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Revocation of G.C.M. 32835

FEB. 25, 1965

GCM 32980

DATED FEB. 25, 1965
DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES
  • Institutional Authors
    Internal Revenue Service
  • Code Sections
  • Language
    English
  • Tax Analysts Electronic Citation
    65 GCM 2-25
Citations: GCM 32980

 

CC:I:I-955 Date: February 25, 1965

 

BR5:RW

 

 

Memorandum to:

 

Harold T. Swartz

 

Assistant Commissioner (Technical)

 

 

Attention:

 

Director, Tax Rulings Division

 

 

Reference is made to your memorandum (T:R:C:3-TEE Dec. 1, 1964) referring the files in the above-captioned case, together with the files of * * * to this office for further consideration of the long standing Service position that amounts received as room charges by a hotel represent "rents" within the purview of section 543(a)(7) of the 1954 Code. (Personal Holding Company Provisions).

G.C.M. 32835, April 29, 1964, * * * I-955, disagreed with your proposal to reaffirm the Service's position. Subsequently, representatives of * * *., filed a request for a ruling, accompanied by a supporting brief, that room rental charges by a hotel constitute rent for personal holding company purposes.

At a conference in * * * office on November 10, 1964, the issues raised by the two cases were discussed, and it was ultimately agreed that the instant case, along with * * * would be submitted to this Office for further consideration.

G.C.M. 32835, supra, pointed out that a hotel involves the active conduct of a risky and competitive commercial enterprise. General management, procurement, and personnel problems are involved in what is essentially a business providing a variety of services. Although noting that the statute broadly defines rent to mean "compensation, however designated, for the use of, or right to use, property . . . (543(a)(7))", it was concluded that room charges do not constitute rent. This conclusion was based on three points:

 

1. A hotel involves a risky, competitive business and is not the "incorporated pocketbook" Congress had in mind in drafting the remedial legislation in 1934 and 1937.

2. A hotel is essentially in the business of serving guests and not renting space. Room charges are therefore not "compensation . . . for the use of or the right to use property . . ." within the statutory definition.

3. The term rent as used in the statute, even though broadly defined, has some residual legal meaning that is distorted by applying it in the instant context.

 

Many of the cases creating difficulty in applying the rental definition vary in the underlying activity producing the questioned receipt. The only case interpreting the rental definition is Webster Corporation, 25 T.C. 55 (1955), aff'd. per curiam 240 F. 2d 164 (2d Cir. 1957), Acq. 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 7, concerning a corporation engaged in crop sharing farming operations. The Court found all three of the above factors relevant in deciding that the receipts were not rent within the meaning of section 543(a)(7).

The position of your office and of the representatives of * * * rely on the Congressional indication that the remedial definition of rent was to be broadly construed:

 

"Rent" as here used is defined in its broadest sense and includes such items as charter fees, etc., and is not limited to rent of real property. H. Rept. No. 1546, 75th Congs. 1st Sess., 1939-1 Cum. Bull. 704, 708.

 

You further point out that Congress clearly indicated a desire to exclude from personal holding company income classification rental receipts realized by a corporation whose principal business was the leasing and management of apartment buildings and office buildings. Congress protected these bonafide "operating companies" by including rents in personal holding company income only when they constitute less than 50 per cent of the gross income of a corporation. (543(b)(7)). From these facts it is argued:

 

* * * Congress required the inclusion of all gross income from "rents", used in its broadest sense. Only by defining "rents" as Congress intended, does the statutory 50 percent test become arbitrarily determinative as to whether or not a corporation is or is not an operating company. In other words, a rental corporation falls within, or without, the personal holding company classification solely on the basis of the percentage that its gross income from "rents" constitutes of its total gross income. Brief submitted for * * * p. 4.

 

It is observed, however, that the Congressional mandate for a broad interpretation is not accompanied by any definitive examples that give content to the rental definition. The definition must be given content by applying it in the light of the remedial purpose of the statute. The ultimate question must be whether or not the operation of hotels involves the type of abuse that the remedial scope of the legislation was designed to encompass. 1 It is doubtful that the operation of a hotel is within what Congress envisioned in legislating against "incorporated pocketbooks". Nor is it valid to contend that "a rental corporation falls within, or without, the personal holding company classification solely on the basis of the percentage that its gross income from 'rents' constitutes of its total gross income", because one must still define "rents" and a "rental corporation" in the context of the remedial purpose of the statute. Congress did not provide a mathematical definition of rent, but merely provided that when receipts that are within the concept of "rents" are present in sufficient magnitude, the statute does not encompass them.

