitioned will be assessed so that the IRS may begin collection, and (3) the taxpayer's remaining remedy is to pay the assessment and sue for a refund.³⁰

Consistent with that regime, the Tax Court and the circuit courts of appeals³¹ have expressly and uniformly treated the deadline of section 6213 as jurisdictional. Congress — presumptively aware of this treatment by the courts — has preserved the operative text in section 6213 through every reenactment and amendment, thereby carrying forward that interpretation. The 90-day deadline of section 6213(a) is therefore, as in Bowles, a limitation imposed by Congress for access to courts which has been uniformly construed and enforced as such for a “century's worth of precedent and practice in American courts.” Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209 n.2; see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (“[S]tare decisis in respect to statutory  interpretation has 'special force,' for 'Congress remains free to alter what we have done.' Additionally, Congress has long acquiesced in the interpretation we have given” (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)) (citations omitted)); cf. Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1500 (“[N]o such long line of authority exists here” (quoting Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019))).

III. Hallmark's remaining arguments that the deadline of section 6213 is non-jurisdictional are unavailing.

A. Section 6214(a) does not confer deficiency jurisdiction but rather supplements the jurisdiction conferred by section 6213(a).

Hallmark argues that “[t]he jurisdictional grant for deficiency suits is in section 6214(a).” If correct, this would locate the grant of jurisdiction in a statute different from the statute that sets the 90-day deadline, making it easier to argue that the deadline itself is not jurisdictional. Section 6214 provides (in part):

Sec. 6214.Determinations by Tax Court.

(a) Jurisdiction as to increase of deficiency, additional amounts, or additions to the tax. — Except as provided by section 7463, the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction to redetermine the correct amount of the deficiency even if the amount so redetermined is greater than the amount of the deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, and to determine whether any additional amount, or any addition to the tax should be assessed, if claim therefor is asserted by the Secretary at or before the hearing or a rehearing.

(b) Jurisdiction over other years and quarters. — The Tax Court in redetermining a deficiency of income tax for any taxable year or of gift tax for any calendar year or calendar quarter shall consider such facts with relation to the taxes for other years or calendar quarters as may be necessary correctly to redetermine the amount of such deficiency, but in so doing shall have no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the tax for any other year or calendar quarter has been overpaid or underpaid. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the Tax Court may apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment to the same extent that it is available in civil tax cases before the district courts of the United States and the United States Court of Federal Claims.

(Emphasis added.) According to Hallmark, “[s]ection 6214(a) derives from language originally appearing in section[ ] 274(a) [sic] (for income tax) . . . of the Revenue Act of 1926”, and “[i]t was in 1926 that Congress first used the word 'jurisdiction' in connection with the Board of Tax Appeals.” Hallmark argues that section 6214(a), rather than section 6213(a), is the jurisdictional grant to the Tax Court over deficiency cases because it explicitly mentions jurisdiction, whereas “[s]ection 6213(a)'s first sentence (which contains the filing deadline) does not even use the word 'jurisdiction'.” Hallmark reasons that, because section 6214(a) is the jurisdictional grant for deficiency cases, and because it does not “refer to the 90-day deadline or to section 6213(a)”, then the deadline of section 6213(a) is not jurisdictional because “[t]he remaining sentences in section 6213(a) do nothing to 'connect' this 90-day filing period to the jurisdictional grant contained in section 6214.”

We do not agree. Hallmark's interpretation is both historically and contextually inaccurate. Hallmark is correct in observing that the origins of section 6214(a) trace back to section 274 of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. at 56, though the predecessor is subsection (e) (rather than subsection (a)), which provided:

(e) The Board shall have jurisdiction to redetermine the correct amount of the deficiency even if the amount so redetermined is greater than the amount of the deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, and to determine whether any penalty, additional amount or addition to the tax should be assessed, if claim therefor is asserted by the Commissioner at or before the hearing or a rehearing.

To resolve the relationship of section 6213(a) (former section 274(a)) to section 6214(a) (former section 274(e)), we previously considered the history of these statutes in Estate of Young v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 879, 884–86 (1983), and we concluded as follows:

The origin of this Court lies in the Revenue Act of 1924, which established the Board of Tax Appeals. That act gave the Board jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies determined by the Commissioner in a statutory notice. However, it did not give the Board jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency greater than that determined by the Commissioner in the statutory notice. Such jurisdiction was given to the Board by section 274(e) of the Revenue Act of 1926 [now section 6214(a)] . . . . We think it is clear that section 274(e) [now section 6214(a)] was intended to cure a previous defect in this Court's jurisdiction so that the Commissioner's ultimate determination of a deficiency in such tax and additions to tax as were the proper subjects of a statutory notice could be resolved in one proceeding before this Court without the need for the issuance of an additional notice . . . .

In view of the foregoing, we think that the jurisdiction conferred by section 6214(a) is merely complementary to the jurisdiction conferred by section 6213 . . . .

Our conclusion that section 6214(a) does not provide an independent basis for the exercise of jurisdiction . . . is also supported by the fact that section 274(e) of the Revenue Act of 1926 was enacted two years after the Board of Tax Appeals was created. As previously stated, section 900(e) of the Revenue Act of 1924 gave the Board jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency determined by the Commissioner in a statutory notice . . . . Thus, if section 274(e) of the Revenue Act of 1926 were viewed as providing an independent basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, it would be mere surplusage because such jurisdiction had already been granted by section [274(a)] of the Revenue Act of 1924.