It must also be observed that an unduly broad interpretation of "rents" can under certain circumstances frustrate the remedial intent of the statute, an intent that Congress has recently reaffirmed by adding more restrictive percentage requirements in the 1964 Revenue Act. Thus an organization may derive 45% of its adjusted gross income from a bare lease of a building or of vacant lots; since no services at all would be involved, this would be a classic example of the personal holding company income envisioned by Congress. Another 50% of the organization's income may be derived from dividends. The organization, deriving 95% of its income from classic personal holding company sources, would seem to be a personal holding company, especially since the 1964 Revenue Act lowered the percentage requirements from 80 to 60 percent. However, by deriving the final 5% of its income from the operation of a hotel, it could escape coverage. 2 The example is cited to show that any decision cuts both ways, and that effective implementation of the remedial purpose of the statute requires that the definition of rent be considered in the light of this remedial purpose and all of the specific features of hotel operations rather than by merely referring to general language in the committee reports and mathematical percentages in the statute.

Despite the views expressed in G.C.M. 32835, supra, and the reservations expressed in the earlier portions of this memorandum, this Office concurs in your proposal to reaffirm the long standing Service position. Room rentals by hotels have been held by the Service to constitute rent within the personal holding company provisions since 1938. See G.C.M.20535, July 28, 1938, * * * A-318075. The rental features of the personal holding company sections are definite and easy to plan around, and it possible that extensive planning has been predicated on the basis of the Service's present position. Since this is an area where certainty and continuity are more desirable than meticulous legality, since the legal question involved is not subject to a definitive answer, and since the present Service position can be supported by a respectable, if not wholly persuasive, legal argument, the administrative reasons for maintaining the status quo are persuasive.

For the foregoing reasons, G.C.M. 32835 in the instant case is hereby revoked.

The administrative files are returned herewith.

Mitchell Rogovin

 

Chief Counsel

 

Internal Revenue Service

 

 

Enclosure:

 

Adm. file

 

FOOTNOTES

 

 

1 In Commissioner v. Webster Corporation, 240 F. 2d 164 (2nd Cir. 1956), the Court, observed:

 

The problem presented arises out of many factors some of which pointed toward a landlord-and-tenant relationship and others of which pointed in other directions. We think the solution reached, better than any other, accords with the language of the statute interpreted in the light of its history and objective. Id. at 165.

 

2 It is realized that the corporation could merely add 5% more income that is clearly from rent, which would seem to be even more of a frustration of the statute. However, it is a frustration Congress tolerated in the interests of administrative simplicity and does not relieve the Service of the difficulty of deciding what actually constitutes rent. If the Service doesn't face it with hotels, they must face it with rent-a-cars, or with cars rented with chauffeurs, or in some analogous case.

 

CC:LR-680 Br1:JCW January 9, 1967

 

 

Director, Income Tax Division

 

 

Chief Counsel

 

 

Definition of "Rents" for purposes of the personal holding company provisions -- * * * CC:I:I-955) G.C.M. 32980

This is in response to your memorandum (T:I:C:2:3) dated October 11, 1966, requesting the litigating position of the Chief Counsel's Office with regard to the issue discussed in G.C.M. 32980, dated February 25, 1965, in re: * * *.

The views of Mr. Rudy P. Hertzog, Associate Chief Counsel (Litigation), were sought with respect to your inquiry and a copy of his memorandum (dated December 6, 1966) addressed to Mr. Richard M. Hahn, Director, Interpretative Division is attached hereto. In addition, a copy of a memorandum dated January 4, 1967, from Director, Tax Court Division, to Director, Legislation and Regulations Division, with respect to the same subject is attached.

The Income Tax Division administrative file transmitted to this Office as an attachment to the memorandum (October 11, 1966) referred to above is returned herewith.

Attachments

 

  Administrative file

 

  Memo from Mr. Hertzog

 

 

CC:I:I-955

 

Br3:IJD

 

 

TO : Mr. James F. Dring

 

       Director, Legislation and Regulations Division

 

 

FROM : Mr. Richard M. Hahn

 

       Director, Interpretative Division

 

 

By a memorandum (T:I:I:2:3) dated October 11, 1966, Income Tax Division solicited the litigating position of the Chief Counsel's office with respect to the issues discussed in G.C.M. 32980, In re: * * * dated February 25, 1965. In * * * we reaffirmed, for the reasons indicated herein, the Service's long standing position that room rentals received by a hotel are "rent" within the purview of section 543.

At a conference held on October 3, 1966, representatives of Income Tax Division, our office, and the Office of Tax Legislative Counsel discussed the possibility of adopting a uniform interpretation of the term "rents" for Federal income tax purposes. At the conclusion of this conference, the conferees from the Office of the Tax Legislative Counsel requested a memorandum from the Service stating its position with respect to "rents" under sections 543, 172, 512, and 1402. Income Tax Division informed us that before this memorandum could be prepared, it would be necessary to ascertain the litigating position of the Chief Counsel's office concerning the issue discussed in G.C.M. 32980.

In light of the nature of this request, we believed it desirable to obtain the views of Mr. Rudy F. Hertzog, Associate Chief Counsel, as to whether G.C.M. 32980 is correct and whether it could be sustained in litigation. In this regard, we forwarded a copy of G.C.M. 32980 for his consideration.

DOCUMENT ATTRIBUTES
  • Institutional Authors
    Internal Revenue Service
  • Code Sections
  • Language
    English
  • Tax Analysts Electronic Citation
    65 GCM 2-25
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