(Citations and footnote omitted.) Former section 274(e) (now section 6214(a)) was enacted to supplement the jurisdictional grant in former section 274(a) (now section 6213(a)) by specifying that the Tax Court, in exercise of its de novo redetermination of a deficiency for a particular year, may redetermine an amount greater than what is asserted in the notice of deficiency. The fundamental grant of deficiency jurisdiction is in section 6213(a).

The courts that have considered our deficiency jurisdiction have been correct in holding that it is derived from section 6213(a), not section 6214.

B. Section 6213(a) does not “closely resemble” section 6330(d)(1).

1. In Boechler the Supreme Court rejected the analogy of section 6330(d)(1) to section 6213(a).

Hallmark argues that “the [Supreme] Court's reasoning in Boechler compels the conclusion that the 90-day filing deadline in section 6213(a) for deficiency cases is not jurisdictional, and thus is subject to equitable tolling” because “the Boechler opinion's analysis of Section 6330(d)(1), a provision that closely resembles section 6213(a), undermines the Organic Cannabis interpretation of section 6213(a).” However, just as the Commissioner failed in his argument for a jurisdictional reading of section 6330(d)(1) by way of its supposed similarities to section 6213(a) in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1500, so Hallmark cannot here succeed in arguing for a non-jurisdictional reading of section 6213(a) based on its supposed similarities to section 6330(d)(1). Boechler emphatically teaches that these are different sections. Each must be analyzed in light of its own text, context, and history. Under the “clear statement” rule, the Supreme Court in Boechler analyzed the 30-day deadline for a CDP petition under section 6330(d)(1) and held it non-jurisdictional. Under the same rule, we have analyzed in this Opinion the 90-day deadline for a deficiency petition under section 6213(a), and we hold it to be jurisdictional.

2. The 30-day deadline of section 6330(d)(1) lacks a history of prior judicial construction of its being jurisdictional and lacks congressional ratification of that construction in reenactments.

We set out in detail (in Part II.E above and in the attached Appendix) the impressive history — almost a century long — of judicial construction of the 90-day deadline as jurisdictional and of Congress's repeated perpetuation of that construction by its amendments, reenactments, and codifications. No such history can be mustered for the asserted jurisdictional character of the 30-day deadline in section 6330(d)(1) (a provision which has existed in the Code only since 1998, see Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, § 3401(b), 112 Stat. at 749). As the Supreme Court said, “no such 'long line' of authority exists here” in connection with section 6330(d)(1). Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1500.

IV. Conclusion

Section 6213(a) clearly states that its 90-day deadline is jurisdictional, as indicated by its text, context, and uniform treatment during its long history. Congress has limited the Tax Court's deficiency jurisdiction to only those cases in which a petition is timely filed, and we do not have authority to extend the deadline in section 6213(a) by equitable tolling. Late-filed deficiency petitions must therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

An appropriate order will be issued.

KERRIGAN, FOLEY, GALE, PARIS, MORRISON, BUCH, NEGA, PUGH, ASHFORD, URDA, COPELAND, JONES, TORO, GREAVES, MARSHALL, and WEILER, JJ., agree with this opinion of the Court.

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APPENDIX

Chronological listing of enactments, amendments, and codifications of statutes creating deficiency procedures, with intervening opinions of the courts, and selected legislative history and Rules of Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Tax Court (with boldface added for emphasis)

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Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 273(1), 274(a)–(c), 900(e), (k), 43 Stat. 253, 296, 297, 337, 338 (enacting deficiency procedures with a 60-day deadline):

Subsequent Caselaw:

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Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 274, 1000, 44 Stat. 9, 55–56, 105–06 (excluding Sunday as the 60th day and enacting the predecessor of section 6214(a)):

Subsequent Caselaw:

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Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 791, 871–72 (amending the predecessor of section 7459(d) to provide for dismissals for lack of jurisdiction):

Subsequent Caselaw:

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Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 272, 48 Stat. 680, 741 (extending the deadline to 90 days, excluding holidays as the 90th day, and making other changes):

Legislative History:

Subsequent Caselaw:

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Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, §§ 272, 1101, 53 Stat. 1, 82–83, 158 (re-enacting and codifying the deficiency procedures):

Subsequent Caselaw:

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Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 168, 504, 56 Stat. 798, 876, 957 (extending the 90-day period to 150 days for foreign taxpayers and renaming the BTA as the Tax Court of the United States):

Subsequent Caselaw:

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International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945, ch. 652, § 203, 59 Stat. 669, 673 (excluding Saturday as the 90th day):

Subsequent Caselaw:

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Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, §§ 6213, 7442, 68A Stat. 3, 771, 879 (re-enacting and re-codifying the deficiency procedures):

Subsequent Caselaw:

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Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 (establishment of the U.S. Tax Court):

Legislative History:

Subsequent Rule:

RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT, 60 T.C. 1057, 1072 (1973):

Subsequent Caselaw:

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Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 2, 100 Stat. 2085, 2095 (re-enacting and re-codifying the deficiency procedures):

26 U.S.C. §§ 6213, 7442 (1986):

Subsequent Caselaw:

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Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3463, 112 Stat. 685, 767 (adding a sentence to section 6213(a)):

Legislative History:

H.R. Rep. No. 105-364, pt. 1, at 71 (1997), as reprinted in 1998-3 C.B. 373, 443 (identical language).

Subsequent Caselaw: